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Abstract 
 
This thesis seeks to evaluate the progress of regional community building in Southeast 
Asia, which has been undertaken by the Association of Southeast Asians (ASEAN). The 
thesis analyses the extent to which there has been a shift from policies and processes 
associated with “old regionalism” (state-security-economic centred regionalism) towards 
those which are associated with “new regionalism” and a regional community (the widening 
of regionalism to non-state actors, and expansion of regional cooperation into new areas, and 
regional solidarity). The first half of the thesis demonstrates the persistence of “old 
regionalism,” based on a tendency to differentiate others as an external security threat in 
Thailand’s bilateral relations. This tendency is driven by a deeply embedded historical legacy 
of differentiation, which is pursued by state actors for domestic political interests, as well as 
on-going bilateral disputes, and a militarised border. The second half of the thesis tests the 
significance of “new regionalism,” based on three case studies on civil society participation 
in regional community building. These case studies demonstrate how “new regionalism” is 
significant in form, rather than in substance, and how progress in community building is 
mainly driven by the more democratic ASEAN member states. Visible progress in 
community building includes the emergence of ASEAN-CSO meetings, an ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), and a transnational civil society 
network (TCSN), which is increasing society’s regional awareness and society’s participation 
in regionalism. However, substantive progress is lacking, due to the region’s political 
diversity and the prioritization of regional unity over the realization of a people-oriented 
ASEAN Community. Thus, ASEAN community building is empty in substance, due to the 
continuation of politically motivated differentiation and border insecurity, symbolic meetings 
between states and CSOs, a powerless regional human rights body, and the remaining gap 
between regional declarations and policy implementation.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 This thesis seeks to evaluate the progress of regional community building in Southeast 
Asia, which has been undertaken by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
ASEAN was founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand. It emerged during the Cold War, at a time when all of these countries were driven 
by geopolitical and security concerns to engage in informal, limited regional cooperation. 
However, the initial, limited regional cooperation in economic development soon expanded 
to include regional dialogue and the promotion of regional cooperation in areas such as social 
welfare, culture and information, as well as the environment.1 This expansion reflects a 
growing regional awareness and regional consciousness among state actors, as well as a 
developing habit of regional dialogue and cooperation. Moreover, expanded regional 
cooperation under the ASEAN framework also reflects efforts to maintain ASEAN’s 
relevance and survival. This was especially the case towards the end of the Cold War, and in 
the post-Cold War period, when 1) ASEAN’s membership had expanded to include all 
Southeast Asian nations, including Brunei Darussalam, and former adversaries from 
communist Indochina; and 2) there was a proliferation of new security threats, such as the 
rise of China and transnational disease. Both these developments stimulated the need to 
consolidate ASEAN. In the past decade, two of the most recent efforts to consolidate ASEAN 
include the Declaration to establish an ASEAN Community, or the Declaration on ASEAN 
Concord II (Bali Concord II) in 2003, and the Kuala Lumpur Declaration to draft an ASEAN 
Charter in 2005. The dramatic difference between these Declarations and the initial aims 
behind ASEAN’s establishment, together with the extent to which these Declarations have 
                                                          
1
 ASEAN Secretariat, “Meeting of ASEAN Ministers Responsible for Social Welfare,” Jakarta, 18-19 July 
1977; ASEAN Secretariat, “Agreement for the Promotion of Cooperation in Mass Media and Cultural 
Activities,” Cameron Highlands, 17 December 1969; ASEAN Secretariat, “Manila Declaration on the ASEAN 
Environment,” Manila, 30 April 1981. 
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and can be implemented, and the obstacles in doing so, constitute the overarching puzzle that 
motivates this thesis. 
The ASEAN Community, as envisioned by the related ASEAN Declarations, Plans of 
Action and Community Blueprints, is a long way from ASEAN member states’ security and 
economic based incentives to establish , what was initially “a loose regional association.”2 In 
the ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration), the founding document of ASEAN, ASEAN 
member states declared their aim to maintain regional stability and to ensure peaceful 
national development free from external interference.3 Almost forty years later, in the 
Declaration on ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) in 2003, they declared that an ASEAN 
Community shall be established, and that it shall consist of three pillars: an ASEAN Security 
Community (ASC), later renamed the ASEAN Political Security Community, an ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) and an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). However, 
this envisaged ASEAN Community differed from the ASEAN in reality in many ways. For 
example, the ASEAN Security Community was envisaged to include a “democratic and 
harmonious environment” and to increase ASEAN’s security through conflict prevention and 
conflict resolution.4 In reality, the ASEAN region is still confronted with challenges to 
democratization (e.g. mob protests in Thailand in May 2010), as well as intra-regional 
conflicts, such as the Thai-Cambodian conflict over Preah Vihear Temple. Other differences 
between the envisaged ASEAN Community and the actual ASEAN are evident in plans for 
the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, which is meant to “seek the active involvement of 
all sectors of society” in development and to foster a regional identity.5 Moreover, the 
                                                          
2
 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “ASEAN’s Enlargement: Political, Security and Institutional Perspectives,” in ASEAN 
Enlargement: Impacts and Implications, edited by Mya Than and Carolyn Gates (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), 39. 
3
 ASEAN Secretariat, “The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration), Bangkok, 8 August 1967, 
http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm [accessed on 20/01/11]. 
4
 ASEAN Secretariat, “Declaration of ASEAN Concord II” (Bali Concord II), Bali, 7 October 2003, 
http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm [accessed on 20/01/11]. 
5
 Ibid. 
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ASEAN Charter also includes the aim “to promote a people-oriented ASEAN in which all 
sectors of society are encouraged to participate in, and benefit from, the process of ASEAN 
integration and community building.”6 In practice, ASEAN’s efforts to involve all sectors of 
society in its development policies are debatable, and many people in ASEAN are still 
unaware of what ASEAN is or does. ASEAN member states seem to interpret involvement of 
society as the inclusion of social groups (e.g. students) in ASEAN themed activities, such as 
seminars and conferences, while non-state actors, such as civil society organizations (CSOs), 
interpret involvement as participation in agenda setting and policy making. As for ASEAN 
awareness, CSOs point out that there is a lack of access to information on ASEAN within the 
region.7 Given the contrast between ASEAN’s inception and its current process of 
community building, as well as the contrast between the envisaged ASEAN Community and 
the actual ASEAN, two research questions can be generated. First, what accounts for this leap 
from a regional association, with limited regional cooperation, to aspirations for a 
comprehensive regional community? Second, and more importantly, is this leap substantive, 
or more symbolic? In other words, how much credence should one give to claims that 
Southeast Asia is actually realizing a regional community? The existing literature tends to 
cover the first research question, while the second research question has received less 
systematic attention. For this reason, this thesis will focus more on the latter, although its 
findings will ultimately shed light on both. 
By tracing ASEAN’s progress towards a stage of regional community building, one 
finds that the same set of driving forces does not operate throughout a region’s evolution, and 
that new developments may be required for community building to be successful. When 
                                                          
6
 ASEAN Secretariat, “Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,” 
http://www.aseansec.org/21069.pdf [accessed on 22/07/11]. 
7
 “Gan prachum radom samong krang this am ruang prachasangkhom lae wathanatham ASEAN,” [Third Brain-
Storming Session on the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community], Prachasangkhom lae wathanatham ASEAN 
[ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community], edited by Prapat Thepchatree (Thammasat University, Thailand: 2008). 
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ASEAN was established in 1967, the five founding member states were all preoccupied with 
the immediate task of nation-building within the constraints of the Cold War context, that is, 
the conflict between the two superpowers and their use of Southeast Asia as a proxy 
battleground, as well as the threat from communist insurgency. As such, they sought to 
consolidate regime security and to reduce the appeal of communism through economic 
development, and, thus, also reduce the possibility for external superpower intervention. At 
the same time, the formation of ASEAN was also intended to promote regional 
reconciliation, given the background of intra-regional conflicts, especially Indonesia’s 
confrontation against Malaysia.   
ASEAN’s evolution, especially in the post-Cold War period, has since then 
demonstrated how driving forces of regionalism vary with changes in the international 
system. The collapse of the bipolar system, most clearly marked by the collapse of 
communism in Eastern Europe, and the resurgence of regions as autonomous regional 
entities, as opposed to parts of this or that superpower bloc or superpower battleground 
produced new regional norms. More specifically, the shift towards democratic forms of 
government promoted new regional norms on democratization and human rights, while the 
resurgence of regions motivated regional consolidation through expansion and the cultivation 
of a regional identity. Security concerns over the post-Cold War international system drove 
regional cooperation and regional expansion. However, similar to the Cold War period, 
security concerns can also divide the region in terms of conflicting interests, which lead to 
differentiation, or negative identification of the other, especially as an external security threat. 
Differentiation within a region is most clearly demonstrated by bilateral relations. It restricts 
the emergence of a collective identity, and, in doing so, also restricts community-building.  
Regional community building in Southeast Asia demonstrates the similarities and 
differences between the driving forces which stimulated the formation of ASEAN during the 
10 
 
Cold War, and those which stimulated ASEAN’s expansion and consolidation in the post-
Cold War period. Security concerns drove both the formation of ASEAN and ASEAN’s 
expansion to include all Southeast Asian nations as part of a regional community. ASEAN’s 
expansion was intended as an historic act of regional reconciliation, and was underpinned by 
security concerns and strategic incentives at both the national and regional level. At the 
national level, for example, Thailand saw ASEAN’s expansion as an opportunity to project 
its own centrality within the association, thereby consolidating its interests. Vietnam saw 
ASEAN expansion as a means to overcome vulnerability vis-à-vis China.8 At the regional 
level, ASEAN’s expansion to include Myanmar was partly a pre-emptive act against China’s 
exploitation of Myanmar’s international isolation for its own strategic ends.9 Moreover, 
ASEAN’s expansion was also expected to reinforce ASEAN’s diplomatic centrality in the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which grew out of ASEAN’s Post Ministerial Conferences 
with dialogue partners, and was formed in 1993.10 ASEAN member states were motivated to 
establish the ARF as a wider regional grouping for multilateral security dialogue for two 
reasons. First, they lacked the capacity to effectively tackle regional security problems by 
themselves. Second, they sought to remain at the centre of discussions on security in the 
Asia-Pacific region.11 In this regard, security concerns explain ASEAN’s expansion and 
ASEAN’s role and interests in multilateral institutions; however, they do not explain why 
ASEAN member states chose to embark on a process of community building, which came to 
include such novel processes as ASEAN meetings with civil society.  
 
                                                          
8
 Robyn Lim, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: Building on Sand,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 20, No. 2 
(Aug,m 1998): 124; Tobias Nischalke, “Does ASEAN Measure Up?” The Pacific Review 15, No. 1 (2002): 105. 
9
 Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN’s Model of Regional Security, Adelphi Paper 
No. 302 (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 47. 
10
 ASEAN has ten Dialogue Partners: Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, New 
Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the United States.  
11
 Lim, “The ASEAN Regional Forum,” 117. 
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ASEAN policy-makers, and academia who have been co-opted by them, tend to 
generate mainstream success stories of ASEAN, rather than an analysis of structural 
weaknesses in the building blocks for an ASEAN Community, namely, differentiation and 
the continuation of bilateral conflicts, as well as the lack of people’s participation, or 
participatory regionalism. While there are analyses on bilateral conflicts within ASEAN, for 
example by Michael Leifer and Andrew Tan, these analyses tend to focus on the unequal 
distribution of power (smaller states’ insecurity vis-à-vis larger and more powerful states), 
territorial disputes, and border disputes on such issues as fishery and drug trafficking.12Rather 
than focusing on the physical security threats posed by bilateral conflicts, I am more 
interested in how they maintain negative stereotypes of neighboring countries, and how this 
restricts ASEAN’s aim to promote regional solidarity as part of the ASEAN Community. 
ASEAN community building is confronted with many obstacles, ranging from political 
diversity, to economic development gaps, to cultural differences. Yet, the literature on 
ASEAN is characterized by a general trend of success stories, which two scholars, David 
Jones and Michael Smith, attribute to the close relationship between ASEAN scholars and the 
state, or what they call “the bureaucratization of academia.”13 Jones and Smith find that 
political elites have directed analytical attention away from ongoing interstate tensions, and 
the lack of participatory regionalism, toward a projection of superficially successful, 
distinctive regional practices.14 They argue that “the role of the scholar-bureaucrats was not to 
                                                          
12
 Michael Leifer, Dilemmas of Statehood in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Asia-Pacific Press, 1972); Andrew T.H. 
Tan, Southeast Asia: Threats in the Security Environment (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2006); Hans H. 
Indorf, “Impediments to Regionalism in Southeast Asia: Bilateral Constraints Among ASEAN Member States,” 
ASEAN Political Studies (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984); Corazon M. Siddayao, The 
Offshore Petroleum Resources in Southeast Asia: Potential Conflict Situations and Related Economic 
Considerations, 2
nd
 impression (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1980); Lee Yong Leng, The Razer’s Edge: 
Boundaries and Boundary Disputes in Southeast Asia (Singapore: ISEAS, 1980); Francis T. Christy, Jr., ed., 
Law of the Sea: Problems of Conflict and Management of Fisheries in Southeast Asia (Singapore: International 
Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management and ISEAS, 1980).  
13
 David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, “Is there a Sovietology of South-East Asian Studies?” 
International Affairs 77, No. 4 (Oct., 2001): 856; David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, “ASEAN 
Imitation Community,” Orbis 46, No. 1 (Winter 2002): 100. 
14
 Jones and Smith, “ASEAN Imitation Community,” 97, 100. 
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question, but to give intellectual credibility to distinctive values and practices that sustained 
the developmental ideology.”15 For this reason, ASEAN studies tend to focus on the success 
of regional norms, or the “ASEAN Way,” in maintaining peace in Southeast Asia, instead of 
analyzing obstacles to community building. This thesis seeks to provide an empirical 
contribution to studies on ASEAN community building by analyzing the impact of bilateral 
relations and civil society on the community building progress. However, before doing so, 
one would first have to understand why ASEAN member states came together and how they 
came to embark on the community building process in the first place. 
Just as driving forces vary throughout a region’s evolution, so too does the strength of 
different international relations (IR) theories to explain different turning points. For example, 
realism provides a strong explanation for why ASEAN member states came together to form 
a regional association. In the discussion that follows, I show how the early realist literature 
essentially sought to assess ASEAN’s role in maintaining regional security vis-à-vis intra-
regional conflicts and external intervention. These realist analyses are less able to provide 
explanations for why states would develop and expand regional cooperation into other areas 
once security threats have subsided. In terms of the deepening and widening of regional 
cooperation, the constructivist approach fares better by analyzing the role of regional 
institutions and norms in socializing states so that they may acquire a stronger regional 
mindset and a stronger sense of regional identity. However, the persistence of nationalism 
and intra-regional conflicts suggests that socialization may only proceed so far if regional 
security threats and regional divisions remain. For this reason, there is a need to develop a 
new, combined theoretical approach, which adopts an implicit realist interpretation of 
ASEAN (ASEAN as a means to maintain regional security), while emphasizing the role of 
constructivist, rather than realist, processes, in ASEAN’s survival and development. This 
                                                          
15
 Jones and Smith, ““Is there a Sovietology of South-East Asian Studies?” 857. 
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means taking account of argumentation and negotiations within ASEAN, as well as balancing 
behavior in reaction to external and intra-regional security threats. Moreover, a combined 
theoretical approach also means analyzing regional discourse as well as action. This thesis 
seeks to adopt such a combined theoretical approach by evaluating ASEAN’s progress in 
community building, based on the shift from regional policies and processes associated with 
“old regionalism,” towards those which are associated with “new regionalism.” Section I of 
this chapter defines and explains the shift from “old regionalism” to “new regionalism,” both 
in terms of actual regional trends and academic analyses of these trends. Section II provides 
the background to an ASEAN Community and an outline of previous studies on ASEAN 
community building. Section III justifies the independent variables of bilateral relations and 
civil society to evaluate the dependent variable of ASEAN community building. Finally, 
section IV presents the analytical framework of this thesis, that is, how this thesis evaluates 
ASEAN’s progress in community building based on the shift from old to new regionalism. 
 
I. From Old Regionalism to New Regionalism 
 
 
 
Two concepts which form the basis of regional community building are regionalism 
and regionalization. Regionalism refers to “formalized regions with officially agreed 
membership and boundaries that emerge as a result of intergovernmental dialogues and 
treaties.”16 Regionalisation refers to processes which “fill the region with substance such as 
economic interdependence, institutional ties, political trust, and cultural belonging.”17 In this 
regard, regionalism originally focused on state-led regional projects while regionalization 
focuses on non-state actors, particularly non-state economic actors, market forces and a 
common identity. The terms are not mutually exclusive, for example, states set up and 
                                                          
16
 Shaun Breslin, “Theorising East Asian regionalism(s): new regionalism and Asia’s future(s),” in Advancing 
East Asian Regionalism, edited by Melissa G. Curley and Nicholas Thomas (London: Routledge, 2007), 29.  
17
 Raimo Väyrynen, “Regionalism: Old and New,” International Studies Review 5, No. 1 (2003): 25-51. 
14 
 
regulate the international political economy in which market forces operate. State policies 
also fund the building of infrastructure for international trade and enable regional or global 
economic integration.18 Thus, regionalism and regionalization are interrelated, but it is the 
term regionalism that is more commonly used and regionalism that has been redefined to 
reflect the changing international system and increasing regional actors.  
The inability of Europe-based integration theories to explain adequately the process of 
regional integration outside Europe led to the emergence of a new strand of literature in the 
1990s. This literature is often placed under the broad umbrella of “new regionalism,” to 
distinguish it from previous works under the broad umbrella of “old regionalism,” although 
some authors do not explicitly use this label for their research.19 This approach of 
distinguishing the new from the old sheds light on our two research questions in terms of the 
move towards a regional community, and progress in regional community building. 
Moreover, it also enables us to create a conceptual continuum from regionalization (regional 
substance), to regional cooperation (ranging from the functional-economic realm, to the 
political and social realm), to regionalism (regional consolidation through discourse and 
policies), and, ultimately, a regional community, where there is a “we-feeling” of solidarity 
and where society becomes involved in regionalism. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18
 Breslin, “Theorising East Asian regionalism(s),” 31; See also Helen Milner, “International Theories of 
Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses,” World Politics 44, No. 3 (1992): 466-494; Etel 
Solingen, “Economic Liberalization, Political Coalitions, and Emerging Regional Order,” in Regional Orders: 
Building Security in a New World, edited by David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); Etel Solingen, Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn: Global and 
Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). 
19
 Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner, eds., The Political Economy of Regionalism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1997); Finn Laursen, ed., Comparative Regional Integration: Theoretical Perspectives 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003); Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, eds., Regionalism in World Politics: Regional 
Organization and International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).  
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Old Regionalism 
 
 
Old regionalism is based on regional developments in the 1950s and 1960s: it is 
mainly Euro-centric, and tends to focus on the origins of ideas for European integration, and 
theories of European integration.20 With regard to the origins, there  is a focus on the context 
of the end of the Second World War, the ideas emerging from individual countries at 
international meetings in Yalta and Potsdam, as well as the issue of what to do with 
Germany. For example, the Soviet Union wanted to strip Germany of its assets, while in 
France and Germany, there was an emerging preference to improve bilateral relations and to 
initiate a working relationship. The old regionalism literature on Europe also focuses on the 
role of policy entrepreneurs, or individuals, namely, Jean Monnet (a French civil servant), 
who advocated incremental regional integration, Robert Schuman (the French Foreign 
Minister), who gave political clout to Monnet’s proposals, and Altiero Spinelli (an Italian 
federalist leader), who advocated a big constitution-based federal system. Moreover, the 
literature also analyses the structural motivations behind regionalism during the Cold War – 
the threat of communism and the need to pool resources to match the superpowers – as well 
as the early schools of thought on how to avoid war, that is, federalism, functionalism and 
transactionalism.21 Federalism was advocated by Spinelli, and focuses on the creation of a big 
central institution underpinned by a constitution. Functionalism and transactionalism were 
both advocated by political theorists: David Mitrany and Karl Deutsch, respectively.22 The 
former focused on the promotion of economic cooperation to overcome ideological 
                                                          
20
 See Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 3
rd
 ed. (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Richard McAllister, From EC to EU: An Historical and Political Survey (London: 
Routledge, 1997); Derek W. Urwin, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945 
(London: Longman, 1991). 
21
 See Ben Rosamund, Theories of European Integration (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000). 
22
 David Mitrany, A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International 
Organization (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943); Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community 
and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1957). 
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differences; while the latter envisaged a group of states, which no longer use military force to 
resolve conflicts, but instead use dialogue, communications and trade to reinforce 
cooperation and trust among them. These early schools of thought on European regionalism 
were characterized by a tendency toward integration and diminishing national sovereignty. 
As such, they were largely inapplicable to developing regions, which tended more towards 
widened and deepened regional cooperation, and which remain very much protective of their 
national sovereignty. 
Euro-centric regionalism aside, the literature on old regionalism is helpful in 
explaining the emergence of regional organizations, and the foundation of what could 
potentially evolve into a regional community. Old regionalism is based on regional 
developments during the early stages of the Cold War. As such, it focuses on reactions to 
external forces, namely, the policies of the great powers and the international political 
economy. Within international relations theories, old regionalism is most closely associated 
with realism. Realists perceive regionalism as a means for nation-states to realize their 
national interests within an anarchic international system, or one without an overarching 
central authority. Given that the international system is anarchic, each state is forced to 
prioritize its own needs and interests as the basic means for survival. As a result, it becomes 
necessary for states to increase and to demonstrate their power in international relations. This 
tends to take the form of military capability and economic power. 
Realists, such as Michael Leifer, argue that security concerns and the struggle for the 
recognition of newly formed states motivated the formation of ASEAN.23 Four of the original 
ASEAN member states – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore – had just 
gained independence during the period of decolonization after the Second World War. All 
                                                          
23
 Michael Leifer, “The ASEAN States and the Progress of Regional Cooperation in South-East Asia,” in 
Politics, Society and Economy in ASEAN States, edited by Bernhard Dahm and Werner Draguhn (Wiesbaden: 
Otto Harrassowitz, 1975). 
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were apprehensive of the uncertain, tense and volatile Cold War environment, and sought to 
consolidate their hard won and newly found statehood. Indonesia saw ASEAN as a means to 
realize the ideal for a new regional order free from Western interference. Malaysia saw 
ASEAN as a means to gain formal recognition of their newly found state and its national 
borders by Indonesia and the Philippines. For the Philippines, ASEAN was perceived as a 
means to reduce their country’s dependence on the US, and for Singapore, a step towards 
recognition by its larger neighbors.24 The leaders of these countries reasoned that effective 
and sustainable nation-building could only take place within a peaceful and stable regional 
context, and that a regional association could promote regional reconciliation, cooperation 
and development.25 All the founding members of ASEAN (the aforementioned four members 
plus Thailand) shared a common vulnerability to internal security threats, be they 
revolutionary social challenges, separatism or irredentism.26 As such, it was their intention 
that ASEAN would facilitate “collective internal security,” by shielding them from the great 
powers, and enabling them to consolidate the nation-state through economic development.27 
Moreover, regional cooperation was intended to help ASEAN member states overcome past 
interstate tensions and conflicts, as well as become self-sufficient and achieve regional 
autonomy.  
In the early years of ASEAN, interstate tensions and obstacles to regional 
reconciliation included Singapore’s sense of vulnerability vis-à-vis its two bigger neighbors 
of Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as the territorial dispute over Sabah between Malaysia and 
the Philippines. The mitigation of interstate tensions occurred through bilateral efforts, 
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sometimes under the ASEAN framework in ASEAN meetings to promote dialogue and a 
settlement that is acceptable to both sides. Bilateral efforts tend to be triggered by escalating 
tension and the possibility of armed conflict. ASEAN member states have the option of 
convening a multilateral High Council under the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia to peacefully resolve disputes.28 However, this mechanism has never been 
used due to the preference for bilateral negotiations and settlements, or the referral of 
conflicts to international organizations.29 Nevertheless, despite interstate tensions and 
conflicts, ASEAN member states were united by their common perception of external 
security threats during the Cold War. These threats included the superpower conflict in 
Southeast Asia, especially the US defeat in Vietnam, and external interference in the process 
of nation-building, should communism spread from Indochina to the rest of the region. 
Common security concerns led to discussions on the “neutralization” of Southeast Asia in the 
1970s. Such discussions produced two new ASEAN agreements, which reaffirmed ASEAN 
member states’ interests and promoted regional solidarity: the Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality (ZOPFAN) Declaration of 1971, and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) 
of 1976.  
Old regionalism, in the form of the realist approach, explains the initial limited 
ASEAN cooperation in the political realm, since it emphasizes power, security and survival 
as its core variables. Realists interpret regionalism as a strategic response to shifts in the 
international balance of power. This is true for both the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. 
The expansion of ASEAN cooperation through an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992 
is interpreted as a means for ASEAN’s renewal, and survival, after the end of the Cold War 
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and the resolution of the Cambodian conflict.30 According to realists, the decline in 
superpower confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union in the 1990s not only 
reduced the strategic significance of ASEAN to the major powers, but also undermined the 
purpose of ASEAN to its member states. For this reason, realists argue that AFTA was 
initiated as a means for ASEAN member states to maintain ASEAN’s relevance into the post-
Cold War period.31 The mission to maintain ASEAN’s relevance became especially urgent 
against the backdrop of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), which was 
formed in 1989, and which threatened to marginalize ASEAN in wider regional affairs.32 In 
addition to APEC, fear of marginalization also arose from regional economic integration in 
Europe and the emergence of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), between 
the US, Canada and Mexico in 1994. This turn towards regionalism in other continents 
reinforced the need for AFTA as a safeguard against closed regional blocs and protectionism, 
as well as a means to increase ASEAN’s bargaining power vis-à-vis external countries and 
other regional blocs.   
As a core variable of the realist approach, security concerns explain progress in 
regionalism, but mainly in terms of institutionalizing benefits provided by the great powers, 
and/or institutionalizing regional security cooperation. Lesser powers seek to stabilize the 
involvement of great powers in regional affairs by creating inclusive regional institutions and 
by balancing. Lesser powers cooperate in the building of regional multilateral institutions to 
promote and regulate interaction, develop norms, and create a regional identity, thereby 
institutionalizing cooperation between the great and rising powers.33 They can also cooperate 
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indirectly to balance against rising powers by promoting the great power’s continued 
commitment to the region. For example, ASEAN member states indirectly balance against 
China by sustaining US dominance in the region.34 They remind the US of its stabilizing role 
in the region, and how its withdrawal would produce competition between rising powers 
(such as China and Japan) to fill the power vacuum, thereby leading to regional instability.35 
The old regionalism literature not only provides the background for the continuing 
importance of security concerns to regionalism, as explained by realists, but also provides the 
background for the continuing importance of economic concerns, as explained by neoliberal 
institutionalists. For neo-liberal institutionalists, “the idea of politics is equated with the need 
to develop social institutions (such as the state and market) that conform more closely to a 
possessively individualist model of motivation and the propensity of ostensibly free 
individuals to pursue their material self-interest.”36 Neo-liberal institutionalists are 
preoccupied with the notion of interdependence that is based on economic integration, rather 
than interdependence that is based on strong regional bonds of solidarity and a common 
identity. They are preoccupied with functional economic integration, which is defined as 
movement towards one price for the means of production, a unit of merchandise or a 
service.37 While neo-liberal institutionalists are able to explain how countries overcome 
resistance to trade and facilitate economic integration, they are less able to explain how 
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countries overcome resistance to other aspects of regionalism, such as the continuation of 
bilateral conflicts and marginalization of non-state actors from regional processes. For neo-
liberal institutionalists, states overcome resistance to trade by facilitating transport and 
communications, introducing new measures to reduce the perception of risk and uncertainty 
of price fluctuations. 38 These actions improve regional infrastructure and the physical 
connectivity of states, but do not necessarily contribute to the non-physical aspects of 
regionalism that characterize a regional community, such as regional solidarity and a regional 
mindset.  
Overall, the realists and neo-liberal institutionalists provide strong explanations for 
regional security and economic cooperation, respectively; however, the aims for ASEAN 
community building have gone beyond these two areas, and, as such, requires other 
approaches to provide a comprehensive analysis. The realist approach to ASEAN’s evolution 
is limited in that it treats the state as a black box, that is, it focuses on states’ reactions to 
structural changes in the distribution of power while ignoring the impact of changes in 
domestic politics. For example, how domestic politics affects intra-regional relations or how 
it influences the decision to include, or exclude, civil society from regional processes. 
ASEAN member states have always prioritized the unity of all Southeast Asian nations into 
one regional grouping, as indicated by the founding document of ASEAN and ASEAN’s 
expansion. However, irrespective of whether ASEAN membership was complete, ASEAN 
member states were always confronted with intra-regional conflicts and, most recently, 
different preferences towards the role of civil society. Given that ASEAN member states 
support the principle of non-interference, any resolution to intra-regional conflicts would 
have to arise from the concerned parties, and is dependent on state-centered security and 
economic interests. As for interactions with civil society, this depends on ASEAN member 
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states’ progress in democratization and domestic politics. Thus, an analysis on ASEAN 
community building requires both a test for the persistence of old regionalism, and the 
significance of factors under new regionalism.  
 
New Regionalism 
 
 
 
Literature which forms part of new regionalism seeks to address the shortcomings of 
old regionalism. This strand of literature mainly grew out of “The New Regionalism Project,” 
led by Björn Hettne, and sponsored by the United Nations University/World Institute for 
Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER) in 1994.39 The project produced a new 
regionalism approach (NRA), which moves beyond the state by including more levels of 
analyses: the world system, inter-regional relations, the region, and the sub-national level.40 
These different levels are treated as follows. At the global level, NRA analysis focuses on the 
decline of hegemonic powers and the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity, and then to 
multipolarity. The emergence of multipolarity implies increasing regionalism as centres of 
power become more evenly spread throughout the world.41 At the inter-regional level, 
emphasis is placed on interactions between different regional organizations and demonstrates 
a trend toward increasing interdependence. Regional level analysis highlights converging 
perceptions, interests and policies in various fields, ranging from security and economics, to 
culture and identity. This level of analysis provides for state preferences and demonstrates the 
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dynamic competing and converging national interests of states within the same region. 
Finally, sub-national level analysis demonstrates how domestic factors, such as nation-
building, affect regionalism.42 Assuming that countries within a region are the drivers of 
regionalism, as opposed to external great powers, one would have to include regional and 
sub-national level analyses to determine the driving forces of regional community building. 
For the regional level analysis on community building, this thesis analyzes the significance of 
new regional processes and actors, namely, participatory regionalism, a new regional human 
rights body, and transnational civil society networks. For the sub-national level analysis, the 
thesis tests for the persistence of old regional problems and dominance of old actors, that is, 
bilateral conflicts that are based on state-centered security interests.  
Hettne and his colleagues wanted to broaden the scope of regionalism in order to 
provide “a comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and historically based social science.”43 They 
wanted to highlight the qualitative differences between European integration and the 
processes taking place in developing regions, that is, the consolidation of regional 
cooperative frameworks and regional identity. Moreover, they sought to highlight the 
differences between the bipolar Cold War context, in which initial European integration took 
place, and the more multipolar context of the post-Cold War period, in which there were 
more regional dynamics worldwide, and in which aspirations for a regional community 
became stronger and more actively pursued. Hence, the development of a new regionalism 
approach to take account of the different actors involved in regional community building and 
the expanding regional agenda. 
A new regionalism approach provides for a comprehensive analysis of community 
building by including multiple levels of analysis, and taking account of an increasing number 
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of actors (namely, non-state actors), as well as a wider range of issues (such as 
democratization and human rights). NRA theorists argue that new regionalism, which 
ultimately leads to a regional community, is not only about state-led projects and the 
institutionalization of regional cooperation. Rather, it is the process of constructing and 
consolidating a region through 1) regional stakeholders’ (including both state and non-state 
actors) discussion of common interests; 2) their engagement in regional cooperation; and 3) 
efforts to become more homogenous by promoting common policies and a common 
identity.44 A new regionalism approach does not assume that all regions have the same 
internal dynamics, but states that each one must be understood in the context of globalization. 
It is argued that globalization contributed to the emergence of non-state actors as advocates of 
regional integration, due to their aim to mitigate its negative impact.45 With regard to 
expanded regional cooperation beyond state actors, the NRA provides for a combined 
analysis of power and norms. This combined analysis demonstrates how state-centered 
security and economic interests can restrict the implementation of regional norms on conflict 
prevention and the non-use of force. Moreover, a combined analysis also sheds light on how 
state-centered regionalism can restrict the emergence of a regional identity by limiting 
regional processes, and the benefits of regional cooperation, to state actors. Given that 
ASEAN regionalism is based on consensus, that ASEAN member states are politically and 
economically diverse, and that they have different interests, it is very difficult for them to 
become homogeneous and to form a regional community of like-minded member states. A 
new regionalism approach explains community building across multiple levels, and 
community building in terms of an expansion of regional actors and regional cooperation. 
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However, it does not explain the processes of community building, in terms of creating a 
collective identity and regional norms. For these processes, one has to turn to constructivism. 
Constructivists focus on the redefinition of identities and interests, which occur 
through states’ interactions and the process of socialization in international institutions. 
Through social interactions, states can identify, maintain, and pursue points of common 
interest and consensus. States’ interests are expected to be redefined, that is, converged, 
through these social interactions. This process of convergence, or socialization, is evident 
when states develop stable expectations of each other’s behavior, when they behave 
according to an agreed code of conduct and come to identify with each other as part of a 
common community.46 Constructivism is useful for an analysis on regional community 
building since it analyzes the interaction between states’ power and norms, and, as such, 
forms the basis of the security community framework. This framework builds on Deutsch’s 
concept of a security community, and, as such, defines a security community as “a group of 
states which have developed a long-term habit of peaceful interaction and ruled out the use of 
force in settling disputes with other members of the group.”47 Moreover, a security 
community has the following three characteristics: 
1. Members of a community have shared identities, values and meanings; 
2. Those in a community have many-sided and direct relations. Interaction occurs 
through some form of face-to-face encounter and relations in numerous settings; 
3. Communities exhibit reciprocity that expresses some degree of long-term interest and 
perhaps even altruism.48 
 
The security community framework provides for regional community building up to a stage 
where a transnational civic community emerges, where the state caters to a broader range of 
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social needs, such as human rights and economic welfare, and where people become part of a 
regional community.49 This stage of development is referred to as a “tightly-coupled security 
community” in terms of people’s sense of belonging to a regional entity, as well as their 
sense of regional solidarity. A security community emerges and is consolidated by social 
interactions, and the norm-setting and identity building which occurs through these 
interactions. Constructivists extend the role of norms beyond the regulation of state 
behaviour, as advocated by neo-liberal institutionalists, towards the redefinition of identity 
and interests in convergent ways. As such, they fill in a gap in the broader literature on 
regional communities, which is mainly related to Europe. 
 For the founding fathers of the European Community – Jean Monnet and Robert 
Schuman – a regional community is based on regional integration, which commences in 
small, incremental steps in sectors where the issue of national sovereignty is least 
contentious, before proceeding to “high politics” areas, such as defense and foreign policy.50 
This “Community Method” was given political clout as the Schuman Plan, which presented a 
European solution to contain Germany’s industries. The plan proposed that French and 
German coal and steel production be “pooled,” and placed under a supranational authority, 
the High Authority. As a result, the European Coal and Steel Community (ESCS) was formed 
in 1951, and laid the institutional foundations for the current European community: the 
Special Council of Ministers (now the Council of Ministers), a High Authority (predecessor 
of the European Commission), a Common Assembly (now the European Parliament), a 
Consultative Committee (now the Economic and Social Committee), and a Court of Justice.51 
The concept of a regional community in Europe was not only based on the creation of central 
political institutions, but also on economic integration (as evident in, for example, the 
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creation of a European Economic Community in 1957, and the Single European Act in 1987), 
Moreover, the concept of a regional community also came to include processes in the field of 
constructivism, such as regional socialization, or Europeanization, leading to a regional 
identity in the form of European citizenship: all of which have been extensively studied.52 
More recently, the concept of a regional community has expanded to include the involvement 
of civil society through interactions between civil society and the European Commission.53 In 
addition, studies on regional community building in Europe also analyze the extent of civil 
society’s influence on EU policies, the prospects and challenges in opening EU governance to 
civil society, as well as the role of civil society in monitoring the accession of new EU 
member states.54 Thus, according to the literature on a European community, a regional 
community is indicated by central political institutions, economic integration, a regional 
identity, and the involvement of civil society in regionalism. 
 
With regard to ASEAN, there is literature from the Cold War and early post-Cold 
War period in the 1990s, which analyses the emergence and consolidation of regional norms; 
this literature then expanded to include analyses on the construction of a security community 
in Southeast Asia.55 Within ASEAN, the regional norms that have been identified and studied 
are known as the “ASEAN Way,” which are said to play a role in the development of shared 
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understandings and the management of regional order.56 The scholar Noordin Sopiee 
identified four key aspects of the “ASEAN Way,” which are listed as follows: 
 
(1) system-wide acceptance of the principle of the pacific settlement of disputes; (2) non-
interference and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of member states; (3) respect for 
each other’s territorial integrity and independence; (4) the principle of not inviting external 
intervention on one’s behalf in the pursuit of disputes.57 
 
 
In this regard, the “ASEAN Way” mainly focuses on the maintenance of regime security, 
since it supports the pacific settlement of interstate disputes and opposes any external 
intervention in domestic affairs that could pose a potential threat to the ruling regime. As a 
result, the “ASEAN Way” restricts community building in two ways. First, if a pacific 
settlement of interstate disputes cannot be reached, these disputes may simply be suspended 
until one or more parties find that it is to their advantage to raise them. This allows interstate 
disputes to be exploited for domestic political gains, thereby undermining regional peace and 
the realization of the ASEAN Political Security pillar. Second, opposition to external 
intervention allows ASEAN member states to violate human rights without any sanctions and 
with the ability to remain under ASEAN’s protective umbrella vis-à-vis the West. Thus, the 
aim to promote human rights, as declared under the ASEAN Political Security pillar, cannot 
be pursued either.  
Nevertheless, ASEAN norms constitute part of ASEAN member states’ collective 
identity, and, as such, contribute to community building. Amitav Acharya, who adopts a 
constructivist approach in his analysis of ASEAN, identifies three main indicators of a 
collective identity:  
 
Firstly, a commitment to multilateralism, including a desire to include an expanding 
 variety of issues on the multilateral agenda: issues which have previously been dealt 
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 with through unilateral or bilateral channels. Secondly, the development of security 
 cooperation, including collective defence, coordination against internal threats, collective 
 security and cooperative security activities. Thirdly, membership criteria of the group.58 
 
These characteristics are based on state actors; even the inclusion of coordination against 
internal threats refers to threats to the state, rather than threats to society, such as the state’s 
violation of human rights. A new regionalism approach provides for a more balanced analysis 
in terms of state and non-state actors, cooperation on traditional security issues, such as joint 
military training, as well as non-traditional security issues, such as human rights. In this 
regard, it is better suited for evaluating ASEAN’s progress in regional community building, 
given that a regional community is not only defined by inter-state relations, but also by state-
society, and inter-society relations. As demonstrated by the following definitions: a regional 
community is based on 
relationships which constitute a network of mutual claims, rights, duties and obligations that 
pull people together in ways that are qualitatively different from the impersonal forces which 
create a system. Community implies the idea of common interests and at least an emerging 
common identity.59  
 
A regional community has a social dimension, which includes the participation of non-state 
actors in regional affairs; hence it is indicated by the following characteristics: 
the region increasingly turns into an active subject with a distinct identity, institutionalized or 
informal actor capability, legitimacy and structure of decision-making, in relation to a more or 
less responsive regional civil society, transcending old state borders. [A regional community] 
implies a convergence and compatibility of ideas, organizations and processes within a 
particular region.60  
The literature on a European community and theories on regional communities assume 
political integration to varying degrees, since scholars in these fields see community building 
as primarily about pooled sovereignty among states. Moreover, Barry Buzan proposes an 
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analytical framework whereby pooled sovereignty among states is followed by the cultivation 
of a shared identity or a “we-feeling” among regional peoples.61 
 With regard to Southeast Asia, previous studies on ASEAN regionalism (including 
those which adopt a combined analytical framework), tend to focus exclusively on state 
actors. For example, Alice Ba analyzes both material and ideational factors in state-centered 
ASEAN regionalism. Ba focuses specifically on ideas about Southeast Asia as a distinct, but 
divided region, where division at various levels is understood as a primary source of 
insecurity and vulnerability.62 She argues that the idea of Southeast Asia as a divided region, 
and consequent vulnerability to external intervention, motivated the establishment of a 
regional organization in the form of ASEAN. Regional unity, through a regional 
organization, was an agreed response to the dangers of national and regional fragmentation. 
However, this same idea on the necessity of regional unity also impeded more formal, 
institutionalized regional cooperation.63 For example, ASEAN member states’ prioritization 
of regional unity maintains the principle of non-interference in another country’s internal 
affairs, decision-making by consensus and informal institutionalism. ASEAN member states 
are concerned that if they accelerate the development of regional processes beyond some 
member states’ comfort level, the whole regional project could fall apart. Their adherence to 
the principle of non-interference means that bilateral problems can remain unresolved if the 
concerned parties cannot reach a peaceful resolution. This continuation of bilateral conflicts 
restricts the realization of the ASEAN Political Security pillar. In addition, decision-making 
by consensus restricts the realization of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural pillar, since ASEAN 
member states can choose to block new regional norms, which could increase the role of civil 
society. Ba did not focus on bilateral problems per se, but rather on intra-regional debates 
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about ASEAN expansion, and ASEAN’s relations with the major powers. In contrast, half of 
the empirical chapters of this thesis will focus specifically on bilateral problems, in order to 
analyze its impact on ASEAN community building. Moreover, this thesis also differs from 
Ba’s research by analyzing the role of non-state actors, specifically civil society, in changing 
the nature of ASEAN regionalism, for example, how ASEAN Summits now have an ASEAN 
People’s Forum running in parallel to them, how events at this Forum are reported on the 
ASEAN Summit website, and how ASEAN officials are expected to meet with participants at 
this Forum. Thus, the contribution of this thesis to existing research on ASEAN regionalism 
is the provision of further empirical material on internal obstacles to an advanced stage of 
regionalism in the form of a regional community.  
 
II. ASEAN Community Building 
 
 
 
Based on ASEAN Community documents, it would seem that ASEAN policy makers 
base community building on old regionalism, that is, security and economic cooperation, with 
the added recognition and expressed support, but no commitment, to features of new 
regionalism, such as democratization and human rights. As such, ASEAN’s progress in 
community building can be evaluated, based on a sliding scale between old and new 
regionalism, whereby the persistence of old regionalism characteristics indicates limited or no 
progress towards a regional community, while the significance of new regionalism 
characteristics indicates the extent of progress towards one. As stated in the previous section, 
a regional community is indicated by 1) common interests; 2) central political institutions; 3) 
economic integration; 4) the quality of social interactions; 5) a regional identity; and 6) the 
involvement of civil society in regionalism. Given that ASEAN member states remain very 
much protective of national sovereignty, they tend to be averse to the creation of central 
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political institutions; and economic integration, as stated in the section on old regionalism, 
can only provide a limited explanation for the community building process. The remaining 
community attributes are more relevant for the ASEAN case, and are covered by the two 
independent variables chosen for this thesis: bilateral relations and civil society participation. 
Bilateral relations indicate the extent of common interests and the prospects and challenges 
for a regional identity, while civil society participation constitutes the remaining community 
attribute. 
Progress towards an ASEAN Community has been stimulated by both traditional 
driving forces and new driving forces of regionalism. ASEAN member states remain bound 
together by the same set of factors, namely, concerns for regime security and economic 
development. For this reason, new security threats, be they external, such as the rise of China, 
or internal, such as the Asian Financial Crisis, have prompted reactive, new regional policies 
to ensure that ASEAN relevance is maintained, and that the interests of ASEAN member 
states are not threatened or marginalized in the evolving post-Cold War regional 
environment.64 However, in addition to the traditional stimulus of security threats, new 
ASEAN policies have also been stimulated by domestic political changes. These changes 
include democratization within ASEAN, as well as the emergence of new regional actors, 
such as think tanks and civil society. ASEAN policies which are stimulated by 
democratization and non-state actors are meant to ensure that regional processes reflect the 
aims for democratization, which have been expressed by state leaders at the national level, 
and that regional processes similarly take account of views expressed by non-state actors. In 
this regard, it would seem that state interests remain the same, in terms of strengthening 
ASEAN vis-à-vis external relations, but that they have changed in terms of ASEAN’s internal 
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relations. The reasons for this change are analysed in chapter five of this thesis. Briefly, they 
include two developments. First, the global trend on increasing civil society activism. 
Second, the emergence of civil society activism in some ASEAN member states (i.e. 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand), which contributed to their support for 
participatory regionalism and recognition of issues that have been highlighted by civil 
society. Other ASEAN member states are less willing to support participatory regionalism 
and can either veto the process or be persuaded to compromise. Thus, the role of civil society 
in regionalism is a contentious issue, and a problematic one in the realization of a regional 
community. 
ASEAN community building prioritizes old regionalism in terms of political-security 
and economic cooperation; at the same time, it limits new regionalism to functional 
cooperation on new security issues, such as the environment, and aims to include all sectors 
of society in development, under the ASEAN Socio-Cultural pillar. Given the predominance 
of old regionalism, the aims for an ASEAN Community, as stated in the Declaration of 
ASEAN Concord II, are very similar to many of the previous statements on the purpose of 
ASEAN. According to the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, ASEAN community building 
comprises three pillars:  
 
political and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation that 
 are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, 
 stability and shared prosperity in the region.65  
 
 
Each of the three pillars is elaborated as follows. The ASEAN Security Community (ASC), 
later renamed the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), is intended “to bring 
ASEAN’s political and security cooperation to a  higher plane to ensure that countries in the 
region live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and 
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harmonious environment.”66 This is significant in showing that ASEAN member states have 
apparently moved towards the homogenization of political systems through democratization. 
With regard to progress in the economic dimension of ASEAN, ASEAN’s founding 
document declared the aim to accelerate economic growth and to promote economic 
cooperation. In comparison to these broad aims, which were underpinned by individual 
states’ economic interests, the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) marks a significant leap 
in ASEAN regionalism. The AEC aims for “the end-goal of economic integration as outlined 
in the ASEAN Vision 2020, to create a stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN 
economic region in which there is a free flow of goods, services, investment and a freer flow 
of capital, equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic 
disparities in year 2020.”67 Finally, the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) is 
significant in demonstrating the shift towards a “tightly-coupled security community” and 
new regionalism, by expanding regional cooperation to new security issues and seeking to 
involve all sectors of society in development.68  
 
In practice, community building is a complete departure from previous ASEAN 
regionalism in that it does not only advocate the harmonization of external norms and 
principles, but also internal norms and principles, which are described by the scholar 
Tsutomu Kikuchi in the table below. 
 
Table I: External and Internal Norms/Principles69 
 
External Norms and Principles Internal Norms and Principles 
Sovereignty Democracy, Human Rights 
Non-Intervention in internal affairs Harmonization of domestic institutions 
Different nation-building processes Good governance 
State security Human security 
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Border Measures (e.g. tariffs)  
 
 
In their statements on the ASEAN Community, ASEAN member states touched on issues 
which would involve domestic political reform, such as democracy and human rights. In 
doing so, they increased the stakes on their individual and collective credibility, should they 
fail to make progress on such reforms. Within ASEAN, democratization and human rights 
have traditionally been difficult to implement due to the presence of authoritarian or semi-
democratic states, with a highly centralized political system and limited freedom for political 
expression. Although some ASEAN member states, such as the Philippines and Thailand, did 
introduce some political reforms to facilitate democratization and implementation of human 
rights, they are still confronted with internal political challenges, for example, domestic 
violence resulting from political polarization. Moreover, when it is only some ASEAN 
member states that pursue democratization, Southeast Asia will remain a politically diverse 
region, which will be confronted with the same old problems arising from political diversity.  
During the Cold War, Southeast Asia’s political diversity divided the region into 
opposing blocs; in the post-Cold War period, political diversity made it difficult to reach an 
agreement on regional norms, especially with regard to civil society.70 ASEAN is 
characterized by different political systems, ranging from an authoritarian system ruled by the 
military junta in Myanmar, to a democratic system ruled by an elected government in 
Indonesia. ASEAN member states which tend toward an authoritarian system will oppose the 
introduction of new regional norms to promote more democratic regional processes, or 
regional processes which include civil society’s participation, while ASEAN member states 
which tend toward a democratic system will be more supportive of meetings with civil 
society. In this regard, the significance of civil society in regionalism indicates progress in 
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community building, in terms of states’ agreement to pursue common political practices, 
which implies converging interests.  
Southeast Asia is not only characterized by different political systems, but also by 
different economic capacities, which affects individual countries’ regime security, and which 
can also have an impact on bilateral relations, and the extent to which individual countries 
can commit to an ASEAN Community. Different economic capacities lead to weak economic 
cohesion, or lack of economic complementarities among ASEAN member states, which 
makes them economic competitors rather than economic partners.71 The extent of the 
difference in economic capacities, or the gap in economic development among ASEAN 
member states, is shown in the table below.  
 
Table II: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of ASEAN Member States (US$ million) in           
200872 
 
Brunei Darussalam 14,147 
Cambodia 11,082 
Indonesia 511,174 
Laos 5,289 
Malaysia 222,674 
Myanmar 27,182 
Philippines 166,773 
Singapore 184,120 
Thailand 273,666 
Vietnam 90,701 
 
 
Domestic politics and a state’s economic capacity are two factors which determine whether 
or not a particular state is weak, and if analysis shows that one or more regional states are 
weak, this will also impose restrictions on community building. Indeed, Christopher Roberts 
argues that divergent political values and weak states are the main challenges to ASEAN 
community building. Roberts adopts Georg Sorensen’s definition for weak states, according 
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to which weak states are those with gaps in any of the following three areas: (1) a security 
gap where the state is unwilling or unable to maintain basic order (the protection of citizens 
within its territory); (2) a capacity gap where the state is either unwilling or unable to provide 
basic social services and values, such as welfare, liberty and the rule of law; and (3) a 
legitimacy gap where the state offers little or nothing to its citizens, and receives no support 
in return.73 Roberts argues that weak states, such as Myanmar, undermine regional cohesion, 
while divergent political values produces divisions on the nature and extent of ASEAN 
member states’ regional cooperation.74 This thesis demonstrates how all three kinds of weak 
states restrict community building, as shown in bilateral relations and the significance of civil 
society participation. The first kind of weak state with a security gap, or one which 
perceives/constructs a security gap, restricts community building, as it may choose to 
strengthen regime security by depicting neighboring countries as a security threat, and thus 
justify its monopoly on power for national defense. Weak states with a capacity gap, 
especially in terms of democratization and the provision of space for civil society to articulate 
its interests, restrict community building by excluding or marginalizing society from regional 
processes. Finally, weak states which lack legitimacy will be preoccupied with regime 
security and may be unwilling or unable to provide credible long-term commitment to 
community building. Thus, the internal characteristics of a state affect both the quality of 
intra-regional relationships (i.e. bilateral relations) and the quality of the involvement of civil 
society in the community building process. The reason for which the internal characteristics 
of states was not chosen as an independent variable for this thesis, and that bilateral relations 
and civil society were chosen instead, is because the latter pair provide a bigger picture of a 
regional community, in terms of its building blocks and wider social dimension. 
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III. Bilateral Relations and Civil Society 
  
 
 
This thesis has chosen two independent variables, bilateral relations and civil society, 
to evaluate the dependent variable of ASEAN community building for the following reasons. 
In accordance with a New Regionalism Approach (NRA), the two independent variables 
enable one to analyze community building from both material and ideational factors, as well 
as to analyze the role of both state and non-state actors, namely, civil society. Bilateral 
relations include material factors in terms of security threats along the border, and economic 
incentives for expanding bilateral cooperation. Bilateral relations also include ideational 
factors in terms of states’ differentiation of each other as enemies through historical 
narratives and public statements, as well as their attempts to reverse differentiation through 
joint cultural activities. With regard to civil society, there is the material factor of states’ 
capacity versus civil society’s capacity in terms of resources and outreach, and the ability to 
initiate change in ASEAN regionalism. As for ideational input, civil society seek to raise 
awareness on international norms, especially in the area of human rights, and to promote 
these norms as part of ASEAN regionalism. Thus, an analysis on the significance of civil 
society demonstrates the extent to which “new regionalism” processes have overcome the 
constraints imposed by “old regionalism”; while bilateral relations demonstrates the extent to 
which “old regionalism” processes still hold back progress towards “new regionalism” and an 
ASEAN Community. 
Bilateral Relations 
 
 Policy-makers in both Europe and Southeast Asia expected regional community 
building to improve bilateral relations; however, this thesis proposes another correlation 
between the two, whereby critical bilateral relations can seriously hamper the community 
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building process. With regard to Europe, the establishment of a European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) in 1951 was intended to pool France and Germany’s war resources, in 
order to prevent them from going to war. Moreover, the ECSC also included a High 
Authority, or a council to ensure that all parties comply to the founding treaty. Cooperation 
and the emergence of a working relationship in one sector was seen as the first step to help 
overcome bilateral conflicts, and was expected to spread to other sectors over time.75 With 
regard to ASEAN, Declarations and statements on an ASEAN Community indicate that 
policy-makers similarly expected the community building process to improve bilateral 
relations. According to the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), the 
community building process is intended to nurture a “habit of consultation” and to promote 
“political solidarity” among ASEAN member states, as a basis for sustainable economic 
development.76 Moreover, community building also aims to institutionalize “the renunciation 
of the threat or the use of force” and the “peaceful settlement of differences and disputes.”77 
Political solidarity may be achieved vis-à-vis countries outside the region to secure ASEAN 
member states’ interests as a whole. Moreover, political solidarity may also be achieved 
within the region if ASEAN member states reverse differentiation of each other, and promote 
assimilation into a regional community, with a shared identity, as well as manage, and/or 
resolve bilateral conflicts. However, political solidarity cannot be achieved within the region 
if they continue to differentiate each other as security threats, and on-going bilateral conflicts 
have the potential to escalate into violent confrontation.  
 Efforts to reverse differentiation, and to promote assimilation, may be difficult, given 
that Southeast Asia has traditionally been described as a divided region, and as one 
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characterised by regional distrust and tensions.78 In 1966, Lee Kuan Yew, former Prime 
Minister of Singapore, made an observation on Singapore’s situation, which is equally valid 
for Southeast Asia today. He observed that 
The strangest thing about countries is: your friends are never your immediate neighbours! 
They get too close and your neighbour’s hedge grows and infringes on your part of the garden 
and the branch of his fruit tree covers your grass and your roses do not get enough sunshine 
and so many things happen! And therefore our best friends, as has happened with so many 
other countries, are those who are farther afield and with whom we can talk objectively.79 
 
For example, the Philippines and Thailand relied more on cooperation with the US during the 
Cold War, than on cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries. Neighbouring countries 
may be averse to bilateral cooperation due to deeply embedded negative historical 
stereotypes. Such stereotypes have traditionally resulted in distrust, and even hatred, which 
makes it difficult to improve bilateral relations between immediate neighbours, and to 
cultivate political solidarity. This was particularly the case during the Cold War between 
neighbouring countries which were supported by different major powers (e.g. Vietnam was 
supported by the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, while Thailand and the 
Philippines were supported by the US). Towards the end of the Cold War, Sino-American 
rapprochement, the West’s withdrawal from Southeast Asia, and rapid domestic economic 
growth, opened up opportunities for new policies; for example, Thai Prime Minister 
Chatichai Choonhavan’s (1988-1991) policy to reverse differentiation of Indochinese 
countries, and to instead promote economic cooperation with them.80 Thus, international and 
domestic dynamics affect the view of state leaders, who then decide to pursue policies which 
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have a negative or positive impact on intra-regional relations, and which restrict or promote 
political solidarity, and progress towards a regional community.  
 An analysis of bilateral relations reaffirms the importance of state leaders in 
promoting assimilation, political solidarity and a collective identity. Previous studies which 
emphasize the importance of state leaders in bilateral relations include Meg Curry’s analysis 
on bilateral relations between Australia and India. Curry identifies three factors which 
promote an active, mutually beneficial bilateral friendship: shared interests, a sense of shared 
history and the leadership’s political will to cultivate close relations.81 However, shared 
interests in, for example, economic cooperation, or a sense of shared history, are not enough 
to cultivate close relations, if the leaders of two countries choose to initiate, and to maintain, 
a discourse which differentiates the other as a security threat. For this reason, the leadership’s 
political will to cultivate close relations is arguably the most important factor to promote 
friendly bilateral relations. After all, it is political leaders who choose to identify, and to 
articulate, shared interests and a sense of shared history; and political leaders who continue, 
or initiate, policies to promote bilateral cooperation. If bilateral relations within a region are 
improved, this would demonstrate the strengthened intra-regional web of relations which 
form a regional community, and thus indicate progress in regional community building. 
Finally, bilateral relations are an important indicator for progress in regional 
community building, since they demonstrate the extent to which countries within the region 
are willing to cooperate with each other on an expanding number of issues: the wider and 
deeper the bilateral cooperation within a region, the stronger the bilateral relationships, and 
the stronger the intra-regional bonds which make up a regional community. As explained by 
Mohamad Ghazali Shafie, former Foreign Minister of Malaysia: 
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Projects under ASEAN (and other regional bodies) are generally limited in scope and 
necessarily restricted to the lowest common denominator which is acceptable to all member 
countries…The limitation of regional cooperation within a formal framework should not 
prevent countries of the region from trying to forge the closest possible links on a bilateral 
basis with one another. It may be, for example, that country X would be willing to establish 
such links on specific subjects and would be prepared to engage in consultations including 
exchange of information, etc., with country Y which she might not consider either appropriate 
or necessary to have with some other third country on a multilateral basis. Such bilateral 
contracts on any subject and at whatever level which may be mutually acceptable should be 
pursued as far as possible. In this way, an important criss-crossing network of bilateral links 
will be established between and among the countries of Southeast Asia.82 
 
Expanded areas of cooperation at the bilateral level facilitate the expansion of areas of 
cooperation at the regional level, and thus facilitate progress from “old regionalism” towards 
“new regionalism” and a regional community. 
 On the other hand, the nature of bilateral relations, especially bilateral tensions and 
conflicts, can also restrict progress towards a regional community. For example, military 
clashes along the Thai-Cambodian border, which occurred as recently as May 2011 indicate 
that ASEAN member states still pose a security threat to each other. Before the clashes took 
place, there were preparations for the use of force on both sides of the border. This 
undermines the aim of ASEAN member states to realize an ASEAN Political-Security 
Community, and demonstrates the intra-regional gaps to their aim of cultivating regional 
solidarity. When asked about the impact of the Thai-Cambodian conflict on ASEAN 
community building, Marty Natalegawa (Indonesia Foreign Minister and ASEAN Chairman 
in 2011) stated: “I think, in the short term, my answer would be it is troubling, it is creating 
special challenges for ASEAN.”83 The Thai-Cambodian conflict not only undermines the aim 
to realize an ASEAN Political-Security Community, but also the aim to realize an ASEAN 
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community as a whole. As stated by Philippine President Benigno Aquino, “how can we have 
one ASEAN, one family, if we have two major components who cannot solve their 
problems?”84 This is one example of how critical bilateral relations can significantly restrict 
progress towards a regional community. 
 The first half of this thesis focuses on such critical bilateral relations, to evaluate 
ASEAN’s progress in regional community building; more specifically, it analyses the extent 
of the shift from differentiation to assimilation in Thailand’s bilateral relations. Both the 
processes of differentiation and assimilation are based on identification of the other, which 
has traditionally been the task of the state, and constitutes its authority.85 Identification of the 
other is flexible, and adaptable to changing domestic and international dynamics. As 
commented by Emmanuel Levinas: “the other is the neighbour, who is not necessarily kin, 
but who can be.”86 Moreover, identification of the other is neither set in stone, nor a matter of 
black or white, but rather “a continuum from negative to positive from conceiving the other 
as anathema to the self to conceiving it as an extension of the self.”87 Negative identification 
of the other, especially as an external security threat, constitutes differentiation, and restricts 
the emergence of a community “we feeling” and a collective identity. Social psychologists 
explain that 
differentiation arises between ourselves, the we-group, or in-group, and everybody else, or the 
other-groups, out-groups. The insiders in a we-group are in a relation of peace, order, law, 
government, and industry to each other. Their relation to all outsiders, or other-groups, is one 
of war and plunder, except so far as agreements have modified it.88 
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For political theorists, “others” are created as the external antagonist against which internal 
identity is mobilized.89 The differentiation of others tends to take place during the process of 
consolidating the nation-state, when political leaders define national identity, in relation to 
others. Moreover, differentiation of others is also pursued by political leaders, who seek to 
maintain power by portraying an external security threat, and their ability to confront it, and 
to protect national security. Thus, the use of differentiation may be exploited for domestic 
political gains, and, as such, restrict progress in regional community building. 
 Liberalists, such as John Oneal and Bruce Russett, argue that economic 
interdependence promotes peace, and, by implication, the reversal of differentiation; 
however, other international relations (IR) theorists, such as Charles Kupchan, point to the 
limitations of economic interdependence, and instead emphasize the importance of political 
reconciliation, which can gradually lead to assimilation.90 According to Kupchan, stable 
peace breaks out through a four-phase process, which begins with political reconciliation.91 
This first phase of political reconciliation occurs through an act of unilateral accommodation, 
that is, a state seeks to remove one source of its insecurity by exercising strategic restraint 
and making concessions to an adversary. Such concessions are conceived as a peaceful 
gesture to indicate benign, as opposed to hostile intent. The second phase in cultivating stable 
peace is reciprocal restraint. This is when states trade concessions and consider the prospect 
of cooperation, rather than competition and rivalry. Cooperation preceded by political 
reconciliation is expected to gradually lead to demilitarized relations, which is indicated by 
undefended borders and/or the redeployment of forces from contested areas, the absence of 
war plans against one another, and evidence that the elite, and the general public have come 
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to see war among the parties in question as extremely remote, if not outside the realm of the 
possible.92 The third phase towards stable peace is reflective of progress from “old” to “new 
regionalism,” since it involves the deepening of societal integration among the states 
concerned. This is indicated by increasing international transactions, and more extensive 
contacts among the elites, as well as ordinary citizens. Interest groups that benefit from closer 
relations are expected to begin investing, and lobbying, for the further reduction of political 
and economic barriers, thereby adding momentum to the process of reconciliation and 
reversing differentiation. The fourth phase involves constructivist processes, through the 
generation of new narratives and identities. This is when states adopt a new domestic 
discourse, which reverses differentiation of the other, and promotes assimilation through a 
communal identity, and a sense of solidarity.93 This new discourse emerges through elite 
statements and popular culture, such as the media and literature. Kupchan’s four-phase 
process for peace is useful for evaluating the progress from “old” to “new regionalism,” since 
it includes both state and non-state actors, as well as security cooperation and efforts to 
promote assimilation.  
 The act of assimilation is significant for promoting solidarity as part of a regional 
community, as well as for maintaining security and international order. In the late 1970s, 
scholars of the English School of International Relations, such as Martin Wight, highlighted 
the role of solidarity in maintaining stability between states in an international system; 
moreover, Hedley Bull also suggested that international order is more likely to develop if 
states share an “international political culture.”94 Assimilation has both institutional and 
socio-cultural determinants. Institutional support for assimilation is provided by the state, 
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while socio-cultural support is provided by the media, and its influence on social attitudes 
and perceptions towards another country. One would expect that, the greater the degree of 
interdependence between two countries, the greater the incentive for them to promote closer 
relations through assimilation. However, interdependence may be asymmetrical, whereby one 
country is more dependent on the other, for example, as indicated by trade. As such, two 
countries may demonstrate symmetric or asymmetric support for assimilation. For example, 
one country may issue more statements and organize more activities to promote assimilation. 
Symmetric and asymmetric support produces three possible scenarios: low support for 
assimilation on both sides (low-low), high support for assimilation on both sides (high-high), 
or asymmetric support (low-high). The best scenario for community building would of course 
be high support for assimilation on both sides. This is more likely to take place between 
countries where there are strong political institutions and consistent foreign policies that 
govern bilateral relations. Such a situation is likely to produce stable bilateral relations, 
whereby both sides feel secure in developing their bilateral relationship. However, if the two 
countries have weak political institutions and pursue inconsistent foreign policies, personal 
relations between state leaders, rather than political institutions, will likely play a more 
prominent role in the bilateral relationship. As a result, the bilateral relationship is vulnerable 
to domestic politics, and to the use of differentiation in foreign policy for domestic political 
gains. Thus, bilateral relations are an indicator for regional community building, based on the 
extent to which the aim to promote solidarity is pursued in foreign policy at the bilateral 
level, and the extent to which there is a shift from differentiation to assimilation. 
 This thesis focuses on Thailand’s bilateral relations, since they arguably constitute the 
most difficult case for progress along the “old regionalism” – “new regionalism” sliding 
scale, and are thus the most problematic for regional community building. While bilateral 
relations between Indonesia and Malaysia have traditionally been viewed as the conflicting 
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dyad in ASEAN regionalism, and while these two countries seem to move from one 
diplomatic spat to another, this thesis will not focus on them for the following reasons. First, 
their diplomatic spats have not resulted in violence, unlike, for example, Thailand and 
Cambodia’s territorial dispute over Preah Vihear Temple, which resulted in an exchange of 
fire across the disputed area in February and May 2011. Second, Indonesia and Malaysia are 
both founding members of ASEAN, and have been proactive in the promotion of community 
building activities; most notably, Indonesia proposed the establishment of an ASEAN 
Security Community, and Malaysia hosted the first ASEAN Civil Society Conference, or 
meeting between ASEAN leaders and representatives of civil society. These actions 
demonstrate that they are committed to realizing an ASEAN Community, and imply that they 
would not allow any bilateral conflicts to get in the way. In contrast, if one looks at another 
pair of Thailand’s bilateral relations, such as that between Thailand and Myanmar, or a 
founding member and a new member of ASEAN, one finds that the importance they give to 
ASEAN is different. Thailand, as a founding member, has promoted the consolidation of 
ASEAN through discussions on an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992, and initiated 
an ASEAN People’s Forum in 2009, as a platform for civil society within the region to 
brainstorm proposals before the ASEAN Civil Society Conference. On the other hand, 
Burmese academics abroad note how the Burmese military regime’s enthusiasm for ASEAN 
has decreased since the late 1990s, because they found that ASEAN was not as good a shield 
against the international community as China and Russia; moreover, Burmese academics note 
that Burmese generals have been disappointed with ASEAN for not supporting them all the 
way.95 The Burmese regime’s different level of commitment to ASEAN, compared to 
ASEAN’s founding members, is mainly due to its tendency to be inward looking, and its 
preference to maintain the status quo, both at the national and regional level, which means 
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that it is averse to adopting new values and norms.96 This resistance to change, especially the 
Burmese regime’s crackdown on political dissidents in September 2007, have strained 
Myanmar-ASEAN relations, as well as Myanmar-Thailand relations, when Thailand was 
ruled by the Democrat Party.97 In this light, the issue of Myanmar is significant for an 
evaluation of ASEAN’s progress in community building; Myanmar-Thailand relations are 
also significant since Thailand, under the leadership of the Democrat Party, has promoted 
ASEAN’s engagement with Myanmar, and thus promoted Myanmar’s socialization into an 
ASEAN Community. The third reason why this thesis is focusing on Thailand’s bilateral 
relations is due to the deeply embedded nature of Thailand’s political crisis, such as the 
southern conflict, which is difficult to resolve, and which has had a negative impact on Thai-
Malaysian relations. Finally, this thesis will focus on Thailand, due to its importance as an 
ASEAN member that is situated on the boundary between the “old” and “new” ASEAN, and 
so has disproportional impact after ASEAN expansion in facilitating or hindering access to 
new members by land, or a disproportional impact on regional connectivity, as well as a 
disproportional impact on the expansion of ASEAN identity to new member states. 
 Existing research on bilateral relations within ASEAN also point to Thailand’s 
bilateral relations as problematic, and include analyses on differentiation, as well as other 
issues, in the form of bilateral disputes.98 Differentiation is based on historical narratives and 
the historical legacy of colonization, as well as ethno-religious differences. Two scholars, 
Narayanan Ganesan and Ramses Amer, identified differentiation in the following sets of 
bilateral relations within ASEAN: Cambodian-Vietnamese, Thai-Burmese, Thai-Cambodian, 
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Thai-Malaysian, and Singapore-Malaysian relations.99 Out of these five sets of bilateral 
relations, Singapore-Malaysian relations can be very tense at times; however, it is the least 
likely to provoke conflict due to Singapore’s substantial reliance on Malaysia for food and 
water.100 Three out of the four remaining sets of bilateral relations all involve Thailand, which 
implies that Thailand’s bilateral relations constitute the major obstacle to progress in regional 
community building. 
 In addition, Thailand’s bilateral relations constitute difficult cases for regional 
community building for the following reasons. Differentiation between Thailand and its 
neighbours is deeply rooted in the political construction of national identity and historical 
narratives, and worsened by on-going border disputes, as well as the historical legacy of 
colonisation. Given that differentiation is deeply rooted in the socio-political structures 
governing bilateral relations, it is convenient for state leaders to pick up this issue and to 
highlight it for domestic political gains. Nevertheless, there have been efforts by successive 
Thai governments to reduce differentiation and to promote friendly bilateral relations. The 
most significant effort to reverse differentiation occurred under the premiership of Chatichai 
Choonhavan (1988-1991). Upon assuming the premiership, Chatichai announced a new 
Indochina policy, which sought to downplay Vietnam as an external security threat, and to 
portray Vietnam as an ally in the economic transformation of Indochina. Vietnam was 
formerly perceived as a security threat, firstly, because of its potential to spread communism 
to the rest of Southeast Asia; and, secondly, because of its invasion and occupation of 
Cambodia in 1978. In any case, both of these threats were resolved in the post-Cold War 
period, which also saw an improvement in Thai-Vietnamese relations, and greater 
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cooperation between the two countries.101 In contrast, Cambodia, as well as Myanmar, posed 
external security threats into the post-Cold War period. Moreover, Thailand’s southern 
neighbour, Malaysia, also posed external security threats during and after the Cold War. This 
thesis will analyse Thailand’s bilateral relations with all of these countries in order to 
evaluate the extent to which state leaders have been successful in reversing differentiation, 
and promoting assimilation, and, thus, the extent to which a sample of ASEAN member 
states have contributed to progress in ASEAN community building.  
Civil Society 
 
 Civil society is a good variable for testing ASEAN’s progress in regional community 
building since it indicates the extent to which regionalism has expanded to non-state actors, 
or the extent of participatory regionalism. Moreover, the significance of civil society in 
regionalism indicates the extent to which non-state actors have been able to participate in, 
and to influence the traditional state-led regional discourse and regional policy. This can be 
measured by the extent to which states recognize and discuss civil society’s proposals, and 
the extent to which these proposals are made into policy. Civil society’s proposals are based 
on their communications and activities with local communities, which include raising 
awareness on the states’ regional agenda, discussing its implications and brainstorming 
alternative proposals in cases where a negative socio-economic impact is identified. Civil 
society not only raises regional awareness through local activities, but also through the 
creation of horizontal linkages with other civil society throughout the region to exchange 
ideas for capacity building programs, such as policy research, as well as to exchange ideas for 
the development of a common regional agenda for advocacy, which they can then use to 
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lobby state actors at both the national and regional level. Given that the role of civil society at 
both these levels is to a large extent controlled by states, one would expect any continuation 
or change in the extent of their role to also be determined by states. For this reason, an 
analysis on the significance of civil society in regionalism also requires an analysis on the 
motivations behind states’ promotion or limitation of their role. Thus, by focusing on civil 
society as a variable, one can deduce both the extent to which regional states have progressed 
towards “new regionalism” and the extent to which civil society has facilitated and/or been 
able to build on this progress, as part of regional community building. 
 Participatory regionalism can be measured based on three indicators – public 
participation, availability of information, and public debate – which can all be seen as part of 
a spectrum. On one end of the spectrum is what I will call closed participatory regionalism, 
which is characterized by i) selected public participation that is limited to specific social 
groups, for example, students and pro-government CSOs; ii) availability of information on 
fait accompli, or official documents which have already been agreed on by state actors; iii) 
the presentation of the results of a public debate on regionalism to state actors, whereby these 
results are not given feedback or acted upon. On the other end of the spectrum is open 
participatory regionalism, which features i) open public participation, whereby anyone can 
participate; ii) availability of draft policies for feedback and voting; iii) the presentation of the 
results of a public debate on regionalism to state actors, whereby these results are given 
feedback and there is a negotiated outcome between state actors and CSOs. 
 According to a New Regionalism Approach (NRA), progress towards a regional 
community is not only indicated by states’ expansion of regionalism to non-state actors, and 
non-state actors’ efforts to participate in regionalism, but also by the expansion of regional 
cooperation beyond the traditional areas of security and economic development; more 
specifically, cooperation in more people-centred areas, such as the promotion of democracy 
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and human rights. Participatory regionalism already covers the promotion of democracy, or 
democratization, at both the national and regional level. This is because countries which are 
undergoing democratization, and which engage in consultations with civil society at the 
national level, are more likely to promote similar processes at the regional and international 
level, including participatory regionalism.102 For this reason, there is no need to focus on the 
promotion of democracy again, when testing for the expansion of regional cooperation. 
Rather, one can just focus on the extent to which states’ promotion of human rights, and the 
extent to which they enable civil society to participate in this promotion of human rights, 
indicate progress in regional community building. If states recognize the importance of 
initiating a regional human rights discourse and establishing a regional human rights 
institution, this demonstrates their preparedness to abide by a set of chosen values and norms, 
as well as their preparedness to identify themselves as part of a common regional entity to 
uphold them. Moreover, if states enable civil society to participate in the promotion of human 
rights, this further demonstrates progress in regional community building, based on both the 
emergence of new regional issues, as well as the emergence of a more socially inclusive 
regionalism.  
 Progress on human rights within ASEAN regionalism can be viewed as part of a 
spectrum, which I have created, based on inter-state and state-CSO cooperation in this area. 
This spectrum is composed of three factors: states’ treatment of norms on human rights, 
states’ discourse and policies on human rights, and the nature of agenda-setting and policy 
implementation. On one end of the spectrum, states recognize and promote norms on human 
rights, while maintaining the exclusively state-centred nature of agenda-setting and policy 
implementation. In practice, this situation is characterized by state-initiated regional 
institutions on human rights, which do not have the mandate to receive complaints on human 
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rights abuses, to investigate them, or to make provisions for CSOs’ participation. Instead, 
they promote human rights without advocating political reform, for example, by raising 
awareness, and facilitating research and training on the protection of human rights. On the 
other end of the spectrum, states create incentives for norm-compliance, or disincentives for 
non-compliance; they promote, as well as protect human rights, and make provisions for CSO 
participation in agenda-setting and policy implementation. This situation is characterized by 
state-initiated regional institutions on human rights with the power to act as a regional police, 
which can investigate complaints from individual countries, and monitor and enforce human 
rights.103 The extent of ASEAN’s progress along this spectrum will be similar to the extent of 
progress along the sliding scale from “old” to “new regionalism”, and thus indicate ASEAN’s 
progress in community building.  
 Finally, civil society is a good variable for testing ASEAN’s progress in regional 
community building, based on the success of transnational civil society networks (TCSN) in 
creating multi-level linkages between national, regional and international policies. The 
creation of multi-level linkages between the national and regional level consists of making 
the policies at these two levels compatible, and related to each other. Assuming that national 
policy over-rides regional policy, the more compatible these policies are, the more regional 
institutions are relevant for society at the national level, and the more such institutions will be 
supported by society, thereby consolidating regional awareness and a regional identity. In 
terms of multi-level linkages to international policies, TCSN seek to bring national and 
regional policies up to an international standard, and, in doing so, promote the harmonization 
of policies across all levels. Such harmonization of policies indicate progress in regional 
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community building, since it demonstrates that regional countries share common interests, 
which provide a basis for the development of regional discourse, regional policies, and a 
regional identity.  
 The extent to which TCSN are able to create multi-level linkages can be seen as part 
of a spectrum. On one end, civil society organizations (CSO) members of a TCSN raise 
awareness on local concerns or international trends, and agree on a common agenda for 
regional advocacy. On the other end of the spectrum, CSO members have strengthened 
themselves to the extent that they are able to act as epistemic communities, which are 
recognized by governments, and invited by governments to discuss new policies. An 
epistemic community is defined as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge 
within that domain or issue area.”104 Such networks are expected to promote discussions and 
negotiations between states, and between states and TCSN on new policies to address 
regional problems. These discussions are expected to facilitate the convergence of interests, 
and the emergence of a common regional position to address regional problems, thereby 
contributing to progress in regional community building. Moreover, the new policies which 
result from these discussions should reflect multi-level linkages, that is, they should reflect 
both local preferences, and international trends and standards. Thus, the extent to which 
TCSN can create multi-level linkages and contribute to regional community building ranges 
from raising awareness and initiating common regional advocacy, to acting as an epistemic 
community and influencing new policies. 
 In summary, the section on civil society demonstrates how this thesis evaluates 
ASEAN’s progress in regional community building, based on the spectrum of participatory 
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regionalism, the significance of human rights and CSOs within ASEAN regionalism, and the 
extent of multi-level linkages created by transnational civil society networks.  
 
IV. Case Studies and Chapter Outlines 
 
 This final section will now provide the case studies and chapter outlines for the 
remainder of this thesis, based on the justification and operationalization of variables 
provided in the previous section. The thesis adopts a two-pronged approach in its evaluation 
of ASEAN’s progress in regional community building by testing the persistence of “old 
regionalism,” as well as the emergence of “new regionalism.” The first part of the thesis tests 
the persistence of “old regionalism” based on three case studies of Thailand’s bilateral 
relations, while the second part tests the emergence of “new regionalism” based on three case 
studies of the significance of CSOs in ASEAN regionalism. The analyses build on secondary 
material, including academic research, newspapers, and related websites. Primary material for 
the analyses includes Foreign Ministry documents and interviews with diplomats, as well as 
civil society documents and interviews with members of civil society. 
 Chapter two evaluates ASEAN’s progress in regional community building, based on 
the extent to which there has been a shift from differentiation to assimilation in Thai-
Myanmar relations. The chapter identifies factors which motivate the reversal of 
differentiation, namely, the Thai government’s pursuit of economic interests through bilateral 
trade and multilateral economic frameworks, as well as its aim to consolidate regime security 
by demonstrating regional leadership in economic development and community building. 
Conversely, factors which maintain differentiation in the bilateral relationship are also 
identified. These include Thailand’s on and off support for the Burmese political opposition, 
cross-border problems, such as drug-trafficking, the presence of military troops in the border 
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area, as well as problems arising from Burmese political refugees and migrant workers. The 
chapter finds that underlying differentiation in the Thai-Myanmar relationship is maintained 
by history textbooks and popular culture. However, it also finds that these sources of 
differentiation have been identified by state actors as obstacles to improving bilateral 
relations, and, as a result, have stimulated initiatives for revised history, as well as efforts to 
raise public awareness and to promote public discussions on regional community building. 
Thus, there is not a lack of ideas and policies for reversing differentiation, but rather a lack of 
political incentives, as well as maintained bilateral tensions, due to Myanmar’s domestic 
politics and border problems.  
 Chapter three analyses the difficulty in reversing differentiation of the other, and 
promoting assimilation, in the Thai-Cambodian bilateral relationship. The chapter 
acknowledges similarities between the Thai-Myanmar and Thai-Cambodian relationship, 
based on a historical legacy of differentiation, and apprehension over Thailand’s hegemonic 
aspirations. Moreover, these two bilateral relationships also share similar variables for the 
reversal of differentiation, in terms of the Thai government’s pursuit of economic interests, 
and its aim to demonstrate leadership in regional development and community building. 
However, despite these similarities, the Thai-Cambodian relationship is more problematic for 
regional community building, due to the internationalisation of Thai-Cambodian bilateral 
conflicts, the use of such conflicts for domestic political gains in both countries, as well as 
recent armed clashes, in 2011, in the contested border area. The internationalisation of 
bilateral conflicts reinforces differentiation, since it is no longer only targeted at a domestic 
audience, but also at the broader international community, in order to secure their political 
support for bilateral conflicts. Thus, progress towards assimilation is restricted by the linkage 
between political interests and bilateral conflicts, the internationalisation of these conflicts, 
and the militarisation of the border area.  
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 Chapter four focuses on Thailand’s southern conflict and state-centred differentiation 
in the Thai-Malaysian relationship. It identifies Thailand’s domestic politics as the main 
source of differentiation for the following reasons. The Thai government’s domestic policies 
have, to a large extent, fuelled the on-going conflict in southern Thailand, which has a 
historical legacy of producing differentiation in the Thai-Malaysian relationship. The reversal 
of differentiation resulting from this southern conflict began in the 1970s, when both the Thai 
and Malaysian governments were faced with a common threat, emanating from a communist 
insurgency in the border area. This common political and security threat created an incentive 
for bilateral cooperation against the communists, which subsequently paved the way for 
expanded bilateral cooperation, and closer bilateral relations. Following this successful 
cooperation against the communists, further incentives for the reversal of differentiation 
emerged, namely, an international trend towards economic integration, and prospects for 
promoting economic growth and stability in the border area. However, despite these 
incentives, the Thai-Malaysian relationship remained vulnerable to differentiation, due to the 
failure of Thai government policies to resolve the southern conflict, and the attempt to find a 
scapegoat, by externalizing the causes of the southern conflict to Malaysia. Most recently, 
Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006) externalized the causes of the conflict, 
thereby proving, yet again, that differentiation in the Thai-Malaysian relationship persists 
because of Thailand’s domestic politics, and, as such, undermines the process of regional 
community building.  
 Chapter five evaluates ASEAN’s progress in regional community building, based on 
the significance of “new regionalism,” as indicated by participatory regionalism. 
Participatory regionalism is defined as the participation of civil society organizations (CSOs) 
in regional policy-making. The chapter finds that democratizing ASEAN member states 
promote participatory regionalism, as an extension of the process of democratization at the 
58 
 
national level, and their existing engagement with CSOs at this level. Conversely, the chapter 
finds that participatory regionalism is restricted by the less open and less democratic ASEAN 
member states, which seek to protect their regime security, and to maintain a purely state-
centred form of ASEAN regionalism. Nevertheless, negotiated compromises between the 
more democratic and less democratic ASEAN member states have led to the inclusion of 
students and CSOs in ASEAN themed conferences. Most significantly, ASEAN leaders have 
been meeting with CSOs at the ASEAN Civil Society Conference since 2005, and enabled 
CSOs to present proposals on an ASEAN Charter. However, these proposals were not 
translated into policy, and there has been a lack of concrete outcomes from meetings between 
state leaders and CSOs. Thus, declarations to realize a people-oriented ASEAN Community 
appear to be rhetorical, due to the lack of substantive participatory regionalism.  
 Chapter six evaluates ASEAN’s progress in regional community building, based on 
the extent to which human rights, and CSOs which work on human rights, have become part 
of ASEAN regionalism. The chapter identifies the external and internal factors, which 
motivated the emergence of a human rights discourse and human rights policies in ASEAN. 
These include pressure from the West’s emphasis on democratization and human rights in 
their foreign policy, as well as the UN World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, and the 
resultant need for regional human rights mechanisms. Moreover, the process of 
democratization in ASEAN member states also motivated the emergence of human rights in 
ASEAN regionalism, as did the promotion of human rights policies by academia, CSOs, and 
National Human Rights Institutions. As a result, ASEAN member states gradually established 
an ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). AICHR 
institutionalised ASEAN member states’ recognition and promotion of human rights norms. 
However, it maintains ASEAN member states’ defensive mechanisms against external 
interference and their exclusive role in agenda-setting. Moreover, it does not provide for 
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investigations on human rights abuses, or sanctions against these abuses; nor does it provide 
for civil society participation. Thus, this chapter similarly demonstrates that ASEAN 
community building is empty in substance, due to the creation of a regional human rights 
body that is exclusively controlled by states and that lacks any power to protect human rights.  
 Chapter seven evaluates ASEAN’s progress in community building, based on the 
extent to which transnational civil society networks (TCSN) have succeeded in creating 
multi-level linkages across the national, regional, and international levels, and thereby 
contributed towards an integrated region, with harmonized domestic and regional policies. 
The chapter focuses on ASEAN policies on rural development and food security, since these 
areas constitute new, non-traditional security issues for regional cooperation, and thus 
indicate progress along the sliding scale from “old” to “new regionalism.” The chapter finds 
that TCSN have been active in raising social awareness of an ASEAN Community, especially 
in the rural communities. Moreover, TCSN have enabled these rural communities to become 
part of a larger regional network, which gives them more visibility vis-à-vis governments, 
and an opportunity to voice their preferences on regional policy. However, despite TCSN’s 
efforts at social mobilization, their promotion of multi-level linkages, and an increase in 
regional policies on non-traditional security, they have thus far failed to influence ASEAN 
policies, for the following reasons. ASEAN member states remain averse to creating multi-
level linkage, where there is a common, regional standard, and provisions for regional 
monitoring, due to their prioritization of regional unity. This means enabling each country to 
proceed at its own pace, in accordance to its own level of political development. Thus, there 
is a lack of substantive progress in ASEAN community building, due to the region’s political 
diversity, and the prioritization of regional unity over the creation of new regional policies on 
non-traditional security, and provisions for civil society participation.  
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 The chapters on bilateral relations and civil society evaluate different aspects of 
ASEAN’s progress in regional community building. The former analyses the extent to which 
the “old regionalism” characteristic of security threats restricts progress towards the “new 
regionalism” characteristic of a shared sense of solidarity. On the other hand, the latter set of 
chapters analyses the extent to which “new regionalism” characteristics - namely, new 
regional actors, new regional issues for cooperation, and multi-level linkages – have 
overcome the constraints imposed by “old regionalism” and become significant in a new age 
of ASEAN regionalism towards a regional community. The thesis finds that ASEAN member 
states are still more inclined towards the “old regionalism” end of the spectrum, and that they 
have made significant progress towards “new regionalism,” in terms of discourse, new 
institutions, and meetings with CSOs; but have made limited progress, in terms of policy 
implementation, the provision of a role for CSOs in regionalism, and the harmonisation of 
domestic and regional policies. Thus, ASEAN’s progress in regional community building is 
more apparent in form, rather than in substance, and is more a continuation of the same old 
regional processes, rather than the consolidation of new ones, as concrete steps towards an 
ASEAN Community.  
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Chapter Two: The Perpetual Enemy and Inconsistent Foreign Policy in 
Thai-Myanmar Relations 
 
 This chapter tests ASEAN’s progress in community building based on the extent of 
the shift from differentiation to assimilation in Thai-Myanmar relations. Thai-Myanmar 
relations constitute a difficult case for community building, in terms of improving the quality 
of intra-regional relations and promoting assimilation into a regional community. This is due 
to a historical legacy of differentiation, and the tendency to continue this legacy, as a result of 
on-going bilateral tensions and problems. Differentiation has been perpetuated over the years 
due to weak political institutions and inconsistent foreign policies. On the Thai side, weak 
political institutions are indicated by the numerous military coups and change of government 
throughout the 20
th
 century. The standard answer for the total number of military coups in the 
20
th
 century is 18, although alternative numbers have also been given by different scholars, 
depending on whether they count plots, attempts, and unsuccessful coups.105 This high turn-
over rate of different Thai administrations has sometimes led to contradicting foreign 
policies, especially towards Myanmar, depending on whether state actors prioritize the 
pursuit of economic cooperation with countries, irrespective of their political system, or 
whether they prioritize the promotion of the international community’s norm of 
democratization over close relations with undemocratic regimes. The resultant changing 
policies of successive Thai governments has contributed to unpredictable bilateral relations, 
which maintains distrust and the tendency to reproduce differentiation. 
 Myanmar’s domestic politics also contributed to unpredictable bilateral relations 
during the Cold War, since there were periods when Burmese state actors sought to protect 
regime security by pursuing diplomatic relations, and other periods when they decided on 
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isolation. Moreover, the Burmese government’s repression of political dissidents, and 
consequent international pressure for reforms, also complicated ASEAN’s position vis-à-vis 
Myanmar: on the one hand, ASEAN member states sought to maintain regional unity, on the 
other hand, they also sought to maintain international recognition and support for ASEAN. 
International recognition of an independent Myanmar can be traced back to 1948, when the 
first government was established after decolonization, with Sao Shwe Thaik as President and 
U Nu as Prime Minister. This government established diplomatic relations with Prime 
Minister Phibun Songkhram of Thailand in 1948. It was subsequently overthrown by a 
military coup in 1962, which was led by General Ne Win. Ne Win initially sought to protect 
regime security by pursuing an isolationist foreign policy. However, he resumed Myanmar’s 
international relations in 1972, at a time when Myanmar’s domestic economy and business 
climate was deteriorating, and a time when he urgently needed to consolidate his regime’s 
security and legitimacy.  
Almost 20 years later, Myanmar’s international relations returned to a state of 
uncertainty when General Saw Maung staged a military coup in 1988. This coup established 
the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which has since then been a concern 
of the international community for the following reasons: its suppression of political 
dissidents and human rights violations, including the house arrest of opposition leader Daw 
Aung San Suu Kyi of the National League for Democracy (NLD), as well as its refusal to 
accept the NLD’s victory in the 1990 general elections. These actions led to condemnation by 
the international community, namely, the US and EU, which agreed to isolate SLORC by 
imposing economic sanctions. Moreover, the US and EU also agreed to suspend or cancel 
international assistance to Myanmar, in order to exert pressure for political reforms.  ASEAN 
member states were initially hesitant and cautious in devising their approach to SLORC, 
given the position of Western countries on the one hand, and their aim to consolidate regional 
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solidarity on the other, as well as their principle of non-interference in another country’s 
internal affairs. Ultimately, they decided to pursue diplomatic relations with the new Burmese 
government, and to accept Myanmar as a new ASEAN member state in 1997. They justified 
this policy as a demonstration of Southeast Asia’s regional autonomy vis-à-vis the Western 
powers.106 Moreover, they also reasoned that ASEAN provided the best channel for engaging 
with Myanmar and for checking Chinese influence in the region. On the part of Myanmar, 
efforts were made to demonstrate its legitimacy as a member of the international community. 
Most notably, SLORC was dissolved and replaced by the State Peace and Development 
Council (SPDC) in 1997: the year Myanmar was admitted into ASEAN. This change was 
interpreted by Myanmar observers as an attempt to appease ASEAN and the broader 
international community, by demonstrating that peace had been consolidated at the national 
level, and that the Burmese were now focused on national development and regional 
cooperation.107 Moreover, the name change was also intended to demonstrate the Burmese 
government’s readiness to proceed, albeit at its pace, to engage its opposition: the National 
League for Democracy, led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. However, it was not until November 
2010 when national elections took place, and even then it was criticized by political 
dissidents in Myanmar and the international media as being a sham.108 
Myanmar’s domestic politics has been an international issue since 1988 and one 
which posed problems for ASEAN’s relations with the West: this situation provided an 
incentive for the ruling Democrat Party in Thailand to propose a collective ASEAN approach 
to Myanmar in 1998, in order to influence political reforms. However, the proposal 
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demonstrated a preference by the majority of ASEAN member states to abide by the 
traditional norm of non-interference in another country’s internal affairs, and worsened Thai-
Myanmar relations. This promotion of a collective ASEAN approach to Myanmar was 
pursued by subsequent governments, led by the Democrat Party in Thailand, and contributed 
to the continuation of bilateral tensions and differentiation. Moreover, bilateral tensions and 
differentiation were also maintained by cross-border drug-trafficking, the presence of military 
troops in the border area, as well as problems arising from Burmese political refugees and 
migrant workers.  
This chapter seeks to analyse, and to explain, the advances and limitations in 
reversing differentiation in Thai-Myanmar relations. It is divided into three sections. Section I 
analyses Thailand’s differentiation for internal rather than external security, that is, the use of 
state-led discourse on differentiation to consolidate Thai nationhood at the national level, in 
contrast to the suspension of differentiation in state-to-state bilateral meetings, to 
communicate mutual recognition of each other’s independence and nation-building efforts, as 
well as to identify areas of common interest for cooperation. Section II analyses on-going 
mutual differentiation, which includes the Burmese government’s differentiation of its Thai 
counterpart, based on support for the Burmese opposition, as well as mutual differentiation 
resulting from cross-border drug-trafficking. Section III identifies incentives for reversing 
differentiation, such as economic interests and the aim to demonstrate regional leadership in 
community building. The chapter concludes that while there is still underlying differentiation, 
based on continued historical legacy, the school curriculum, and distrust in bilateral relations, 
there has also been increasing efforts to reverse differentiation, based on the aim to 
consolidate a regional community for security and economic interests, as well as 
collaboration between state and non-state actors. Thus, the incentive to promote community 
building at the state level exists; however, states appear to need more persuasion to replace 
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their legacy of instilling differentiation within society, with a new trend to promote 
assimilation into a regional community. 
I. Thailand’s Differentiation for Internal rather than External Security 
 
 Differentiation of Myanmar became deeply embedded in the Thai political system 
since the 18
th
 century, at a time when both countries’ leaders fought to consolidate their 
kingdom, and Myanmar ultimately conquered the old Thai capital of Ayutthaya in 1767. 
Differentiation of Myanmar, based on reminders of this conquest, have repeatedly been used 
by Thai leaders whenever they judged that a rallying call of nationalist feelings would protect 
their political interests, or keep them in power to safeguard national security. The political 
elite’s reference to past conquests by an external enemy led to the construction of Thai 
nationhood, based on differentiation of an aggressive other. This construction of “Thainess”, 
and political statements on the urgency of protecting this “Thainess” against external security 
threats, was used by Thai leaders to maintain power and hegemony within the Thai state; and 
within the sub-region of Thailand, Myanmar, and the former Indochinese states of Cambodia, 
Laos and Vietnam.109 The continued use of differentiation in state-led discourse on Thai 
nationshood has led to deeply embedded negative images of Thailand’s neighbours within 
Thai society, which constitute a major obstacle to improving the quality of intra-regional 
relations, and to creating a community “we-feeling.” Historians, political scientists, and the 
media all demonstrate the tendency of Thai leaders to reproduce differentiation, to the extent 
that it appears to have become a default, institutionalized policy, with detrimental impact on 
Thailand’s bilateral relations.110 The negative images produced by the state-led discourse on 
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differentiation may change over time, but the intent to highlight a neighbouring external 
security threat remains, be it in the form of Myanmar as a past invader, a threatening socialist 
state during the Cold War, or, more recently, a country of origin for drugs.111  
Thai Military Governments and Nation-Building (1930s-1950s) 
 
Current negative images of Myanmar can be traced back to the Thai military 
governments of Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram (1938-1944 and 1948-1957), which sought 
to consolidate the nation state by constructing a notion of “Thainess” based on differentiation 
of an aggressive Myanmar. Phibun, and subsequent Thai leaders, sought to maintain regime 
security and legitimacy by contrasting their promotion of peaceful international relations, 
with Myanmar’s history and inclination towards aggression. Grand historical narratives of 
Thai battles against Burmese aggressors became institutionalized by the Thai state and elite’s 
cultivation of nationalism, which has been the main influence on Thai foreign policy towards 
Myanmar, as well as Thai society’s perception of Myanmar.112 Under Phibun’s military rule, 
Luang Wichit Wathakan (1898-1962) was the predominant creator of the notion of 
“Thainess” through popular culture, based on differentiation of Myanmar. Luang Wichit was 
a politician, historian and playwright, who sought to consolidate the military regime’s 
legitimacy by emphasizing its role in strengthening the nation-state against an aggressive 
Myanmar, and the need to abide by khwam chuea phunam: a Thai norm on following the 
leader.113 The depiction of Myanmar as Thailand’s enemy was further accentuated during the 
Cold War when Phibun led an anti-Communist campaign against it. Under Phibun’s rule, the 
military became involved in warfare in Myanmar, both on the side of the Kuomintang troops 
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(KMT), which were fighting Communist China from Myanmar, and on the side of many 
ethnic insurgencies against the Burmese military and government’s central authority. 
Thailand supplied arms to both groups. It developed strong relations with the various anti-
Communist ethnic groups in Myanmar and created a buffer zone along the Thai-Burmese 
border, which was to last for decades, and which maintained mutual suspicion and tension 
between the two countries. Cooperation with the anti-Communist ethnic groups was aimed at 
destabilizing the political power of Thailand’s “traditional enemy” Myanmar while 
simultaneously fighting Communism.114 Thus, state-led differentiation of Myanmar was 
reinforced by the Cold War ideological battle, and further estranged the two countries. 
Differentiation of Myanmar from the Cold War to the present was also based on grand 
historical narratives written by Prince Damrong Rajanubhab (1862-1943), who was an 
influential member of the elite, and played an important role in institutionalizing the 
differentiation of Myanmar. Prince Damrong wrote a grand historical narrative in 1917 
entitled Thai Rop Phama or “Thais Fight Burmese” in English, which state leaders then 
included as part of the school curriculum, and which the elite turned into popular culture 
through the fabrication of related stories and movies.115 The most prominent Thai-Burmese 
battle which became part of popular culture is the battle against Burmese invaders in the Thai 
village of Bangrachan 1765-1767, which ended with the conquest of Ayutthaya. For example, 
the battle of Bangrachan was made into a novel by a Thai aristocrat, Kan Puengban na 
Ayutthaya, in 1968, and reproduced differentiation by depicting the Burmese as evil 
aggressors who slaughtered patriotic Thai people.116 Moreover, the battle of Bangrachan has 
appeared every now and then in popular culture, be it as a movie (one movie was released in 
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1966 and another in 2000), or as a television series, such as “Sai Lo-Hid” in 1995. Most 
recently, differentiation of Myanmar in popular culture appeared in the movie “Queen 
Suriyothai”, which was released in 2001, and narrates the story of a Thai Queen who was 
killed while fighting the Burmese in the 16
th
 century. Such sources of popular culture 
demonstrate how the differentiation of Myanmar as a neighbouring aggressor has been 
perpetuated over the years. In contrast, there are no counter-sources which depict Myanmar 
as a friend, and the absence of such sources represent a gap in the state and elite’s efforts to 
promote regional community building.  
Regime Security and the Suspension of Differentiation (1940s-1980s) 
Despite Thailand and Myanmar’s historical legacy of enmity and the state-led 
discourse on differentiation in Thailand, both countries had an incentive to protect their 
regime during the Cold War, and, as such, communicated their recognition, and respect, for 
each other’s independence and nation-building efforts. This mutual recognition was 
communicated through the exchange of state visits, which were supplemented by mutual 
support for their common religion of Buddhism, through donations to temples and 
participation in each other’s religious ceremonies. The exchange of state visits and 
participation in religious ceremonies can be traced back to the establishment of Thai-Burmese 
diplomatic relations in 1948, which paved the way for subsequent state visits. In 1955, the 
first Burmese Prime Minister, U Nu, visited Thailand. U Nu signalled his regime’s peaceful 
intent, and promoted bilateral reconciliation by making a donation toward the restoration of 
temples and Buddha statues, which were destroyed by Myanmar in its second invasion of the 
old Kingdom of Ayutthaya in 1767. Thai leaders subsequently reciprocated such visits and 
peaceful gestures by attending a religious ceremony in Myanmar in 1955.117 In 1960, His 
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Majesty the King and Queen of Thailand visited Myanmar as guests of General Ne Win. In 
addition, civil servants from both countries also visited each other and sought to maintain 
peaceful bilateral relations by drafting agreements on various issues, such as the Treaty on 
Peace and Friendship and memorandums of understanding on border problems.118 Both 
countries respected each other’s common aim to strengthen their nation state, and agreed to 
mutually support this endeavour through recognition of each other’s independence, which 
includes independence to pursue their chosen path of development, and not to interfere in 
each other’s domestic affairs. In this regard, there was a reversal of differentiation between 
states, but not between Thai society and the Burmese state, due to a state-led discourse on 
differentiation in Thailand, as part of nation-building.  
The incentive to protect regime security through the reversal of state-to-state 
differentiation has to a large extent continued to the present day, and constitutes part of the 
broader aim to protect regime security through expanded international relations and 
international cooperation. On the Burmese side, General Ne Win (Chairman of the ruling 
Burma Socialist Programme Party 1964-1988) sought to protect Myanmar’s security interests 
by ending the previous policy of isolation and reaching out to the international community in 
1972.119 On the Thai side, Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda (1980-1988) also sought to 
consolidate Thailand’s security by expanding its international relations. In this endeavour, he 
initiated an “Omni-Directional Policy” in 1982, which sought to demonstrate Thailand’s 
willingness to negotiate, and to have good relations with every country, irrespective of its 
political ideology or religion.120 The exchange of visits and communications between Thai 
and Burmese leaders, as a result of these policies, led to significant improvements in state-to-
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state relations in the 1980s.121 Burmese leaders recognized the Thai Royal family and Thai 
state actors, and demonstrated the importance they gave to Thailand. For example, General 
Ne Win invited Her Royal Highness Princess Sirindhorn of Thailand to pay an official visit to 
Myanmar as his guest in 1986; and also allowed the Thai Foreign Minister at the time, Sitthi 
Savetsila, to pay a courtesy call during his visit to Myanmar that same year. This was very 
significant since General Ne Win rarely met representatives from other countries, be they 
officials or Heads of State. Burmese state actors reciprocated their Thai counterparts’ visits. 
For example, Foreign Minister U Yaegong visited Thailand in 1986, and Prime Minister U 
Maung Kha paid a visit in 1987. Such exchange of state visits facilitated the reversal of 
differentiation by providing both governments with an opportunity to express their 
commitment to jointly resolve common problems, such as that of Burmese ethnic insurgents 
in the border area, through the Thai-Burma Border Committee, which was established in 
1963.122 Thai Prime Minister Prem sought to reverse state-to-state differentiation by 
emphasizing his government’s policy of not supporting ethnic insurgents in the border area. 
However, one Burmese political activist, Maung Zarni, argues that the Thai military in the 
border area had business ties with ethnic insurgents (namely, the New Mon State Party and 
the Karen National Liberation Army) and that they allowed weapons to be transported to 
them up until 1988.123 Such business ties and transactions maintained distrust in bilateral 
relations, and served as factors for underlying differentiation.  
II. On-going Mutual Differentiation 
From 1988 onwards, the Burmese government differentiated its Thai counterpart as a 
security threat, based on the latter’s alleged involvement in anti-Yangon organizations and 
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exploitation of Myanmar’s resources.124 The Burmese government interpreted its Thai 
counterpart’s involvement in anti-Yangon organizations as an infringement on national self-
determination and sovereignty, and, as such, lost trust in its Thai counterpart. Moreover, the 
perceived exploitation of Myanmar’s resources was interpreted by the Burmese government 
and media as a means for the Thai government to increase its power in the region, and its 
potential to become the regional hegemon.125 Moreover, these actors also differentiated 
Thailand as a potential hegemonic threat by referring to the Thai Defence Minister (and 
Deputy Prime Minister) General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh’s idea in 1989 of creating a 
“Suwannaphume,” or Golden Land in Southeast Asia, with Thailand as the economic 
centre.126 Thus, the Burmese government’s differentiation of its Thai counterpart was based 
on its alleged support for the Burmese opposition, its apparent aims to build Thailand’s 
hegemony in the region and activities which were seen to support this aim.  
Differentiation of Thailand is deeply embedded in Burmese society, since it is 
included in school textbooks and forms part of the curriculum on neighbouring countries. 
Differentiation of Thailand was included in three supplementary textbooks on Thai-Burmese 
relations for primary and secondary school students, which were introduced by the Burmese 
government in 2001. The textbooks portrayed Thai people as those who are dependent on 
others, since they are “lazy” and “disinclined to self-reliance and hard work.”127 Following 
this background, supplementary history textbooks for secondary school differentiate the Thai 
government as a security threat, due to its hegemonic aspirations to weaken and exploit 
others, as evident in its support for ethnic insurgents in Myanmar and anti-Myanmar 
organizations, as well as involvement in drug trafficking and extraction of Myanmar’s 
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resources.128 Nevertheless, despite this differentiation in the school curriculum, scholars of 
Thai-Myanmar relations find that differentiation of Thailand as Myanmar’s historical enemy 
is not as stark as that of Myanmar in Thai historiography.129 In any case, Burmese scholars 
observe that Burmese society not only differentiate Thailand, but also resent the Thai state for 
not doing enough to help Burmese people push for democratization.130 Thus, obstacles to 
improving Thai-Myanmar relations on the Burmese side include differentiation in the school 
curriculum and resentment against the lack of pressure for political reforms.   
Burmese Awareness and Resentment Against Thailand’s Differentiation (Post-Cold War) 
Not only are there restrictions on progress from differentiation to assimilation at the 
state-to-state level, but also at the people-to-people level, due to the national diffusion of 
negative identification of the Burmese; negative identification of the Burmese not only 
differentiates the Burmese in Myanmar from Thai people, but also alienates those who fled 
persecution back home (namely, after the Burmese government’s crackdown on political 
dissidents in 1988) to live in Thailand. Burmese political refugees in Thailand have sought to 
understand Thailand’s negative identification by studying Thai historical narratives and 
analysing the motives behind Thai leaders’ perpetuation of an external security threat from 
Myanmar. Some analyses on Thailand’s negative identification have appeared in their news 
magazine, The Irrawaddy, which was founded in 1999, in Chiangmai, Thailand, by Aung 
Zaw. The Irrawaddy monitors Myanmar’s politics and is closely associated with the pro-
democracy movement. Moreover, The Irrawaddy also reports on political developments in 
Southeast Asia, but to a lesser extent.131 Burmese political refugees are aware of the deeply 
embedded differentiation of Myanmar, which can make it difficult for them to assimilate into 
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Thai society. One political refugee, Min Zin, identified many sources from Thai historical 
narratives in the 14
th
 to 18
th
 century, which differentiated Myanmar as an aggressor and 
national enemy, and which formed the basis for the subsequent institutionalization of 
differentiation in the 20
th
 century.  For example, one source that was written by a Thai 
historian, Krom Pharawangboworn, vividly depicts the outrage at Myanmar’s invasion and 
pillage of Thailand: 
The sinful Burmese ravaged our villages and cities. A great number of our citizens [were 
killed] and many temples were…ruined. Our peaceful kingdoms were abandoned and turned 
into forests. The Burmese showed no mercy to the Thais and felt no shame for all the sins 
they had committed.132  
 
Moreover, even the historical records of Thai monks contributed to the threatening Burmese 
stereotype by describing the Burmese as a threat to the Buddhist faith, due to their inclination 
towards aggression and their slaughter of fellow Buddhists in Thailand. Such sources are 
included in Thai history textbooks and serve to maintain nationalism, to the expense of 
improving the quality of intra-regional relations for the realization of a regional 
community.133 
In the case of Thailand and Myanmar, improvement of bilateral relations was further 
complicated by what Burmese political refugees described as Thai people’s sense of 
superiority. This apparent sense of superiority is traced back to Thai Prime Minister Chatichai 
Choonhavan’s (1988-1991) depiction of Thailand as a model of development and prosperity, 
in contrast to Myanmar’s stagnation and poverty.134 As argued by Min Zin: “the steady 
deterioration of social and economic conditions in (Myanmar) after decades of misrule under 
successive military regimes has added a sense of worldly, as well as moral, superiority to 
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many Thais’ self-image vis-à-vis their neighbour.”135 The Burmese government also detected 
a sense of superiority on the part of the Thai government and Thai military, and responded by 
differentiating the Thai state as a threat, based on its condescending behaviour. For example, 
the Burmese government criticized the Thai military’s unilateral closing of the border in 
reaction to conflicts in the border area, as well as the Thai military’s unilateral drawing up of 
conditions for the border to be reopened in 2001. They interpreted this behaviour as 
differentiation of Myanmar as Thailand’s inferior, stating that “the Thai authorities treated us 
like a country under their influence. Ignoring the equality and mutual respect between the two 
countries, Thailand treated us like a satellite state.”136 In this regard, one can argue that the 
evolution of differentiation under successive Thai governments has, at worst, contributed to 
hatred on the part of Burmese people, and, at best, resentment: neither of which facilitates 
progress towards assimilation.  
Mutual Differentiation of the Other as a Security Threat (Post-Cold War) 
  
 In the post-Cold War period, progress towards assimilation has been hindered by the 
Thai and Burmese state’s mutual differentiation of each other as a security threat, based on 
drug-trafficking and the presence of military troops in the border area. Burmese political 
refugees in Thailand add to the differentiation of the Burmese government as a security 
threat, in order to maintain international awareness of the political situation in Myanmar, and 
to maintain international pressure for political reforms. In this endeavour, published articles 
questioned the sincerity of the Burmese government, or the State Peace and Development 
Council (SPDC), as of 1997, in pursuing anti-drug trafficking cooperation with Thailand. 
Burmese political refugees added to the Thai state’s differentiation of Myanmar by arguing 
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that the SPDC was only willing to make vacant promises, and that it had not taken any 
concrete steps to reduce drug-trafficking activities.137 Moreover, Burmese political refugees 
also added to the Thai state’s differentiation by arguing that the SPDC’s pledges of 
cooperation with Thailand were only made for the sake of regime legitimacy, and for a 
chance to interact with the broader international community, to reduce its isolation.138 
Burmese political refugees consolidated differentiation of the Burmese government, based on 
drug-trafficking, by arguing that it tended to be non-committal in efforts to resolve the 
problem for the following reasons. The United Wa State Army (UWSA), an ethnic group in 
the border area which allegedly produces drugs for export to Thailand, signed a cease-fire 
agreement with the Burmese government in 1989. Since then, it is argued that the Burmese 
government has reciprocated the UWSA’s cooperation by ignoring their drug related business 
activities. This arrangement benefitted both sides. However, it maintained the Thai military’s 
differentiation of Myanmar as a security threat, based on cross-border drug trafficking. The 
influx of drugs into Thailand reached such an extent that some high-ranking Thai generals 
warned the UWSA that they could face a direct military attack on their settlement if they 
continued to illegally transport drugs across the border.139 In this regard, drug-trafficking not 
only maintained differentiation, but also led to the threat of military attacks. The fact that 
such threats occurred as recently as 2010, demonstrates the continuation of bilateral problems 
as obstacles to the realization of an ASEAN Community, especially the ASEAN Political 
Security pillar. 
 Differentiation of the Burmese government, based on drug-trafficking, is maintained 
by the Thai military and Thai media, as well as Burmese political refugees and a Burmese 
                                                          
137
 “Mutual Interests,” The Irrawaddy 8, No. 4/5 (April 2000), 
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=1872 [accessed on 28/01/10]. 
138
 Aung Naing Oo, “Old Enemies, New Friends?” The Irrawaddy 7, No. 2 (February 1999), 
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=1121 [accessed on 28/01/10]. 
139
 “Tangled Ties,” The Irrawaddy 8, No. 7 (July 2000), http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=1957 
[accessed on 28/01/10]. 
76 
 
anti-junta civil society, the Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (ALTSEAN Burma).140 
These actors insist that the flow of methamphetamines is from Myanmar to Thailand, instead 
of the other way around, as claimed by the Burmese side; moreover, they argue that the Thai 
military’s threats of military attacks on Burmese settlements have led to no apparent change 
in the intensity of drug-trafficking, which implies that it is likely to continue, and to remain a 
source for bilateral differentiation.141  
 The Burmese government and pro-government scholars argue that the Thai 
government is using Burmese ethnic insurgent groups as a scapegoat for internal drugs 
problems; moreover, they undermine the Thai government’s claims by referring to 
international reports, and, in doing so, maintain bilateral tension, which provides a fertile 
environment for continued differentiation.142 The Burmese government has referred to 
sections in reports by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which 
recognize their efforts in fighting against drug-trafficking.143 However, it did not refer to other 
sections in the reports, which stated that corrupt army personnel are involved in such 
activities.144 In any case, the Burmese media – The New Light of Myanmar and Kyemon – as 
well as pro-government scholars have attempted to protect their government’s legitimacy by 
raising awareness on Thailand’s historical role in the drug trade, and the continued historical 
legacy of such activities. In this regard, they are similar to their counterparts in referring to 
historical events, as a basis for present-day differentiation. For example, the Burmese media 
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published articles by prominent historians, which implicitly accused the Thai King in the 18
th
 
century of being responsible for the opium trade in Southeast Asia.145 In addition, pro-
government Burmese scholars also differentiated Thailand as a security threat by arguing that 
the drugs problem came to Myanmar from Thailand; that Thailand is a major transit and 
haven for internationally organized criminals engaged in drug-trafficking; and that it is 
equipped with funding and facilities for drug production.146 Such differentiation of Thailand 
led to protests by the Thai government, thereby maintaining bilateral tension, and restricting 
progress in the improvement of bilateral relations and assimilation.  
In addition to drug trafficking, Thailand and Myanmar’s mutual differentiation of 
each other as a security threat was also based on the presence of military troops on both sides 
of the border. On the Thai side, the security threat is from the potential spill-over of fighting 
between the Myanmar Armed Forces, the Tatmadaw, and ethnic minorities in the border area, 
such as the Karen. Most recently, there was fighting between the Tatmadaw and ethnic 
minorities in November 2010, after the latter protested against the general elections. 
Grenades from the fighting landed in Mae Sot district of northern Thailand and injured three 
to seven Thai people (depending on different sources); moreover, hundreds to thousands (also 
depending on different sources) of Burmese fled to Thailand as a result of the fighting.147 
Some of the Burmese refugees have been detained at the Border Patrol Police in Mae Sot. 
Some have found jobs in Thailand and have been exploited due to their status as 
undocumented migrant workers.148 Neither of these situations facilitates progress from 
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differentiation to assimilation. Detention of Burmese refugees with the Thai police maintains 
differentiation of the Burmese as a security threat, while some Thais’ exploitation of Burmese 
migrant workers has led to narratives of victimization and resentment against Thais on the 
part of the Burmese.149 Thus, the continuation of a militarized border, fighting in the border 
area on the Burmese side, and consequent problems of refugees and migrant workers, 
maintained mutual differentiation in Thai-Myanmar relations.  
III. Incentives for Reversing Differentiation 
 Nevertheless, despite the continued mutual differentiation, a fundamental shift did 
occur in Thai-Myanmar relations in 1988, when the new Thai Prime Minister Chatichai 
Choonhavan (1998-1991) prioritized the pursuit of economic interests over good relations 
between the Thai military in the border area and Burmese ethnic insurgents.150 Chatichai was 
a military officer, turned businessman-politician, who was motivated to reverse 
differentiation of Thailand’s neighbours in the pursuit of economic interests. Chatichai 
outlined a vision of Thailand as an economic centre in mainland Southeast Asia, which would 
engage with neighbouring Indochinese countries, as well as Myanmar.151 His cabinet 
consisted of similar business-oriented politicians, who specifically targeted logging and 
fishing concessions from Myanmar. They prioritized the pursuit of private and national 
economic interests over support for the international community’s condemnation of 
Myanmar’s military coup in 1988, which established the State Law and Order Restoration 
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Council (SLORC). At the time, Thailand’s natural resources, such as forests, minerals, wild 
animals and aquatic animals, were rapidly decreasing and insufficient for domestic 
consumption and industry.152 As such, the search for supplementary raw materials from other 
countries became necessary, and Myanmar appeared to satisfy this need. In the search for 
supplementary raw materials, Chatichai promoted international economic cooperation and the 
expansion of Thailand’s trade to other countries, irrespective of their political ideology and 
political system. This international outlook had huge implications for Thailand’s foreign 
policy after the end of the conflicts in Indochina, since it enabled Chatichai’s government to 
be opportunistic and to initiate the policy of turning Indochina’s “battlefields into 
marketplaces.”153 This pursuit of economic interests was extended to other countries, such as 
Myanmar. Chatichai sought to consolidate Thailand’s economic interests by promoting the 
idea of joint economic development with neighbouring countries. Moreover, he sought to 
highlight Thailand’s success in economic development and to project Thailand’s leadership 
in the sub-region by expressing his willingness to share Thailand’s developmental experience 
with neighbouring countries, and, in doing so, strengthen them economically for both their 
interest as well as Thailand’s. These motivations to reverse differentiation for economic 
interests are evident in the following argument by Chatichai: 
To trade with our neighbours, like Burma, we need to consider their need, treating 
them as partner not enemy. In this way, not only can we pass on our experience about 
economic development, but it is also in our interest to have economically strong 
neighbours.154 
 
In this endeavour, General Chavalit was sent to Myanmar in 1988, as a de facto ambassador 
to pave the way for trade negotiations with SLORC. The choice of Chavalit was based on his 
personal relations with the Burmese leader, General Saw Maung. Chavalit sought to persuade 
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Saw Maung of the mutual benefits that could be gained from bilateral trade, and to pave the 
way for future visits by Thai politicians to negotiate trade deals on wooden products and 
fishery.155 He justified his visit to Myanmar and the promotion of bilateral trade by stating 
that they had a positive impact on Thai-Burmese relations.156 However, Chavalit’s visit also 
demonstrated that the Thai government prioritized economic interests over the protection of 
human rights in Myanmar, to the extent that it helped repatriate Burmese political dissidents 
who fled to Thailand, in exchange for logging rights and fishing deals.157 In this regard, the 
exchange of Thai economic gains for Burmese political dissidents may have reversed 
differentiation of the other as a security threat at the state level, but not at the level of society. 
This was due to the domestic political conflict in Burma, which complicates the reversal of 
differentiation and promotion of assimilation in Thai-Myanmar relations. Moreover, Burma’s 
domestic political conflict also meant that the initiation and development of bilateral 
cooperation between states is not necessarily enough to reverse differentiation at all levels. 
Most Thai governments since the 1980s have chosen to pursue trade with the 
Burmese government over differentiation of an authoritarian regime, since this policy was 
expected to yield the most political, economic, and security benefits. Under Chatichai’s 
government, trade with Myanmar benefited specific groups: politicians, people associated 
with politicians, businessmen and the military. The Thai military played a major role in 
promoting bilateral economic exchanges by purchasing gems and wood from junta owned 
businesses, such as the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings (UMEH), also known as the 
Myanmar Economic Holdings, the Myanmar Economic Cooperation (MEC), and the Union 
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Solidarity Development Association (USDA).158 These economic exchanges benefitted the 
two countries’ militaries and consolidated their bilateral relations. At the time, state leaders 
downplayed or suspended differentiation to pursue economic interests, and were less 
proactive in laying the foundation for the promotion of cultural ties and assimilation.  
 
When General Chavalit, as head of the New Aspiration Party, was Prime Minister of 
Thailand (1996-1997), he sought to consolidate bilateral trade by becoming friendlier with 
his Burmese counterparts, and developing the habit of referring to them as “brothers,” 
thereby further reversing differentiation.159 Chavalit became Prime Minister of Thailand 
during the Asian Financial Crisis at a time when it was also in the interest of Myanmar’s 
ruling generals to reverse differentiation, since they were desperate for foreign investment 
and improvements to national infrastructure. Chavalit continued to prioritize economic 
interests over human rights, as evident in his trips to Myanmar with Thai delegations to 
negotiate investment projects, despite protests by human rights activists back home.  These 
activists differentiated the Thai government from the Burmese military dictatorship and its 
lack of political freedoms. They pointed out that Chavalit came to power through a legitimate 
electoral process, and that he should not undermine Thailand’s democratization by 
associating with the Burmese military dictatorship and repatriating Burmese ethnic refugees. 
Instead, they argued that Chavalit should be meeting with the Burmese pro-democracy leader 
Aung San Suu Kyi.160 These different opinions on Thailand’s approach to Myanmar 
constitute a major obstacle to promoting assimilation between the two countries: on the one 
hand, Thai governments want to promote assimilation through the common aim for economic 
growth, irrespective of different political systems; on the other hand, Thai political and social 
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activists want to promote assimilation through shared norms of international society, namely, 
democratization and human rights.  
Moreover, assimilation was made difficult due to conflicting statements by General 
Chavalit to his critics and the Burmese government, which resulted in uncertainty and 
mistrust of Thailand’s foreign policy on the part of the Burmese, and, thus, the absence of 
stable, predictable relations as a basis to promote assimilation. General Chavalit sought to 
appease his critics in Thailand and the West, by expressing his support for democratization 
and human rights at the national and international level; at the same time, he also sought to 
maintain close relations with the Burmese government and to secure bilateral trade by 
reassuring them of non-interference in domestic affairs. Chavalit justified close relations with 
the Burmese government as a means to “influence” reforms and to assimilate Myanmar into 
the international community. He sought to demonstrate how his close relations enabled him 
to make recommendations that would promote democratization and human rights. For 
example, in an interview on his meeting with Burmese General Than Shwe in May 1997, 
Chavalit proudly boasted: “I told him to slowly release some freedoms. People want to see 
something on human rights and freedoms.”161 Than Shwe had no comment to make on this 
remark, thereby enabling both the Thai and Burmese governments to demonstrate their 
consideration on human rights to the international community, in an endeavour to gain 
international recognition. In order to maintain close relations and bilateral trade, Chavalit 
promised the Burmese leaders that he would not meet with the leader of their opposition, 
Aung San Suu Kyi, or attempt to act as a political mediator between them.162 Chavalit 
reversed differentiation in Thai-Myanmar relations by referring to the Burmese government 
as a friend of Thailand. He then reasoned that if the Burmese government was a friend of 
Thailand, and Aung San Suu Kyi was an enemy of the Burmese government, then she was 
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not a friend of Thailand. Aung San Suu Kyi did not pose a threat to Chavalit’s government. 
However, his support for her was expected to result in the termination of bilateral relations 
and bilateral trade. As argued by the Secretary-General of the National Security Council of 
Thailand in the year 2000, personal relationships between the Thai and Burmese military 
were crucial.163 The Secretary-General observed that the Burmese government chose to 
engage with people it trusts, and that once distrust emerged, bilateral relations would be made 
difficult or suspended altogether.164 Thus, any efforts to promote assimilation in bilateral 
relations are conditional on the cultivation of trust between the two leading political actors on 
both sides. While trust is a difficult factor to measure, one can measure the increase or 
decrease in political statements by Thai leaders, which either portray Myanmar in a positive 
light (e.g. as a friend or an economic partner), or a negative light (e.g. an authoritarian 
military regime which represses political freedom and abuses human rights). These different 
portrayals of Myanmar result from the different interests and priorities of successive Thai 
leaders, as shown throughout this chapter.  
 
Emphasis on International Norms and a Collective Approach to Myanmar (Post-Cold War) 
 
 
 The declining role of the military and the increasing role of civilians under Thai Prime 
Minister Chuan Leekpai (1997-2001) resulted in a different policy towards Myanmar, which 
led to more distant, as opposed to close, bilateral relations, and which highlighted the 
difficulties in promoting assimilation at both the bilateral and regional level. Chuan came to 
power as leader of the Democrat Party when Prime Minister Chavalit resigned in 1997, 
following the Asian Financial Crisis, and pursued a different approach to Myanmar for three 
main reasons. First, as leader of the Democrat Party, he stood for democratization at home 
and abroad. Second, his government had to comply with the International Monetary Fund’s 
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(IMF) conditions for economic aid, which included domestic political reforms and a liberal 
financial system that is open to the free flow of various types of funds into and out of the 
economy.165 As such, Chuan’s government saw the initiation and completion of the most 
democratic constitution in Thai history, which included the protection of human rights.166 
Democratization and support for human rights at the national level was extended to foreign 
policy. For example, Chuan withheld international recognition of the Burmese military junta 
by refusing to visit Yangon and openly calling on the junta to improve its human rights 
records.167 The third reason for which Chuan pursued a different policy was the membership 
of his cabinet, which included professional politicians and leading academics who, unlike 
previous administrations, had no economic interests in Myanmar. Chuan’s cabinet did not 
include any military officers, which made it easy for him to delegate foreign policy to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other national ministries.168 Chuan replaced the tradition of 
pursuing Thai-Myanmar relations through personal, military contacts, with a policy of 
“collective diplomacy,” or coordinated foreign policy between state leaders and national 
ministries.
169
 His motivations in doing so were to make his government more legitimate by 
placing policy-making in the hands of elected state actors, rather than un-elected military 
officers. Moreover, his government sought to consolidate Thailand’s status as a member of 
the international community by being more proactive and taking more concrete steps to 
promote democratization and human rights in Myanmar.170 For example, Chuan’s Foreign 
Minister, Surin Pitsuwan, proposed in 1988 that ASEAN member states adapt their traditional 
approach on non-interference in another country’s domestic affairs to one of “constructive 
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intervention.”171 Surin explained and justified his proposal as follows: “when a matter of 
domestic concern poses a threat to regional stability, a dose of peer pressure or friendly 
advice can be helpful.”172 However, this initial proposal, and its subsequent watered down 
version as “flexible engagement” was ultimately put to the side since it was opposed by a 
majority of ASEAN member states, which preferred to abide by the traditional ASEAN norm 
of non-interference in another country’s domestic affairs.173  
 Chuan’s government set the precedent for subsequent Democrat Party-led 
governments to be proactive in promoting political reform in Myanmar and differentiating 
Myanmar as an authoritarian military regime. Moreover, his government also set a precedent 
for the promotion of a collective ASEAN approach to influence political reforms in 
Myanmar. This policy serves to consolidate the traditional ASEAN norm of non-interference, 
which treats ASEAN member states as separate entities that unite against shared security 
threats, rather than promotes assimilation into a regional community, where states share 
common internal characteristics and can relate to each other at a deeper level. In this regard, 
the major obstacle to assimilation is the region’s political diversity and state actors’ aversion 
to imposed change from outside, be it from fellow ASEAN member states or Western 
countries. While ASEAN member states did agree to realize a regional community of 
democratic states in 2003, they have an implicit understanding that the process of 
democratization at the national level cannot be forced or accelerated by other countries, and 
that it has to be left to the discretion of state leaders. This understanding indicates that 
ASEAN member states remain averse to an explicit, collective approach to influence political 
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reforms; however, it does not exclude the possibility for political reforms to be promoted 
through less explicit, bilateral meetings, where there appears to be less international pressure 
for concrete outcomes. This aim to promote political reforms would of course have to be 
reciprocated by the target regime, which means that assimilation, based on a democratizing 
region, is primarily dependent on the interests and outlook of state leaders (e.g. isolationist or 
internationalist), with bilateral and international persuasion being of secondary importance. 
 
Leadership in Community Building and Prospects for Assimilation (2001 onwards) 
 
In an attempt to strengthen Thailand’s position within the region, and to demonstrate 
Thailand’s leadership in economic development and community building, Thaksin’s 
government initiated new bilateral and regional projects, which sought to increase 
cooperation, and to promote assimilation into a regional community. As such, Thaksin’s 
political party, Thai Rak Thai (TRT) 2001-2006, and its subsequent reincarnations as the 
People Power Party (PPP) 2007-2008, then Pheu Thai (PT), which came to power in 2011, all 
prioritized bilateral economic cooperation to the expense of promoting democratization and 
human rights in Myanmar. This prioritization of economic cooperation led to the portrayal of 
Myanmar as an economic partner, rather than a security threat.174 Moreover, it also led to an 
increase in bilateral trade and new investment links with the Burmese government under 
Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai government (2001-2006). For example, Shin Corp, a 
telecommunications company owned by Thaksin’s family at the time, signed a deal with 
Bagan Cybertech, an internet service provider owned by the son of General Khin Nyunt (a 
member of the Burmese government, and Prime Minister of Myanmar 2003-2004).175 Such 
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business deals served as incentives for both governments to maintain close relations and not 
to pursue differentiation. 
Thaksin’s government sought to consolidate its economic interests and to demonstrate 
Thailand’s leadership in improving intra-regional relations, by providing for the expansion of 
bilateral cooperation into new areas, such as culture. In this endeavour, his government 
initiated the Thai-Myanmar Cultural and Economic Cooperation Association (TMCECA), 
and the Myanmar-Thai Cultural and Economic Cooperation Association (MTCECA), in July 
and August 2001, respectively. These associations were established under the patronage of 
Deputy Prime Minister General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh of Thailand, and Prime Minister 
General Khin Nyunt of Myanmar, with the primary aim to promote Thai businesses’ access 
and relations with the Burmese regime. For example, at the Third Joint Meeting of both 
associations, a group of Thai businesses presented “gifts” as a token of Thailand’s friendship: 
the MDX Group of Companies, Thailand, presented a “gift” of US$25,000; the Bangkok First 
Union Company Limited, Thailand, presented US$12,000 worth of disposable syringes, and 
the Hotel & Golf Club, Tachilek, a “gift” of US$4000.176 Moreover, the MDX Group of 
Companies, which deals with investment and real estate development, as well as basic 
infrastructure projects and energy businesses, also cooperated with the Ministry of Public 
Health in Myanmar on projects on disease control, especially malaria and the setting up of 
mobile medical units.177 These “gifts” from Thai businesses and their cooperation with 
Burmese ministries demonstrate the extent of their economic interests in pursuing friendly 
relations with the Burmese government, as well as the extent to which they have assumed 
their government’s role as a donor country. Moreover, these “gifts” were recognized, and 
given importance by Burmese state actors, as they were received by the Patron of the 
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Myanmar-Thai Cultural and Economic Cooperation Association (MTCECA), Major General 
Kyaw Win, and the Deputy Education Minister, U Myo Nyunt. As such, they increased 
interactions between Thai businesses and the Burmese regime, and, in doing so, reduced 
incentives for bilateral differentiation. However, because the Cultural and Economic 
Cooperation Associations were established under Thaksin’s premiership, and because 
Thaksin’s opposition, which came to power through a military coup in 2006, sought to 
distance themselves from their predecessor, these Associations were dropped when Thaksin 
was no longer in power. Thus, changes in one country’s domestic politics may increase or 
decrease incentives to, at the very least, reduce differentiation, and, at most, to reverse it and 
instead promote assimilation.  
Thaksin’s government sought to demonstrate Thailand’s leadership in the sub-region 
by highlighting Thailand’s new role as an emerging donor country, which is prepared to 
provide developmental assistance to neighbouring countries, such as Myanmar.178 In this 
regard, Thaksin discontinued differentiation of Myanmar as an enemy and security threat, and 
instead identified Myanmar as a less economically developed neighbour, which would benefit 
from developmental assistance, and, in turn, strengthen the region’s economic development 
as a whole. Developmental assistance is coordinated by the Thailand International 
Development Cooperation Agency (TICA), which is a branch of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. TICA’s developmental assistance focuses on human resource development in three 
main areas: agriculture, education, and public health.179 This focus on human resource 
development is intended to increase interactions between Thai and Burmese people for 
training purposes, and, in doing so, improve people-to-people relations between the two 
countries. Moreover, such interactions are intended to reverse differentiation of the other as a 
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security threat, on the part of Thailand, or differentiation of the other as an economic 
exploiter, on the part of Myanmar. However, cross-border drug-trafficking and the abuse of 
migrant workers, as described in the section on mutual differentiation, appear to undermine 
these efforts to improve bilateral relations. 
Nevertheless, Thaksin’s government was motivated to downplay differentiation as 
much as possible due to its aim to 1) expand trade, through the development of close, 
informal relations between regional state leaders, and increased regional cooperation; and 2) 
to strengthen Thailand’s status in the international community by promoting international 
norms, and demonstrating Thailand’s leadership in influencing the adoption of these norms 
within the region. As a result, Thai foreign policy was “to bring Myanmar in from the cold” 
and to socialize Myanmar into the international community’s trend of democratization; the 
tactic for implementing these aims was to promote the drafting of a new constitution as part 
of the military junta’s roadmap to democracy.180 This policy was part of the broader aim of 
Thaksin’s government to increase Thailand’s regional and international role, as evident in the 
initiation of frameworks such as the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) and the Ayeyawady 
Chao Phraya Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS): all of which promoted 
assimilation through a common regional identity. Multilateral economic cooperation differs 
from bilateral economic cooperation, in that it can project a regional identity, and enable 
countries to associate with this identity, as well as to consolidate it through increasing 
interactions and cooperation. However, assimilation based on a common regional economic 
framework may only be limited to state actors, and may not have a wide-ranging social 
impact; this is especially the case if political and social discourse, as well as popular culture, 
maintains differentiation. For assimilation to occur beyond state actors and to be sustainable, 
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there is the need for both bilateral reconciliation and the creation of new narratives of the 
other.181 
Thaksin sought to promote Thailand’s leadership in the region by not only initiating 
multilateral economic frameworks, but also bilateral friendship associations: all of which 
were intended to strengthen the region as a whole by making it more self-sufficient through 
mutual help, and by promoting assimilation into a regional community. Thaksin prioritized 
the strengthening of bilateral relations with Thailand’s immediate neighbours - Myanmar, 
Cambodia, Laos and Malaysia – due to the following security concerns: geographical 
proximity, border security, cross-border trade and exchange of visits.182 In this endeavour, his 
government initiated bilateral friendship associations, which were intended to promote closer 
bilateral relations at the state-to-state and people-to-people level through the exchange of 
visits, as well as academic and cultural exchanges. While these efforts remain marginal in the 
broader scheme of bilateral relations, they indicate that state leaders are giving more 
importance to improving the quality, and securing the durability, of intra-regional 
relationships, in order to consolidate the region and to achieve a regional community. 
Bilateral friendship associations promote closer relationships between state and non-
state actors who aim to reverse differentiation, and to improve bilateral relations between 
states and peoples; such associations provide a space for these actors to brainstorm and 
develop their activities, which may initially have a small impact, but has the potential to have 
a wider political and social impact over time, if they are given more importance by state 
actors, and if there is increasing social demand for their activities. A Thai-Myanmar 
Friendship Association was established in 2001, although by 2010, observers of Thai-
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Myanmar relations point out that there is limited to no awareness of this association in 
Myanmar, and that the continuation and development of its activities is not guaranteed, due to 
fluctuations in the domestic politics of both sides.183 The association’s membership includes 
civil servants, academia, members of the Thai community in Myanmar, as well as members 
of the Burmese community in Thailand, who have been invited to join the association by their 
embassy, academia or friends.184 Thus far, it has sought to reverse differentiation in three 
main ways. First, by highlighting shared culture, namely, the common religion of Buddhism 
in joint religious ceremonies. Second, by providing developmental assistance from Thailand, 
which is intended to reverse differentiation of the other as an enemy, since enemies are not 
expected to help each other. Third, by providing a space for networking, which reverses 
differentiation, since it implies that there is a need for increased contact and cooperation. Past 
activities of the association include: the Thai community’s participation in Buddhist 
ceremonies in Myanmar (in records for 2006 – the present), the provision of funds from 
Thailand for medical care in Myanmar (for example, a mobile medical unit was sent to 
Myanmar in 2006), networking among Thai and Burmese businesses (in records for 2007), 
and the publication of a bilingual dictionary (2007) to promote bilateral communications.185 
Networking among Thai and Burmese businesses is intended to increase cooperation between 
them, and to provide them with incentives to lobby their governments for the maintenance of 
stable, friendly bilateral relations. This implies that friendship associations need to obtain the 
support of influential actors, such as big businessmen, in order to influence state policies that 
would improve bilateral relations. Thus, the success of friendship associations in firstly 
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reversing differentiation, and subsequently promoting assimilation, relies on the support of 
important non-state actors at the domestic level (e.g. businessmen and possibly the elite), who 
may exert more pressure on state actors for the said policies.  
 
The Thai government’s aim to demonstrate its leadership in the region, by 
highlighting its role as a donor country and reversing differentiation, was given a boost by the 
opportunity to lead the provision of disaster relief to Myanmar, after Cyclone Nargis in May 
2008. Following the cyclone, the government and Thai diplomats highlighted the fact that 
Thailand was the first country to send aid to Myanmar, and that Thailand fully participated in 
reconstruction efforts, be it through the Tripartite Core Group (TCG: ASEAN-UN-
Myanmar), or through donations (donations were made by Thai people in Myanmar, 
Thailand, and overseas), as well as the continued provision of aid in human resource 
development.186 Moreover, they also highlighted how the Thai Embassy in Yangon, in 
collaboration with the Thai Red Cross, coordinated the renovation of a building to serve as a 
national blood centre, the purchase of medical equipment for this blood centre, as well as 
training courses for doctors and nurses in Myanmar.187 In the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, 
aid was provided by both state and non-state actors: both of which sought to reverse any 
underlying differentiation, on the part of Myanmar, by signalling benign intent to help 
Myanmar’s reconstruction efforts in the long-term. For example, Her Royal Highness 
Princess Sirindhorn of Thailand donated a cyclone shelter, which was built under the 
supervision of the Thai Armed Forces Command.188 When there is no cyclone, the shelter 
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serves as a school and thus compliments TICA’s efforts to promote education as part of 
human resource development. In addition, the Thai military division for development has also 
visited the cyclone shelter to give advice on sustainable livelihoods, in accordance with His 
Majesty the King of Thailand’s sufficiency economy.189 Non-state actors have been active in 
initiating volunteering and funding activities. For example, Dr. Sunthorn, a member of 
Thailand’s Foundation for Rural Doctors, has led groups of volunteers to Myanmar and 
oversees the operation of mobile medical units there.190 Moreover, he also coordinates 
funding to buy medical equipment for Myanmar. These activities received support and 
funding from the Thai embassy in Yangon in 2010, which indicate collaboration between 
state and non-state actors to facilitate Myanmar’s reconstruction, as well as to promote a 
positive image of Thailand as a good neighbour, as opposed to one that exports drugs and 
economically exploits others. Thus, Cyclone Nargis marked a turning point in Thai-Myanmar 
relations, since it enabled Thai state and non-state actors to demonstrate their activeness in 
aiding Myanmar, and increased collaboration between these two actors to reverse any 
negative images of Thailand, as well as to improve bilateral relations at all levels. 
Thaksin’s successor, Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2011) was the leader of the Democrat 
Party, and, as such, sought to build Thailand’s leadership in the region by pursuing his party’s 
policy of differentiating an authoritarian Burmese government, and promoting a collective 
ASEAN approach to influence political reforms. One can argue that Abhisit was motivated to 
reinforce this policy as ASEAN Chair in 2009, in order to increase his government’s 
legitimacy, to demonstrate Thailand’s aim for all ASEAN member states to explicitly 
promote democratization in the region, so as to gain further recognition and support from the 
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international community. As the ASEAN Chair, Abhisit issued a statement on Myanmar, 
which called on the Burmese government to release all political prisoners, including Daw 
Aung San Suu Kyi, to enable them to participate in the 2010 General Elections.191 Moreover, 
the statement also conveyed a collective ASEAN approach to Myanmar, by mentioning that 
ASEAN member states were prepared to cooperate with the Burmese government in its 
efforts to democratize.192 Abhisit’s foreign policy, and his statement as ASEAN Chair, 
worsened Thai-Myanmar relations, leading to protests by the Burmese government of 
interference in Myanmar’s internal affairs. However, the policies of his opposition, Thaksin’s 
political parties, did not completely improve bilateral relations either. Rather, their different 
policies, and policy outcomes, demonstrate the difficulties in improving Thai-Myanmar 
relations at all levels: support for the Burmese government leads to Burmese society’s 
resentment of Thailand, based on the lack of support for democratization, while pressure on 
the Burmese government to democratize, leads to deteriorating bilateral relations and the 
potential suspension of bilateral cooperation.  
 Nevertheless, despite these difficulties, Abhisit sought to improve Thailand’s bilateral 
relations with all its immediate neighbours, including the reversal of differentiation and 
promotion of assimilation, in order to maintain Thailand’s security and economic interests. 
During Abhisit’s premiership, there were efforts by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to reverse 
bilateral differentiation in the wider society, especially among the new generation of young 
people, so that the legacy of differentiation may fade away with the older generations, and be 
replaced by a trend toward assimilation into a common regional community. For example, 
there were efforts by the Foreign Ministry to bring Thai and Burmese historians together to 
rewrite history textbooks based on historical facts, rather than emotionally charged negative 
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stereotyping.193 However, at the time of writing, such history textbooks have not yet been 
produced, due to a lack of collaboration and funding. In addition to the rewrite of history 
textbooks, the Thai Foreign Ministry also sought to facilitate assimilation into a regional 
community by launching an “East Asia Watch” website in June 2010. This website was 
intended to make foreign policy more transparent, and to introduce a social dimension to 
foreign policy considerations, in accordance with the aims of the ruling Democrat Party at 
that time; moreover, the website was intended to promote an expansion of international 
relations into “public diplomacy,” that is, to promote the people’s role as media by providing 
them with information on Thailand’s neighbours, together with a space for public discussion 
and the exchange of views on foreign policy.194 However, the actual website has no public 
discussion board, but the option of sending questions to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Moreover, the page for articles and comments is written by students and academia, rather 
than the public in general, which could mean that the website has limited to no public 
outreach, and shows no evidence of raising public awareness on Thailand’s neighbours and a 
regional community. In summary, there has been a lack of progress in reversing 
differentiation at the level of society, due to a lack of follow-up on policies to re-write history 
textbooks and a lack of funding. With regard to public outreach on the realization of a 
regional community, there has been increasing news coverage in Thailand from 2010 to the 
present, on the urgency of becoming more knowledgeable on fellow ASEAN member states, 
due to the approaching deadline for an ASEAN Community in 2015.195 As such, one can 
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conclude that ASEAN member states which give importance to the ASEAN Community will 
increase their efforts to promote its realization in the next few years, which includes activities 
to reverse differentiation and to promote assimilation. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 This chapter tested ASEAN’s progress in community building based on the extent of 
the shift from differentiation to assimilation in Thai-Myanmar relations. The chapter noted 
the limitations to reversing differentiation, based on historical legacy, the school curriculum, 
as well as bilateral problems which maintain tension and distrust, namely, cross-border drug-
trafficking, the presence of military troops in the border area, and the problem of Burmese 
political refugees and migrant workers. In addition, Myanmar’s domestic politics also 
complicated improvement of bilateral relations at all levels, since support for the Burmese 
government led to Burmese society’s resentment of the Thai government for not pushing for 
democratization, while pressure on the Burmese government for political reforms led to 
worsened state-to-state bilateral relations, which undermines efforts to promote regional 
cohesion as part of community building. Nevertheless, if one discounts the period in which 
the Burmese government pursued an isolationist policy, bilateral state-to-state meetings have 
always indicated, at the very least, a suspension of differentiation, for the purpose of routine 
exchange of state visits, and mutual recognition of each other’s independence and choice of 
development policies. Thus, the routine exchange of state visits at least provides the 
minimum baseline for the reversal of differentiation in bilateral relations.  
 
 The reversal of differentiation is motivated by the following factors, which tend to 
improve state-to-state relations, rather than address the underlying sources of differentiation 
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(as previously mentioned): the pursuit of economic interests through bilateral trade and 
multilateral economic frameworks, as well as the aim to consolidate regime security by 
demonstrating regional leadership in economic development and community building. 
Chatichai’s government introduced a fundamental shift in Thai-Myanmar relations by 
prioritizing the pursuit of economic interests over good relations between the Thai military in 
the border area and Burmese ethnic insurgents. Moreover, his government also prioritized the 
pursuit of economic interests over the protection of human rights in Myanmar, to the extent 
that it helped repatriate Burmese political dissidents who fled to Thailand, in exchange for 
logging rights and fishing deals. As such, economic deals may reverse differentiation of the 
other as a security threat at the state level, but not at the level of society. With regard to the 
demonstration of regional leadership in economic development, Thaksin’s government 
initiated multilateral economic cooperation frameworks, which are good in projecting a 
regional identity, and enabling countries to associate with this identity. However, this process 
of building a regional identity appears to be limited to state actors, and lacked the creation of 
new narratives of the other at the level of society, which would have contributed to bilateral 
and regional assimilation. For this reason, there was an incentive to create bilateral 
frameworks at the society level, such as friendship associations. These associations facilitate 
community building, in terms of bringing civil servants and non-state actors together, so that 
they may organize activities to highlight their shared culture. However, they require more 
support from influential non-state actors at the domestic level, such as businessmen and the 
elite, who may exert more pressure on state actors for resources and for policies to further 
promote the reversal of differentiation. Nevertheless, despite its limitations, these 
associations do indicate that state leaders recognize the importance of improving the quality 
of intra-regional relations at all levels for community building. 
 
98 
 
 Moreover, state leaders are motivated to advance regional community building, as a 
means to consolidate regional security, and, thus, protect their own security and economic 
interests. As a result, there have been initiatives to reverse differentiation in the school 
curriculum through a re-write of history textbooks, and state-sponsored websites to promote 
regional awareness and discussions on foreign policy towards the region, in order to 
introduce more of a social dimension, and to strengthen the community building process. 
Thus, while the sources of underlying differentiation in history textbooks and popular culture 
may still remain, they have been recognized by state actors as obstacles to improving bilateral 
relations, and have stimulated initiatives for revised history, as well as efforts to raise public 
awareness and to promote public discussions on regional community building. In this regard, 
there is progress in terms of emerging ideas and policies for reversing differentiation; 
however, the problem lies in the political support and resources for their implementation, as 
well as bilateral tensions which resulted from Myanmar’s domestic politics and border 
problems.  
  
99 
 
Chapter Three: The Politicisation, Militarisation and Internationalisation 
of Thai-Cambodian Conflicts  
 
 This chapter tests ASEAN’s progress in community building based on the extent of 
the shift from differentiation to assimilation in the Thai-Cambodian bilateral relationship. 
Thai-Cambodian relations share many of the same variables as Thai-Myanmar relations, in 
terms of challenges from a historical legacy of differentiation, and apprehension over 
Thailand’s apparent hegemonic aspirations; moreover, these two bilateral relationships also 
share similar variables for the reversal of differentiation, that is, the Thai government’s 
pursuit of economic interests and its aim to demonstrate leadership in regional development 
and community building. However, despite these similarities, the Thai-Cambodian 
relationship constitutes a bigger obstacle for regional community building, for two main 
reasons. First, bilateral differentiation and border conflicts between Thailand and Cambodia 
have been more internationalised, rather than restricted to the bilateral level. This 
internationalisation reinforces differentiation, due to the higher political stakes involved, that 
is, differentiation is not only targeted at a domestic audience, but also at the broader 
international community, in order to gain their support for bilateral conflicts. The most salient 
example of the internationalisation of Thai-Cambodian differentiation, and conflicts, is their 
territorial dispute over the area surrounding Preah Vihear temple, including the presence of 
military troops and military armed clashes in the contested border area. These factors not 
only worsen Thai-Cambodian relations, but also undermine the process of ASEAN 
community building, as well as ASEAN’s relevance and credibility, in the wake of ASEAN’s 
failed attempts at third party mediation. Finally, the second reason why the Thai-Cambodian 
relationship constitutes a bigger obstacle for regional community building than the Thai-
Myanmar one, is due to the use of bilateral conflicts for domestic political gains on both 
sides. In Thailand, an opposition movement sought to undermine the government, by 
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questioning its handling of Cambodia’s application for World Heritage status, for Preah 
Vihear temple; while in Cambodia, the political leadership referred to the nationalist, anti-
Cambodian sentiment in Thailand, to consolidate its power, based on the maintenance of an 
external security threat. Thus, the reversal of differentiation in bilateral relations is restricted 
by the linkage between political interests and bilateral conflicts, and by the 
internationalisation of these conflicts, which indicates the failure of bilateral mechanisms, 
and the consolidation of differentiation as both a domestic and foreign policy. 
 Current bilateral conflicts are difficult to resolve since they build on, and consolidate 
a historical legacy of differentiation from the 11
th
 century onwards, especially on the part of 
Cambodia. Just as Thai nationhood was constructed on differentiation of Myanmar, so 
Cambodian nationhood was constructed on differentiation of Thailand, which similarly 
constitutes a major obstacle in improving the quality of bilateral relations at all levels, and 
promoting a “we feeling” of regional solidarity. The Cambodian leadership’s differentiation 
of Thailand as an aggressive neighbour, and security threat, can be traced back to the 11
th
 
century. This state-sponsored differentiation is evident in, for example, the Angkor Wat 
temple complex from that period. The temple includes carvings of Siamese invaders, who 
were depicted as ugly and cruel, in order to demonize them, and to reinforce the narrative of 
aggressive Siamese invading and destroying the Angkor civilization.196 The notion of 
“victimization” by Siam (renamed Thailand in 1939) is deeply embedded within Cambodia’s 
historical memory, ranging from Siam’s invasion in the 11th century, to Siam’s seizure of 
Angkor Wat, the symbol of Cambodia’s glorious empire, in the 15th century, to further 
seizures of Cambodian territory in subsequent periods.197 Cambodian historians have 
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continued the legacy of differentiation by contrasting an aggressive, expansionist Siam, from 
the 13
th
 to 19
th
 century, to the weak victim of Cambodia, which was likened to Siam’s vassal 
state.198 Moreover, the decline of the Cambodian empire, following Siam’s invasions 
produced a well-known legend entitled “Preah Ko Preah Keo,” which is still read as a 
children’s book today, and which narrates how Siam stole Preah Ko and Preah Keo, the 
symbol of peace and prosperity, from Cambodia. The legend has been popular and influential 
within Cambodian society. It has also been promoted by Cambodian leaders during times of 
political tension between the two countries, in order to gain social support for the political 
regime and the regime’s policies.199 Such use of differentiation maintains a vicious cycle of 
bilateral tension between states, leading to the state’s promotion of differentiation, which can 
either heighten bilateral tension, and reproduce the same cycle, or escalate the existent 
bilateral tension into a bilateral conflict, as well as a regional and international issue, due to 
its potentially wide ramifications. The internationalisation of bilateral disputes between 
Thailand and Cambodia has already occurred, and only reinforces the state’s differentiation 
of Thailand throughout history, while maintaining public consciousness of a neighbouring 
security threat.  
 From the Second World War to the 1980s, the Cambodian government reinforced its 
differentiation of Thailand as a security threat, based on Thailand’s collaboration with third 
countries to seize more Cambodian territory; moreover, Thailand was differentiated as a 
growing security threat due to its allies, especially the US, and regional powers such as Japan 
and China.200 During the Second World War, the Cambodian government differentiated 
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Thailand as a growing security threat, not only due to collaboration with third countries 
against Cambodia, but also against other neighbouring countries, which implied hegemonic 
ambitions. For example, it was claimed that the Thai government sought to use Japanese 
power against Cambodia, while also accommodating the US military in an attempt to weaken 
all its neighbours.201 Differentiation of Thailand was not only restricted to the bilateral level, 
but was also taken to the international level, which further institutionalized the policy since it 
was communicated to, and recognized by, the wider international community. The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Kampuchea (Cambodia) took differentiation to an international level 
when it published a booklet on “Thai Policy vis-à-vis Kampuchea” in 1983. The purpose of 
this booklet was to undermine Thailand as the frontline state against a Vietnamese-sponsored 
Cambodian government, as well as to undermine Thailand’s bid to serve as a non-permanent 
member of the UN Security Council in 1984.202 Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia and the 
bipolar structure of the international system during the Cold War contributed to the wider 
ramifications of bilateral differentiation, in that differentiation of the other was not only used 
to consolidate one’s nationhood, but also used to undermine the other’s international 
relations. Such use of differentiation within a wider international setting increased bilateral 
tension, while consolidating the habit of taking bilateral disputes to the international level, 
and not having faith in, or neglecting the possibility of any regional mechanisms. 
 This chapter seeks to demonstrate the advances and limitations in reversing 
differentiation in the Thai-Cambodian relationship. It is divided into three sections. Section I 
analyses the economic and political incentives for reversing differentiation from 1988 
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onwards; for example, Thailand’s pursuit of economic interests and the aim to demonstrate 
leadership in regional development and community building. Section II analyses the 
underlying threats to the reversal of differentiation in the post-Cold War period, such as the 
Cambodian state and Cambodian society’s perceptions of Thailand’s hegemonic aspirations. 
Finally, section III analyses the politicisation, militarisation and internationalisation of 
differentiation from 2008-2011. More specifically, it analyses the difficulties in reversing 
differentiation, based on high political stakes, the presence of military troops in the contested 
border area, as well as the failure of regional mediation, and implications for community 
building. Thus, the chapter concludes that the Thai-Cambodian relationship remains largely 
characterized by differentiation, due to domestic political interests and the involvement of the 
military in a bilateral territorial dispute. However, progress in assimilation is also noted, in 
the form of an increasing number of non-state actors who are raising awareness of Thai-
Cambodian similarities, emphasizing Thailand’s national and regional interests, and 
mobilizing society to call for peaceful bilateral relations. 
I. Economic and Political Incentives for Reversing Differentiation (1988 onwards) 
 Similar to Thai-Myanmar relations, Thai-Cambodian relations also experienced a 
reversal of differentiation, based on the pursuit of economic interests. Thai Prime Minister 
Chatichai Choonhavan (1988-1991) was a military officer, turned businessman-politician, 
who sought to expand Thailand’s trade by reversing differentiation of Indochina, replacing 
perceptions of the Cold War ideological divide with “trade-based realism,” and emphasizing 
economic cooperation over historical animosity.203 Chatichai was provided with an 
opportunity to shift the focus of Thailand’s foreign policy from national security to trade 
expansion, due to the anticipated end of the Cambodian conflict (or Vietnam’s invasion and 
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occupation of Cambodia) by 1988. Moreover, the aim for trade expansion had already been 
promoted by his predecessor, Prem Tinsulanond, based on Thailand’s rapid economic growth 
from 9.5% in 1987, to 13.2% in 1988.204 At the time, the nature of the Thai economy was 
undergoing rapid change, as agriculture formed a decreasing percentage of gross domestic 
product (GDP), while manufacturing’s share increased, together with the demand for trade 
and markets. Chatichai saw Indochina as a solution for this demand. As such, he sought to 
justify the reversal of differentiation, and the promotion of economic cooperation, in the 
following ways. First, he announced that Thailand would now pursue an “independent” 
foreign policy, given that the basis for its reliance on external security support from the US 
was gradually being removed. This meant that Thailand was no longer obliged to follow the 
US position towards Indochina. Second, he emphasized the importance of developing 
economic relations with Indochina for mutual economic benefits, as well as for the benefit of 
regional development as a whole. Third, he justified economic cooperation with Indochina as 
means to consolidate regional security, by integrating Indochina into the community of 
Southeast Asian states.205 Thus, economic and security-related incentives motivated the 
reversal of differentiation in Thailand-Indochina relations in general, and Thai-Cambodian 
relations in particular.  
Under Chatichai’s premiership, the reversal of differentiation was specifically pursued 
to satisfy the domestic demand for trade, and to place Thailand in a strategically 
advantageous position, given the changing regional dynamics from the US military 
withdrawal and the approaching end of the Cambodian conflict. When Chatichai came to 
power, Thailand’s natural resources, such as forests, minerals, wild animals and aquatic 
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animals, were rapidly decreasing, and insufficient for domestic consumption and industry.206 
In the search for supplementary raw materials, Chatichai promoted international economic 
cooperation and the expansion of Thailand’s trade to other countries, irrespective of their 
political ideology and political system. He was driven by geopolitical and economic 
incentives to reverse differentiation, in terms of promoting national security through peaceful 
relations, and trade with neighbouring countries, respectively. As a result, he sought to 
change the political mind-set of Thailand and the US, versus Communist Indochina and the 
Soviet Union, to Thailand and Indochina’s joint development. This involved reversing 
differentiation of Indochinese countries – Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam – as a security threat, 
and instead depicting them as Thailand’s new trade partners.207 Chatichai’s international 
outlook had huge implications for Thailand’s foreign policy after the end of the conflicts in 
Indochina, since it enabled his government to be opportunistic and to initiate the policy of 
turning Indochina’s “battlefields into marketplaces.”208 Thus, the reversal of differentiation 
was stimulated by changing dynamics at many levels: US withdrawal at the international 
level, the end of the Cambodian conflict at the sub-regional level, and economic demand at 
the national level. 
Economics-Driven Foreign Policy and the Reversal of Differentiation (Post-Cold War 
Period) 
 
 In the post-Cold War period, the reversal of differentiation was precipitated by 
changing economic dynamics at many levels: the competitive demands of the global 
economy, which prompted Southeast Asian countries to work towards more economic 
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interconnectedness; and Thailand’s continued rapid economic development, in the absence of 
an external security threat, which again increased demand for trade and markets. Thai Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006) grasped the opportunities provided by these 
changing dynamics in his implementation of an economics-driven foreign policy. Thaksin 
was motivated to consolidate national economic growth by promoting economic 
interconnectedness within the region, and went about doing so by building working 
relationships with neighbouring countries, and thereby signalling the reversal of 
differentiation for mutual economic benefits. Like Chatichai, Thaksin was motivated to 
improve Thailand’s relations with former Indochina, due to their abundance in raw materials, 
manufacturing for Thai businesses, as well as markets for Thai products.209 In this regard, 
former Indochina became differentiated as less developed, raw material providing countries, 
rather than a security threat. Their abundance in raw material motivated Thaksin’s 
government to facilitate trade by investing in infrastructure, such as the construction of roads 
and railways; while their less developed economic situation opened opportunities for his 
government to demonstrate Thailand’s status as a newly emerging donor country through the 
provision of developmental assistance.210 For example, in the fiscal year of 2003, the Thai 
government invested 67, 314 Baht in bilateral cooperation programmes with Cambodia, and 
in 2004, a reduced amount of 24,066 Baht, due to increased allocations to other countries, 
such as Laos, Myanmar, and Timor Leste.211 Thus, economic incentives, and the incentive to 
upgrade Thailand’s status in the international community, motivated the reversal of 
differentiation through development cooperation.  
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Political-Business Interests and the Reversal of Differentiation 
 Thaksin was driven by political and business interests to reverse differentiation of 
Thailand’s neighbours. In terms of political interest, he sought to demonstrate his 
government’s capability to maintain peace, and to promote trade, in the Thai-Cambodian 
border area. Given that this border area is mainly populated by Thaksin’s political supporters, 
his attention to, and promotion of their security and economic interests was expected to 
secure their continued support, and to maintain his party in power.212 In addition to domestic 
political interests, Thaksin was also motivated by business interests to strengthen his personal 
ties with the Cambodian Prime Minister, Hun Sen, and to reverse differentiation by building a 
Thai-Cambodian business partnership. The importance that Thaksin gave to this partnership 
is evident in the many number of visits he paid to Cambodia as Prime Minister of Thailand: 
at least eight visits were recorded altogether, of both an official and private nature.213 
Thaksin’s business relationship with Hun Sen dates back to 1997, when he signed 
telecommunications deals with Cambodia through his company Cambodia Shinawatra, or 
CamShin, which generated revenues as high as 4.3 billion Baht in 2003.214 His business-
centred, close relationship with Hun Sen resulted in a bilateral relationship that tended more 
towards a functional and personalized nature, rather than a normative and institutionalized 
one. Personalized bilateral relations do not guarantee sustained reversal of differentiation, 
since this policy may be dependent on particular state leaders, or a particular political party. 
In order for the reversal of differentiation to be sustained, and developed, there was a need to 
institutionalize it as a foreign policy, which could be maintained by state institutions, such as 
the Foreign Ministry. This institutionalized intent to reverse differentiation is more likely to 
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promote consistent, stable relations in the long-term and thereby facilitate progress towards 
bilateral and regional assimilation. Thaksin perceived the need to initiate activities that would 
reverse differentiation for long-term security and economic interests, since economic 
cooperation was not enough to achieve this goal. Economic cooperation may increase 
bilateral cooperation and potentially decrease conflict; however, it does not necessarily 
reverse differentiation of the other, as states are able to trade with each other while 
maintaining mutual distrust and suspicion, as in the case of Thailand and Cambodia. Thus, 
bilateral economic exchanges are inadequate for the complete reversal of differentiation and 
community building. 
Economic Investments and Status in the International Community 
 Thaksin was motivated to reverse differentiation in order to facilitate Thai 
investments in Cambodia, and to consolidate Thailand’s status as a new donor country 
through the provision of developmental assistance. These incentives are evident in the 
objectives of Thai-Cambodian cooperation, as stated by the Thailand International 
Development Cooperation Agency (TICA), which is a branch of the Foreign Ministry.215 
According to these objectives, the provision of developmental assistance to Cambodia was 
intended to facilitate Thai investments by “(promoting) Cambodia’s capacity and preparation 
for further development.”216 Moreover, developmental assistance to Cambodia was expected 
to have a positive impact on Thailand, in terms of expanded trade and markets, as well as to 
upgrading Thailand’s status in the international community, by strengthening its relations 
with other donor countries operating in Cambodia.217 In this regard, the reversal of 
differentiation was primarily pursued for Thailand’s economic and international interests, 
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rather than a broader regional interest of community building. Cambodian society perceived 
the pursuit of these narrow interests, which is why developmental assistance has not reversed 
differentiation; moreover, the reversal of differentiation is also made difficult by Cambodian 
society’s perception of Thai people, as having a superiority complex, and looking down on 
Cambodia as a less economically developed country.218 This is one of the reasons why 
Cambodians prefer to receive developmental assistance from other countries. The failure of 
Thailand’s developmental assistance in reversing differentiation and improving the bilateral 
relationship is confirmed, and explained by a former Thai Ambassador to Cambodia, Prasas 
Prasasvinitchai (2010-2011), who stated that 
developmental assistance has little impact. The Cambodian people see Thailand’s 
developmental assistance as serving Thai interests; for example, they see the building of roads 
as for our own trade…We need to look after Cambodian scholars so that they do not get 
looked down on when they come to study in Thailand, and so that they can go back with good 
perceptions…Cambodia has contacts with other countries like Japan, Korea and France, and 
does not want scholarships from Thailand…We used to be big economically in Cambodia, 
but now there is China, Singapore and France.219 
 
Thus, developmental assistance did not reverse Cambodia’s differentiation of Thailand, but 
rather reinforced its differentiation of Thailand as a neighbouring threat that exploits and 
looks down on others.  
Leadership in Regional Development and Community Building 
 Thaksin was motivated to reverse differentiation in order to demonstrate leadership in 
regional development and community building, and thereby strengthen Thailand’s status in 
the international community. In this endeavour, he initiated multilateral economic 
frameworks, which were intended to promote a common regional identity, by encouraging 
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member countries to associate with each other as part of a common entity, with a shared aim 
for sustainable economic growth and regional consolidation. One prominent multilateral 
economic framework that was set up by Thaksin’s government is the Ayeyawady-Chao 
Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS), which was established in 2003. 
ACMECS includes Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Thailand, with Vietnam joining in 
2004. ACMECS was formed to address the economic gaps between countries in the region by 
promoting bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation. Such cooperation was expected to 
strengthen a sense of regional solidarity and regional identity, since member countries would 
be helping each other to reach similar levels of economic development, and working together 
to increase their mutual economic benefits.220 The official aims of ACMECS indicate a 
reversal of differentiation and the promotion of a regional community, since ACMECS was 
intended to serve as a “building block” for ASEAN.221 However, ACMECS has thus far 
promoted increasing functional cooperation, rather than normative cooperation in reversing 
differentiation between member countries and promoting regional awareness in society. For 
example, the Phnom Penh Declaration on ACMECS, in November 2010, noted that 
ACMECS played a role in facilitating functional cooperation in many areas: trade and 
investment, agriculture, industry and energy, transport linkages, tourism, human resource 
development, public health, and the environment.222 This functional cooperation reduces the 
incentive, and likelihood of intra-regional conflict. However, it does not necessarily reverse 
societies’ differentiation of the other, or improve the quality of intra-regional relations. This 
requires wider and deeper changes in social perceptions, attitudes, and discourse, which can 
only be implemented through the generation, acceptance, and adoption of new narratives of 
the other.  
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II. Underlying Threats to the Reversal of Differentiation (Post-Cold War Period) 
 In the post-Cold War period, the underlying threats to the reversal of differentiation 
include Cambodian society’s differentiation of Thailand, based on their state’s historical 
narratives. This differentiation is heightened by Cambodian society’s perception of the Thai 
state’s distorted historical narratives, and the potential threat of this narrative being 
recognized by the international community, and overshadowing their own. The mainstream 
Thai historical narratives tend to similarly differentiate neighbouring states, including 
Cambodia, as a means to develop, and to consolidate, Thai nationhood. One exception is 
historical narratives by a Thai scholar, Charnvit Kasetsiri, which, for example, includes the 
Thai government’s seizure of Cambodian territory during the Second World War with 
Japanese assistance.223 Charnvit is part of a growing number of non-state actors, who seek to 
promote peaceful bilateral relations from the bottom-up, by reversing society’s differentiation 
of the other, which has been influenced by state-led discourse. For example, Charnvit seeks 
to demonstrates how Cambodia was not always differentiated as a security threat, but rather 
how the Siamese (Thai) Kingdom had an admiration for anything Khmer (Cambodian) from 
the 13
th
 century onwards, which led to its adoption of Khmer art and culture.224 In this age of 
the internet and social media, Cambodian bloggers are able to access Charnvit’s work online 
with ease, which has resulted in a discussion on how his work is a refreshing departure from 
what Cambodian state actors have described as Thai leaders’ indoctrination, and 
brainwashing of the Thai people with distorted history.225 In a “Cambodia Forum” website, 
Cambodian bloggers made a contrast between the majority of Thai people and Charnvit, who 
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they said “dared” to write about “Thailand’s real history.”226 This discussion demonstrates 
that a negative perception of Thailand runs deep in Cambodian society, based on what is 
described as the Thai state’s manipulation and distortion of history, and the consequent 
disillusion of Thai society in thinking that they need to reclaim territory from Cambodia. It is 
argued that this disillusion fuels bilateral conflicts, such as the one surrounding Preah Vihear 
Temple, to the extent that it became a regional and international issue, which exposed the 
competing narratives that should not have been a problem in the first place. In this regard, the 
reversal of differentiation in Thai-Cambodian relations is hindered by deeply embedded 
negative perceptions of Thailand on the part of Cambodia, which strongly indicate that the 
Thai state is not to be trusted, and that it propagates false information to protect regime 
security to the expense of peaceful international relations.  
Perceptions of Thailand’s Hegemonic Aspirations (Post-Cold War period) 
 Similar to Thai-Myanmar relations, Thai-Cambodian relations were also fraught with 
apprehension over perceptions of Thailand’s hegemonic aspirations in the post-Cold War 
period. The Cambodian government and Cambodian society differentiated Thailand as an 
aspiring hegemon, based on perceptions of Thai businesses’ exploitation and domination of 
the Cambodian market. Moreover, Thailand was also differentiated as a threat to the 
Cambodian identity, due to its extensive cultural presence in the form of soap operas. This 
overwhelming economic and cultural Thai presence led to a growing nationalist anti-Thai 
sentiment, to the extent that Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen had to ban Thai dramas at 
one point.227 Thus, improvements in Thai-Cambodian relations were hindered by suspicions 
and apprehension over Thailand’s increasing influence on Cambodia’s economy and society.  
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 Threat perceptions in bilateral relations maintain a high probability of conflict, since 
suspicions and apprehension of the other can easily be triggered by any provocation to 
produce a strong, nationalist backlash. For example, reports in the Cambodian news on a 
purported remark by a Thai actress, Suwannan Konying, triggered anti-Thai protests in 2003. 
According to these reports, Suwannan stated that she would not go to Cambodia unless 
Angkor Wat was returned to Thailand.228 Given that Angkor Wat is an important symbol of 
Cambodian civilization and cultural heritage, Suwannan’s alleged statement led to attacks by 
nationalist mobs on about a dozen Thai businesses in Cambodia, including Cambodia 
Shinawatra (a telecommunications company set up by the Thai Prime Minister at the time, 
Thaksin Shinawatra) and the Royal Phnom Penh Hotel. The strong nationalist backlash 
involved a day of attacking Thai businesses, flag burning, and anti-Thai chanting; before the 
mobs made their way to the Thai embassy in the evening, set it on fire, and made bonfires of 
furniture, motorcycles and cars.229 The extent of the nationalist backlash reflects the deeply 
embedded differentiation of Thailand as Cambodia’s enemy, and one which remains inclined 
to encroach on Cambodian territory. This perception is supported by interviews from the 
scene. For example, a Reuters reporter interviewed a Cambodian law student, who was taking 
part in the protests, and who explained that “the protest is because we hate the Thais inside 
Cambodia and because the Thais encroach on Cambodian border territory.”230 The 
overwhelming Cambodian nationalist anti-Thai sentiment reached such an extent that the 
Cambodian Defence Minister, Teah Banh, had to send more military troops to Phnom Penh, 
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to aid the military and police already stationed there. As Teah Banh told a Thai television 
station, “we have had to call in big reinforcements in every area because police could not 
control the situation. There are stand-offs now at so many places.”231 This incident in 2003 
demonstrates the fragility of Thai-Cambodian relations. It also demonstrates how bilateral 
differentiation has the potential to escalate into violence, thereby further undermining 
progress towards a regional community based on trust and peaceful relations.  
The anti-Thai riots in Cambodia precipitated policies of retaliation on the Thai side, 
which further worsened the bilateral relationship and restricted the emergence of a 
community “we feeling” between the two countries. The Thai Prime Minister at the time, 
Thaksin Shinawatra, highlighted the severity of the anti-Thai riots by describing them as “the 
worse incident ever” between the two countries, and by expelling the Cambodian 
Ambassador to Thailand “for his own safety.”232 This expulsion added to Cambodia’s 
differentiation of Thailand as a security threat since it signalled the possibility of anti-
Cambodian protests taking place in Thailand. Moreover, the expulsion of the Cambodian 
Ambassador also downgraded the two countries’ diplomatic relations and, in doing so, further 
undermined progress towards a regional community based on mutual recognition and 
assimilation. Other retaliatory measures included the suspension of all economic and 
technical assistance to Cambodia, pending full explanation and compensation. In addition, the 
Thai Foreign Ministry also criticized the Cambodian government for its inadequate response 
to repeated pleas for protection from the Thai Ambassador to Cambodia, which implied its 
support for the anti-Thai riots. The Cambodian authorities dismissed such a claim by replying 
that their inadequate response stemmed from their underestimate of the riots’ potential for 
violence. However, many Thais were sceptical, and accused the Cambodian government of 
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orchestrating the protests, and of deliberately delaying the deployment of aid.233 This 
suspicion on the Thai side highlighted the mutual inherent distrust between the two countries, 
and only served to maintain a cold distance between them, as well as bilateral tensions. Thus, 
mutual distrust and differentiation between Thai and Cambodian societies hinder any 
prospects for a positive outcome to dialogue, such as mutual understanding, and restrict the 
improvement of bilateral relations, as part of regional community building. 
 The extent of anti-Thai riots demonstrated the underlying fear of Thailand’s growing 
reach into Cambodian territory, which was already evident in Cambodian markets and 
Cambodian television: such an underlying fear of the other constitutes a major obstacle to 
reversing differentiation in a bilateral relationship. Cambodian scholars explain that this 
underlying fear was based on the potential negative impact of Thailand’s extensive presence 
on efforts to reconstruct a Cambodian identity after their civil war and occupation by 
Vietnam; they also argue that Cambodian society gave vent to this fear and frustration by 
participating in the anti-Thai riots.234 For example, the Executive Director of the Phnom Penh-
based Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, Kao Kim Hourn, explains that 
Cambodian society was apprehensive of a “Thailandization of Cambodia” and that they felt 
like there were “losing out to Thailand.”235 Some Cambodians reinforced this argument by 
referring to how Thai television was affecting the Cambodian identity. For example, one 
Cambodian businessman observed that there was fear and resentment in society that the Thai 
way of living, as portrayed in Thai soap operas, was being pursued to the expense of the 
Khmer way of living.236 Such fear and resentment against the other breeds nationalist 
frustration, and tends to be exploited by state actors, through political statements and the 
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media, in order to protect regime security. Thus, the tendency of state actors to maintain 
differentiation in order to stay in power hinders progress towards realizing regional solidarity 
and a community “we feeling.” 
National Security and the Reversal of Differentiation (2003-2004) 
After the anti-Thai riots in Cambodia, in 2003, both the Thai and Cambodian 
governments were motivated to reverse differentiation for national security. In this 
endeavour, the Thai and Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a Thai-
Cambodia Joint Commission for the Promotion of Cultural Cooperation (later renamed the 
Thailand-Cambodia Cultural Association) in 2004. The Joint Commission sought to produce 
a shift from differentiation to assimilation in bilateral relations; more specifically, it sought to 
produce a shift from the emphasis on victimization by Thailand in Cambodia’s historical 
memory, and the Thai people’s memory of anti-Thai riots in Cambodia, towards an emphasis 
on the two countries’ shared historical and cultural heritage. The aim in emphasizing a shared 
past and a shared heritage, was to highlight commonalities between the two countries and two 
peoples, thereby reversing differentiation and creating a basis for progress towards 
assimilation. Thai and Cambodian government officials noted that education and the media 
have a strong influence on society’s perceptions, and that the reversal of differentiation thus 
requires media and academic support. These aims and views were reiterated at the first 
meeting of the Thai-Cambodia Joint Commission for the Promotion of Cultural Cooperation, 
in May 2004. At the meeting, the Thai Co-Chairman of the Commission emphasized the 
importance of reversing differentiation, in terms of promoting mutual respect for each other’s 
history and culture, mutual recognition of shared history and cultural heritage, and a shared 
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identity as fellow members of ASEAN.237 Moreover, he also promoted the reversal of 
differentiation by encouraging the exchange of peoples, ideas, and knowledge, as well as 
public outreach through cooperation with the media.238 As a result of the meeting, participants 
agreed to explore the possibility of setting up working groups on history and culture 
education, in order to make historical narratives less nationalistic (thereby reversing 
differentiation), and to promote a shared identity.239 However, such working groups did not 
materialize till two years later, when the renamed Thai-Cambodia Cultural Association 
created three sub-committees on culture, history and tourism. In the meantime, there were 
efforts to raise awareness, and to promote a shared historical and cultural heritage through 
bilateral meetings between government officials and academia, as well as lectures to 
university students. For example, in August 2004, a group of Cambodian cultural officers, 
researchers, and one designer and architect, went on a field trip to Thailand, to discuss the 
objectives of the Thai-Cambodia Cultural Association with their counterparts.240 The field trip 
promoted bilateral cooperation, by enabling government officials and academia to exchange 
their knowledge and experience in cultural heritage and conservation.241 However, bilateral 
exchanges during the field trip were only limited to the actors involved, and to the students 
who attended a lecture on Cambodian history, which was given by a Cambodian researcher at 
the Faculty of Archaelogy, Silpakorn University. This is just one example of the minimal 
impact that the Thai-Cambodia Cultural Association has on improving bilateral relations. As 
noted by the Thai Ambassador to Cambodia, Prasas Prasasvinitchai (2010-2011): 
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It [the Thai-Cambodia Cultural Association] is not as active as we would like…there is the 
issue of funding to organize meetings between different groups of people and there is no 
coordinated action…The trouble with trying to promote people-to-people relations is that 
everyone is worried about bilateral relations between the two governments, and they are 
scared about what will happen.242  
 
For these reasons, the Thai-Cambodia Cultural Association has been inactive since 2004, 
when the urgency of repairing bilateral relations after the anti-Thai riots had waned. Thus, 
efforts to shift differentiation towards assimilation were hindered by the lack of political will, 
which contributed to a lack of funding and coordination, as well as continued differentiation 
and tensions between the two governments. 
III. The Politicisation, Militarisation, and Internationalisation of Differentiation (2008-
2011) 
 
Domestic politics and business relations between state leaders worsened 
differentiation between Thailand and Cambodia in 2008. At the time, the Cambodian 
government, as personified by Prime Minister Hun Sen, was differentiated as an enemy of 
Thailand, due to its support for Thaksin, who was then a political fugitive. Thaksin was in 
self-imposed exile to escape a prison term for corruption. However, despite his status as a 
political fugitive, Thaksin was still recognized and treated as a legitimate state actor by Hun 
Sen. Moreover, Hun Sen defended Thaksin, stating that he was a victim of the Thai political 
system, and explicitly showed his support by enabling Thaksin to expand his business deals 
with the Cambodian government, and by offering him a position as the Cambodian 
government’s economic advisor, which he accepted. Hun Sen’s defence and support for 
Thaksin resulted in Thai society’s differentiation of him as a political and security threat, due 
to his interference in Thailand’s domestic politics. Hun Sen’s relationship and business deals 
with Thaksin were closely followed by the Thai media, especially after speculation in Thai 
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society that Thaksin’s political party had compromised Thailand’s national interest in 
exchange for Thaksin’s business ventures.243 This speculation emerged after Thaksin’s 
personal lawyer and then Foreign Minister, Noppadon Pattama (2008), visited Cambodia to 
discuss the UNESCO World Heritage listing of Preah Vihear temple, and was shortly 
followed by a visit to Cambodia by Thaksin, to negotiate big investment projects.244 The 
proximity of these two visits led to speculation that they were related to each other; more 
specifically, that Cambodia’s agreement to Thaksin’s investment was conditional on the Thai 
government’s support for Cambodia’s listing of Preah Vihear temple. This speculation 
demonstrates how domestic politics and personal/business relations between state leaders can 
worsen differentiation in bilateral relations. On the Cambodian side, Thailand was also 
differentiated as a source of political threats, when the Cambodian opposition party argued 
that Thaksin was trouble, and that he only wanted to use Cambodia as a base for political 
activities in Thailand.245 Thus, domestic politics and personal/business relations between state 
leaders hindered the reversal of differentiation in the bilateral relationship by maintaining 
mutual distrust, and suspicion, in political and social discourse. 
 Hun Sen’s support for Thaksin was a source of bilateral conflict, which heightened 
Thai society’s differentiation of Cambodia as a political threat, especially under the 
premiership of Thaksin’s opposition, Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2011). Hun Sen’s appointment 
of Thaksin as an economic advisor to this government in November 2009 was interpreted as a 
deliberate demonstration of his taking sides in Thailand’s domestic politics, and interference 
in Thai politics, due to his support for a political fugitive, who was exacerbating Thailand’s 
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political polarization.246 Moreover, Hun Sen’s refusal to cooperate with Abhisit’s government 
and his verbal attacks on the Thai political system further added to the Thai state and 
society’s differentiation of Cambodia as a threat that sought to weaken Thailand through 
political means. For example, Hun Sen refused Abhisit’s request to extradite Thaksin from 
Cambodia, arguing that Thaksin was a victim of political persecution. Moreover, Hun Sen’s 
government also expressed its support for Thaksin to the international community, while 
undermining the legitimacy of Abhisit’s government. For example, , the spokesman for Hun 
Sen’s government told the BBC that Cambodia valued Thaksin’s leadership qualities and 
business experience, and that they saw him as a national asset.247 The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and International Cooperation (MFAIC) of Cambodia also justified the government’s 
refusal to extradite Thaksin, based on Thaksin’s electoral legitimacy and what they perceived 
as political manipulation of the Thai judicial system.248 Finally, Hun Sen differentiated 
Abhisit as an adversary, who particularly targeted Cambodia when Thaksin was residing 
there, but did nothing when Thaksin visited other countries.249 In addition, Hun Sen attacked 
the legitimacy of Abhisit’s government by stating that it was “stolen” from someone else, and 
that “(Abhisit claimed) other people’s property as (his) own.”250 Such attacks on the other 
maintain bilateral tensions while hindering prospects for bilateral dialogue and cooperation, 
as well as the reversal of differentiation. Thus, the Thai-Cambodian relationship is one 
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example of how regional community building is restricted by acrimonious relations between 
state leaders.  
Politicized Territorial Disputes and Mutual Differentiation (2008) 
Mutual differentiation between Thailand and Cambodia worsened in 2008, due to the 
highly politicized territorial dispute over the area surrounding Preah Vihear temple. This 
dispute dates back to the 1950s, when the Thai and Cambodian governments failed to reach a 
solution through bilateral negotiations, and subsequently agreed to submit the case to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1959. In 1962, the ICJ ruled in favour of Kampuchea 
(now Cambodia), by a majority vote of 9 to 3. Following this verdict, the Thai government 
and Thai media differentiated the Cambodian leader, Prince Sihanouk, as Thailand’s top 
enemy; the verdict became a sensational issue for the Thai public, and fighting along the 
Thai-Cambodian border became a regular activity, with both governments blaming each other 
for the border conflict and producing White Papers to gain international support.251 The ICJ 
verdict of 1962 has since then been an underlying point of contention in bilateral relations. It 
was revived as a bilateral problem in July 2008 when the Thai government, led by Prime 
Minister Samak Sundaravej, was being challenged by its opponents over UNESCO’s listing 
of Preah Vihear temple as a World Heritage site, and UNESCO’s recognition of the Preah 
Vihear temple area as belonging to Cambodia.252 In this regard, one government’s opposition 
can worsen differentiation of the other in bilateral relations by highlighting a linkage between 
domestic politics and foreign policy in general, and the current government and bilateral 
problems in particular.  
In Thailand, an opposition movement, the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), 
included Cambodia in domestic politics by exerting pressure on Samak’s government over its 
                                                          
251
 Khien Theeravit, “Thai-Kampuchean Relations: Problems and Prospects,” Asian Survey 22, No. 6 (June, 
1982): 567. 
252
 UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. 
122 
 
handling of Cambodia’s application for World Heritage status; by highlighting a link between 
the government and a sensitive bilateral issue, the opposition movement was seeking to 
politically weaken the government, at the expense of peaceful bilateral relations. PAD used a 
sensitive bilateral issue to attack the government, by accusing it of betraying Thailand’s 
heritage and successfully forcing the resignation of Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama. 
PAD sought to undermine the government in the following ways: by demonstrating its failure 
to protect national interests and national territory, and by stirring up a nationalist backlash 
against it, and against its close relations with the Cambodian government.253 In this regard, 
PAD extended a domestic political conflict into bilateral relations. Such an extension, the 
blurring of domestic and bilateral issues is problematic for regional community building if 
domestic politics is highly polarized and unstable. This is because changes in domestic 
politics are likely to lead to changes in foreign policy, which does not facilitate the 
development of consistent, stable bilateral relations, as a solid basis for the reversal of 
differentiation.  
The listing of Preah Vihear temple as a World Heritage site worsened differentiation 
between Thailand and Cambodia since it was exploited for domestic political gains on both 
sides. On the Cambodian side, Hun Sen was able to refer to Preah Vihear temple’s World 
Heritage status as an additional accomplishment of his government. Moreover, he was also 
able to highlight the nationalist backlash in Thailand and to demonstrate his government’s 
capability in acting against this neighbouring enemy. Hun Sen was able to make the most of 
the World Heritage listing and Thailand’s reaction, which coincided with Cambodia’s general 
election. Although there was no doubt that Hun Sen would be re-elected, international 
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recognition of Preah Vihear temple and differentiation of Thailand arguably helped Hun Sen 
to secure an overwhelming majority.254 The case of Preah Vihear temple is significant for 
demonstrating how Cambodian nationalist sentiment against Thailand, and Thai nationalist 
sentiment against Cambodia, takes little to reignite. Moreover, it is also significant for 
demonstrating how these sentiments, once unleashed, are difficult and politically costly to 
diffuse. Any attempt to downplay nationalism by a political party could undermine that 
party’s popularity in relation to others, and, thus, its maintenance of power and victory in the 
next general election. In Thailand, any political party that downplayed the listing of Preah 
Vihear temple as a World Heritage site would risk being accused of compromising 
sovereignty and national dignity. As noted by a Thai scholar, Thitinan Pongsudhirak: Thai 
leaders could not go too far against the nationalist tide, “or (they) would be accused of being 
a traitor.”255 Thus, political considerations produced disincentives to diffuse the bilateral 
conflict, and to reverse differentiation of the other. 
The Militarisation and Internationalisation of Differentiation (2010-2011) 
The reversal of differentiation in Thai-Cambodian relations is hindered by the 
presence of military troops in the contested border area, which indicates the possibility of 
border clashes, and preparations for them. In contrast, the reversal of differentiation and 
progress in regional community requires demilitarized relations, which is defined by Charles 
Kupchan as follows: undefended borders and/or the redeployment of forces from contested 
areas, the absence of war plans against one another, and evidence that the elite, and the 
general public, have come to see war among the parties in question as extremely remote, if 
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not outside the realm of the possible.256 In 2010-2011, Thai-Cambodian relations were still 
fraught with military clashes in the disputed border areas, which undermined the 
development of mutual trust and peaceful bilateral relations. Moreover, both countries 
expressed their readiness for attack, should the other venture into, and occupy the contested 
area. For example, at the World Heritage Committee (WHC) meeting in 2010, Cambodian 
Foreign Minister Hor Namhong warned that Cambodian troops would fire at Thais who 
intrude into the disputed territory; to which Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva replied that 
Thai security forces were prepared in the case of violence.257 In February and May 2011, 
Cambodian and Thai troops exchanged fire across the disputed area surrounding Preah 
Vihear temple, which resulted in deaths, injuries, and the displacement of people on both 
sides; this incident was significant in terms of undermining ASEAN community building at 
both the regional level and bilateral level.258 While the exact causes of the border clashes were 
unclear, there have been many theories to account for their occurrence. For example, some 
commentators argued that the timing of border clashes coincided with campaigns for 
Thailand’s general elections in July 2011, and were part of the Abhisit government’s scheme 
to remain in power.259 Others argued that the clashes were orchestrated by Hun Sen to rally 
nationalist sentiment in an attempt to divert attention from domestic issues, such as the 
erosion of civil liberties, and to bolster the military credentials of his son and successor, who 
is in charge of border troops.260 In any case, irrespective of its causes, the border clashes 
impaired community building at both the regional and bilateral level. At the regional level, 
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the incident violated the very spirit of ASEAN, and key ASEAN agreements, such as the 
1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which commits member states to reject the 
use or threat of force in interstate relations, and to the peaceful settlement of interstate 
disputes. At the bilateral level, both sides blamed each other for initiating and sustaining the 
conflict, thereby differentiating each other as a security threat.261 For example, Cambodian 
Prime Minister Hun Sen asked the UN Security Council to intervene, in order to stop what he 
described as Thailand’s “repeated acts of aggression” against his country.262 Following the 
exchange of fire, Cambodian troops turned the Preah Vihear temple area into an armed camp, 
thereby further increasing the military presence in the border area.263 Thus, community 
building was undermined, and restricted, by armed clashes in the border area, and the 
increasing use of the military in bilateral relations.  
The failure of both sides to negotiate an agreement maintained mutual differentiation, 
and led to the bilateral conflict becoming a regional and international issue, which further 
highlighted adversity between the two countries. As the smaller country, the Cambodian 
government sought to consolidate its leverage vis-à-vis Thailand, by calling for UN 
intervention. This call for UN intervention, and international concern over the Thai-
Cambodian conflict, led to both sides presenting their positions to the UN Security Council in 
mid-February, and a UN resolution. The UN Security Council sought to diffuse bilateral 
tensions by reminding both sides of the notion of good neighbourliness, urging both sides to 
show “maximum restraint” and to agree to a permanent cease-fire.264 Moreover, the Council 
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also promoted regional community building, by supporting mediation efforts by Indonesia, 
which was the ASEAN Chair at the time. In this regard, the Council promoted an ASEAN 
role in the resolution of an intra-regional conflict, reminding both Thailand and Cambodia of 
their common regional membership and common regional goals.265 The UN resolution on the 
Thai-Cambodian conflict produced mixed reactions among the concerned parties. The Thai 
government did not want the conflict to have a negative impact on its international relations, 
and preferred to contain the conflict to the bilateral level. However, the Cambodian 
government preferred third party mediation, due to their weaker position, in terms of country 
size and economic power, as well as its lack of faith in bilateral mechanisms, based on past 
experience.266 This preference was indicated, for example, in the following statement by a 
spokesman for the Cambodian Foreign Ministry: “bilateral negotiations do not work…all 
negotiations must always have the participation of a third party.”267 Thus, bilateral conflicts 
became internationalised and further highlighted, and consolidated, mutual differentiation. 
 The Thai-Cambodian conflict escalated to such an extent that it became an issue for 
ASEAN; however, ASEAN failed to mediate this bilateral conflict, and to demonstrate the 
existence of a regional community in which intra-regional conflicts can be peacefully 
resolved. This failure was due to the uncompromising stance of both the Thai and Cambodian 
governments, since the conflict was a matter of territorial integrity and national pride.268 
Moreover, the Thai government was under pressure from the strong nationalist feelings in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Permanent-Cambodia-Thailand-Cease-Fire-116180379.html [accessed on 05/10/11]; “Thai-Cambodia border 
fighting enters fourth day,” BBC News, 7 February 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-
12378987 [accessed on 05/10/11]. 
265
 See Besheer, “UN Security Council Urges Permanent Cambodia-Thailand Cease-Fire.” 
266
 Kesavapany, “ASEAN and the Cambodia-Thailand Conflict”; Pongphisoot Busbarat (university lecturer at 
the Australian National University), “Thai-Cambodian conflict: an obstacle to the ASEAN Community 2015?” 
East Asia Forum, 20 May 2011, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/05/20/thai-cambodian-conflict-an-obstacle-
to-the-asean-community-2015 [accessed on 07/10/11]; Puangthong Pawakapan (university lecturer at 
Chulalongkorn University),” Rao Mai Dai Teu Pai Nhua Kwa” [We Do Not Hold a Higher Card], Thai Post, 22 
November 2009, http://www.thaipost.net/print/13901 [accessed on 04/08/10].  
267
 Quoted in “Thai-Cambodian border troops clash as UN Security Council urges “permanent ceasefire,”” 
Deutsche Welle, 15 February 2011, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,6438986,00.html [accessed on 
05/10/11]. 
268
 See Neil Chatterjee, “ASEAN Summit fails to resolve Thai-Cambodia conflict,” Reuters, 8 May 2011, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/08/us-asean-idUSTRE74709V29119598 [accessed on 07/10/11]. 
127 
 
Thailand, while the Cambodian government sought to maintain international recognition for 
their territory, and to demonstrate their ability to defend national interests against a historical 
enemy and stronger neighbour. In Thailand, nationalist feelings were stimulated by 
conservative, anti-Thaksin political groups, led by the People’s Alliance for Democracy 
(PAD), or the Yellow Shirts, in order to undermine the pro-Thaksin government. These 
conservative groups attacked Thaksin and his allies for “selling the nation,” based on the pro-
Thaksin, Samak government’s support of Cambodia’s listing of Preah Vihear temple as a 
UNESCO World Heritage site in 2008.269 As observed by a Thai scholar, Pongphisoot 
Busbarat, the PAD successfully convinced many Thais that UNESCO’s listing of Preah 
Vihear temple will lead to the loss of Thai sovereignty over the disputed 4.6 square kilometre 
area adjacent to the temple, despite the fact that World Heritage status has nothing to do with 
any legally binding border demarcation.270 Prime Minister Abhisit and his Democrat Party 
supported PAD’s nationalist agenda over Preah Vihear when they were the opposition in 
2008.271 Subsequently, when Abhisit became Prime Minister in December 2008, his 
government came under pressure to sustain the nationalist agenda and to adopt a hawkish 
stance vis-à-vis Cambodia. In order to placate the nationalists, Abhisit insisted on resolving 
the boundary issue and on using the Thai, as well as the Cambodian name for the temple.272 
However, at the time of writing, the boundary issue remains unresolved, Cambodia refused to 
accept the Thai name for the temple, and both countries still differentiate each other.273 For 
example, in May 2011, Thai sources differentiated Cambodia as a security threat, which used 
human shields to escalate the border conflict, in order to justify international intervention and 
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condemnation of Thailand.274  On the Cambodian side, Hun Sen maintained a discourse on 
differentiation of Thailand. He accused Thailand of invading Cambodia and seeking to 
prolong the conflict “in order to violate weaker neighboring ASEAN members,” at the annual 
ASEAN Summit that same month.275 ASEAN’s failure to mediate not only enabled Thai and 
Cambodian military troops to continue fighting in the border area, but also threatened 
ASEAN’s political unity, and undermined the aim of ASEAN member states to work towards 
building an ASEAN Political-Security Community, which includes cooperation between 
member states to find a peaceful solution to interstate conflicts. As commented by the 
Philippine President, Benigno Aquino: “How can we have one ASEAN, one family, if we 
have two major components who cannot solve their problems?”276 Thus, domestic politics in 
Thailand and Cambodia, and their militarized border and border disputes, are a major 
obstacle for ASEAN community building. 
National Security and the Reversal of Differentiation (2011) 
 
In 2011, non-state actors from academia and civil society were motivated to step up 
their efforts to promote the reversal of differentiation, in the wake of military armed clashes 
in the border area. A Thai scholar, Charnvit Kasetsiri, revived the idea of re-writing historical 
narratives, against the backdrop of ASEAN community building. Moreover, he also sought to 
facilitate the shift towards assimilation by suggesting the promotion of regional culture 
through “Hindu-Buddhist Trans-Boundary ASEAN World Heritage” sites.277 Charnvit argued 
that distorted history produced incorrect perceptions, which could then be “negatively and 
politically exploited”; moreover, his main argument was that “bad history” led to “bad 
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education,” and to “bad relations between nations.”278 This implies that sustainable 
assimilation must begin with the reconciliation and reconstruction of historical memory, 
which can then be reflected in school textbooks, and influence new social attitudes and 
discourse. Charnvit’s proposal for a cultural trans-boundary world heritage site was 
specifically targeted at the Preah Vihear temple, which has been the centre of a highly 
politicized territorial dispute, as well as border clashes between Thailand and Cambodia. The 
proposal for a joint world heritage site was intended to promote bilateral cooperation in the 
area, with administration overseen by ASEAN. However, the chances for this scenario to 
occur are slim to none, given that the Thai and Cambodian governments have not been able 
to agree on a management plan for the temple, or to encourage ASEAN mediation and an 
ASEAN role in resolving the dispute. Thus, it is not a lack of ideas for the reversal of 
differentiation which hinders community building, but rather a lack of political will to 
compromise on bilateral conflicts. 
Most recently, the reversal of differentiation between the Thai and Cambodian 
governments was hindered by a lack of political will to negotiate a compromise over the 
management plan for Preah Vihear temple. Under the terms of the UNESCO World Heritage 
site, Cambodia was required to submit a management plan to the World Heritage Committee 
(WHC) for approval, which it did in 2010. However, the proposal was actively opposed by 
the Thai government, with no sign, at the time of writing, of any compromise being reached. 
The difficulties in negotiating a compromise were confirmed by Thai Prime Minister Abhisit 
Vejjajiva in a press interview in 2010. Abhisit stated that the two countries remained in 
bilateral deadlock and that meetings between Thai and Cambodian diplomats had not been 
fruitful; moreover, he also reiterated Thailand’s position, which is unacceptable to Cambodia, 
that Thailand will only accept the management plan for the temple, if the temple is jointly 
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listed between the two countries.”279 The refusal to accept Cambodia’s management plan had 
been agreed in a Thai cabinet resolution, and justified on the basis that it would affect 
Thailand’s sovereignty. This cabinet resolution reiterated Thailand’s position that any action 
on the management plan is not possible pending demarcation of the Thai-Cambodian border, 
as stated in the 2000 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the Thai and 
Cambodian governments.280 Thus, the reversal of differentiation continued to be restricted by 
the issue of border demarcation around Preah Vihear temple, and the inability of the Thai and 
Cambodian governments to cooperate with each other on the issue, due to strong nationalist 
feelings for the defence of national sovereignty in both countries. 
Thai scholars were motivated to diffuse bilateral tensions, and to promote the reversal 
of differentiation, due to the following concerns: national security, regional community 
building for regional development and security, and ASEAN’s relevance and credibility, both 
for member states and vis-à-vis the international community. Thai scholars, such as 
Puangthong Pawakapan, note that many Thais differentiate Cambodian people as inferior, as 
coming from a smaller, less developed country, and that many Thais also do not show respect 
to Cambodian people.281 In reaction to this prevalent social attitude, Puangthong has led a call 
for the reversal of differentiation, arguing that Thailand’s neighbours have just as much 
dignity as Thailand, and that they are not weak as they were in the past. She argues that if 
Thailand has bad relations with its neighbours, these countries will just turn to each other, as 
well as other countries, and that it is Thailand that will suffer. Finally, she points to the 
regional implications of Thailand’s adverse relations with neighbouring countries, stating that 
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such a situation will restrict the aspiration of successive Thai governments to make Thailand 
a regional economic hub, and that Thailand’s failure to improve its bilateral relations has 
already made Thailand a problem for ASEAN.282 Thus, scholars have picked up on the issue 
of reversing differentiation, and have sought to influence a change in social attitudes and 
discourse, by emphasizing Thailand’s national and regional interests. However, they were 
unable to influence policy change due to strong nationalist, anti-Cambodian sentiment within 
society, which was fuelled by the territorial dispute and border clashes near Preah Vihear 
temple.  
In addition to academia, civil society organizations (CSOs) in both countries have 
also been motivated to promote the reversal of differentiation, in order to safeguard border 
communities’ security and economic exchanges, and to demonstrate their capacity to 
influence change. CSOs have been active in social mobilisation and in organizing activities to 
raise awareness on calls for peaceful bilateral relations. For example, in May 2011, a Thai 
CSO, People’s Empowerment Foundation, responded to the border clashes by organizing a 
march for peace in the Thai border town of Aranyaprathet.283 Participants included a variety 
of non-state actors, such as religious leaders, local villagers, academics, students, peace 
activists, and civil society. Activities such as this peace walk are significant for the reversal 
of differentiation, for many reasons. They constitute a symbolic act and raise awareness on 
society’s call for peace. In addition, they can also promote discussion within society on 
conflict mediation and resolution, and thus build, and consolidate, a mind-set and discourse 
on the long-term goal of peaceful bilateral relations and assimilation. One Thai participant, a 
well-known social critic, Sulak Sivaraksa, criticized Thai historical narratives and called for 
bilateral reconciliation. He stated that  
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our way of teaching history is nationalistic and discriminatory against our neighbours. 
Thailand should apologize to Cambodia…We think we are better than Cambodia because we 
have never been colonized. But we have been colonized by this way of thinking.284 
 
Moreover, a Thai scholar, Akarapong Kamkun, from the Thai border province of Ubon 
Ratchathani, noted that border communities have sought to maintain peaceful relations and 
that they have apologized to each other for past conflicts; however, he emphasized the fact 
that “governments should apologize, since it is not a conflict between people.”285 Indeed, 
border communities are more assimilated, than differentiated, due to cross-border family ties, 
shared culture, as well as trade: all of which demonstrate the social deconstruction of borders, 
and the potential for larger scale socially-driven assimilation. Thus, a successful, long-term 
reversal of differentiation requires inclusion of the wider society, which can be facilitated by 
CSOs. 
 CSOs from Thailand and Cambodia were motivated to promote peace in the border 
area, and in bilateral relations in general; and, as such, promoted an ASEAN role to advance 
regional community building. More specifically, CSOs supported the role of ASEAN as an 
observer and mediator to the bilateral conflict. However, ASEAN can only carry out this role 
with the support of the Thai and Cambodian governments, whose failure to reach a consensus 
on the bilateral conflict resulted in unfruitful ASEAN meetings and ASEAN’s restricted role 
as an observer.286 Nevertheless, Thai and Cambodian CSOs perceived bilateral negotiations to 
be ineffective, and thus appealed for ASEAN mediation. They highlighted how the border 
clashes in February and May 2011 had displaced many people, and how these people’s 
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human rights had been violated; for example, their right to stability, security and food.287 Thai 
and Cambodian government agencies, such as the Ministry of Public Health, the Red Cross in 
both countries, as well as CSOs, such as OXFAM and World Vision, have provided aid to 
displaced people; for example, tents, rice, water, and other food supplies.288 However, a long-
term solution to the border conflict can only be negotiated by the two governments. One Thai 
human rights activist, Somsri Hananuntasuk, emphasized Thailand and Cambodia’s common 
membership of ASEAN, and, thus, their common regional identity, which should push them 
towards a solution as soon as possible. Moreover, she also promoted a role for ASEAN, 
rather than external, international organizations, like the UN, which are further away, and are 
thus expected to have less understanding of the conflict.289 Thus, CSOs support ASEAN 
mediation as the best way to reverse differentiation and to improve bilateral relations between 
Thailand and Cambodia, as part of regional community building. 
In terms of community building, the fact that CSOs support ASEAN mediation is 
significant, since it demonstrates their act of association with a regional organization, and 
their recognition of the interconnectedness between intra-regional relations and regional 
consolidation. CSOs have a stronger regional mind-set than state actors, since they are not 
bogged down by domestic politics, and are thus important actors in efforts to reverse 
differentiation and to promote assimilation within society. As such, they have been delegated 
the task of raising awareness of an ASEAN identity, as part of regional community building, 
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and have carried out their role through networking and discussion sessions on ASEAN 
policy, and ASEAN’s development.290 The problem with CSOs is that they do not have as 
much economic or human resource capacity as governments, and are thus more restricted in 
the scope and scale of their actions. Nevertheless, since the first ASEAN Civil Society 
Conference in 2005, there has been an expanding role for CSOs within an ASEAN 
framework, and, thus, a wider opening for the role of CSOs in reversing differentiation and 
promoting assimilation. 
IV. Conclusion 
 
This chapter sought to test ASEAN’s progress in community building based on the 
extent of the shift from differentiation to assimilation in the Thai-Cambodian relationship. 
The chapter analysed the advances in reversing differentiation, in terms of successive Thai 
governments’ economics-driven foreign policy, and the aim to strengthen Thailand’s status in 
the international community, be it as a new donor country, or a leader in regional 
development and community building. Moreover, the chapter also analysed the role of non-
state actors in reversing differentiation; for example, the role of academia in raising 
awareness on similarities between Thailand and Cambodia, and Thailand’s national and 
regional interests, as well as the role of civil society organizations (CSOs) in mobilizing the 
wider society to call for peaceful bilateral relations. These actions have thus far had a 
minimal impact on the Thai-Cambodian relationship, which is still confronted with three 
major problems: first, the underlying, deeply embedded differentiation within society; 
second, the tendency of state actors to derive political benefits from differentiation, rather 
than risk political losses by going against historical legacy and strong nationalist sentiment; 
and, third, the continued perception of the other as an external security threat and the 
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possibility of bilateral conflict, as indicated by the presence of military troops in the contested 
border area and recent military armed clashes. These problems indicate that the shared aim of 
realizing an ASEAN Community has failed to overcome domestic political imperatives. This 
implies that progress from differentiation to assimilation requires a stronger political will 
from state actors, and/or more action on the part of non-state actors to persuade the wider 
society of benefits in reversing differentiation, and promoting long-term, peaceful bilateral 
relations, and regional community building. In this regard, state actors need to be persuaded 
of the relative gains from the reversal of differentiation and community building, compared to 
the maintenance of differentiation; while non-state actors need to gain more support from 
society in general and/or the support of influential members of society and state actors in 
particular, in order to increase the chances of their proposals being translated into policies. 
Thus, the shift from differentiation to assimilation in intra-regional relations, and regional 
community building, ultimately depends on domestic political dynamics in the individual 
ASEAN member states, and the extent to which non-state actors have a political role, and are 
able to influence policies for the protection of social and economic welfare. 
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Chapter Four: Thailand’s Southern Conflict and State-Centred 
Differentiation in the Thai-Malaysian Relationship 
 
 This chapter tests ASEAN’s progress in regional community building, based on the 
extent to which there has been a shift from differentiation to assimilation in the Thai-
Malaysian relationship. Unlike the previous bilateral relationships surveyed in this thesis – 
Thai-Myanmar and Thai-Cambodian relations – the Thai-Malaysian relationship is not 
confronted by differentiation between the two societies; however, its state-centred 
differentiation, whether one-sided or mutual, still has a strong negative impact on bilateral 
relations, and, by extension, regional community building. The Thai-Malaysian relationship 
consists of three kinds of differentiation: first, the Thai government’s differentiation of its 
Malaysian counterpart as a security threat, based on support for insurgents in southern 
Thailand; second, the Malaysian government’s differentiation of its Thai counterpart as a 
threat to ethnic Malays in Southern Thailand, based on the Thai government’s centralisation 
policies, which do not take account of the Malay identity and culture, and based on the socio-
economic marginalization of ethnic Malays, as well as the abuse of human rights. Such 
differentiation between ASEAN member states restricts the development of trust, and 
maintains tensions in bilateral relations, thereby undermining the process of regional 
community building. The third kind of differentiation in the Thai-Malaysian relationship is 
that between the ethnic Malays in southern Thailand and the central Thai government, which 
has resulted in the southern conflict, and maintained tensions and the issue of border security 
in bilateral relations. All three kinds of differentiation are based on Thailand’s southern 
conflict, which is in part a border issue. This implies that the reversal of differentiation is 
primarily dependent on the Thai government’s domestic policy towards the conflict, and 
foreign policy towards Malaysia. The pursuit of differentiation by both governments would 
indicate a lack of progress in regional community building, while efforts to reverse 
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differentiation by one or both governments would indicate progress, based on the intent to 
improve bilateral relations, which constitute an important building block for a regional 
community.  
 The negative impact of Thailand’s southern conflict on Thai-Malaysian relations 
undermines the aim of both countries’ government to promote security and stability in 
Southeast Asia, as fellow members of ASEAN which seek to realize a comprehensive 
regional community. Successive Malaysian governments have emphasized the importance of 
ASEAN as “the cornerstone of Malaysia’s foreign policy.”291 As such, they sought to 
strengthen ASEAN as a regional grouping, and to reduce risks to security by improving 
bilateral relations.292 However, differentiation in the Thai-Malaysian relationship, which is 
based on Thailand’s southern conflict, undermines such aims. Moreover, it also undermines 
regional community building, since it indicates distrust and a lack of confidence among 
ASEAN member states. On the part of Thai governments, Thailand’s southern conflict also 
undermines their aims for ASEAN regionalism. For example, Thai Prime Minister Abhisit 
Vejjajiva (2008-2011) proposed an ASEAN Connectivity Plan in 2009, which involves 
linking ASEAN member states through physical infrastructures, online connectedness, as 
well as people-to-people contacts to create a strong sense of community.293 While the 
violence in southern Thailand did not prevent the completion of a Thai-Malaysian Friendship 
bridge in 2009, it does threaten cross-border connectivity, as well as the development of a 
sense of community between Thai Buddhists and Malay Muslims. Both the Thai and 
Malaysian governments sought to address problems to these regionalism aims through the 
exchange of visits between state leaders, to strengthen good bilateral relations, as well as the 
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promotion of bilateral cooperation.294 For example, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak 
(2009-to the present) visited Narathiwat province in southern Thailand with Thai Prime 
Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva in 2009, to demonstrate his concern over the situation and to offer 
Malaysia’s support for the Thai government’s efforts to resolve the conflict. The southern 
conflict threatens border security, as well as the human security of both Thai and Malaysian 
communities in the border area.295 Thus, differentiation and the persisting issue of security in 
Thai-Malaysian relations undermine regional community building, since it indicates a 
missing gap in the development of trust and confidence between regional states, as well as a 
missing gap in the creation of peaceful regional connectivity. 
This chapter seeks to analyse the advances and limitations in reversing differentiation 
in the Thai-Malaysian relationship, and is divided into four sections. Section I provides the 
background and an overview of the impact of Thailand’s southern conflict on regional 
community building. Section II analyses the prospects for assimilation, based on the 
international trend towards economic integration, and shared political and security interests 
from the 1980s to 1990s. Section III focuses on challenges to improving the quality of Thai-
Malaysian relations. More specifically, it focuses on the recent interval of one-sided 
differentiation in the bilateral relationship, in terms of the escalating conflict in southern 
Thailand, versus bilateral cooperation for political and security interests in 2001-2006. 
Finally, section four analyses the prospects for community building, based on a period of 
expanded bilateral cooperation, mutual reversal of differentiation, and on-going cross-border 
assimilation in 2007-2009. 
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The chapter concludes that there is a general shift from differentiation to assimilation 
in the Thai-Malaysian relationship, which builds on the underlying cross-border kinship ties 
and dual citizenship, as well as regular cross-border exchanges. These underlying people-
centred community building processes are complimented by state-sponsored projects, such as 
the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle, the Joint Development Strategy, and 
states’ support for increasing bilateral people-to-people exchanges. Bilateral relations 
between states have also witnessed a general upward trend in reversing differentiation, due to 
shared political, security and economic interests. While some Thai leaders chose to maintain 
their political interests by differentiating their Malaysian counterpart, Malaysian leaders have 
been more constant in pursuing their political and security interests through the reversal of 
differentiation. Despite the fact that Malaysian leaders identify the Thai state as a threat to 
ethnic Malays in southern Thailand and provide asylum for these ethnic Malays, they have 
maintained their support for the Thai government’s efforts to resolve the southern conflict, 
and continue to promote bilateral cooperation in such endeavours. Thus, an improvement in 
Thai-Malaysian relations is primarily threatened by failed attempts to resolve the southern 
conflict and one-sided differentiation on the part of the Thai government, which overshadows 
the strong cross-border linkages, undermines border security, and maintains tensions in the 
bilateral relationship, to the expense of regional community building.   
I. Thailand’s Southern Conflict and Regional Community Building 
 
The Thai- Malaysian relationship has a historical legacy of undermining the 
realization of a regional community, due to state actors’ securitization, or identification of the 
separatist movement in southern Thailand, as a bilateral security issue.296 Such an act of 
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securitisation goes against the process of regional community building, whereby security 
gradually diminishes as an intra-regional issue, and whereby regional states are able to have 
dependable expectations of peaceful change. In the case of Thai-Malaysian relations, security 
persists as a bilateral issue, due to the on-going conflict in southern Thailand and the 
conflict’s proximity to the porous Thai-Malaysian border.297 This conflict originated as a 
separatist movement, and has since then created tensions in the Thai-Malaysian relationship. 
The conflict is difficult to resolve, since it is a deeply embedded one, based on historical 
legacy, identity, and politics. The historical legacy of separatism can be traced back to the 
15
th
 century, when what is now the three southernmost provinces of Thailand – Pattani, Yala 
and Narathiwat – and four districts of Songkhla province, constituted the Greater Pattani, or 
the Pattani Kingdom. In 1902, the Pattani Kingdom was annexed by Siam (now Thailand). 
This annexation was subsequently formalized by the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909. 
According to the terms of this Treaty, Siam (now Thailand) was to cede neighbouring Kedah, 
Perlis, Kelantan and Terengganu to what was then British Malaya; a border was imposed 
between Siam and British Malaya, and has remained in place ever since. This border was 
established without due respect for the needs of local communities, which became divided, 
and which became a minority in their host country. The externally imposed divide, or the 
colonial border, constitutes the genesis of the present day conflict in southern Thailand, 
which has resulted in an increasing number of violent incidents since the 1990s. According to 
Heidelberg University’s “Conflict Information System” (CONIS) database, the years 1993-
2000 saw a total of 468 violent incidents in southern Thailand, with most of the violence 
being acts against public facilities and the state’s security forces; between January 2001-April 
2007, the number of violent incidents had leapt to 6,965; subsequently, the database shows 
that attacks on the civilian population has intensified since 2008, as have tensions between 
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the majority Thai Buddhists, and the minority ethnic Malay-Muslims.298 No known resistance 
group has claimed responsibility for the violence. However, several factions remain key 
actors in the southern insurgency. They include the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN – 
formed in 1960), the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO – 1967), and the 
Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP – 1995).299 Thus, tensions and violence between 
ethnic groups in southern Thailand, which include ethnic Malay-Muslims, have a negative 
impact on Thai-Malaysian relations, and, as such, undermine the process of regional 
community building. 
The ethnic Malays in southern Thailand have expressed their resistance against the 
central Thai government through discourse and action, which, in the early 20
th
 century 
included a preference for unification with the Federation of Malaya (now Malaysia), and 
currently includes violent attacks, followed by cross-border escapes into Malaysia; in this 
regard, the separatist movement in southern Thailand has always involved Malaysia, in some 
form or another, and constitutes an underlying source of tension in bilateral relations, as well 
as a restriction on regional community building. Ethnic Malays from the former Pattani 
Kingdom deeply resented Siam’s annexation and the externally imposed border, and, as such, 
resisted control by the central government.300 Some Malay Muslims in the south of Siam 
wanted more autonomy from the Siamese government; some demanded full independence, 
and others wanted to unify the south of Thailand with the Federation of Malaya (now 
Malaysia). In any case, those who supported unification with the Federation of Malaya were 
only active from 1902 to the 1950s, when it became apparent that they would not receive any 
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support from the Malaysian government.301 At the local level, the extent of resistance has 
varied in accordance to state policies on centralization and the promotion of Thainess, which 
was seen to undermine and to threaten the local Muslim identity and culture.302 Policies from 
the central government which were not well received, and which worsened relations with the 
south, include King Chulalongkorn’s policy of administrative centralization in the 1890s. 
This policy deprived the Malay rulers of their traditional power of taxation and 
appointment.303 Other policies include the compulsory Primary Education Act of 1921, which 
required all Malay-Muslim children to spend 4-5 years studying the national, that is, Siamese 
(now Thai) curriculum; Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram’s Custom Degree, which 
prevented Malays in the south of Thailand from wearing their traditional dress, from having 
Malay names, or speaking and learning Malay.304 These policies were described by a Thai 
historian, Thanet Aphornsuwan, as part of the centralizing character of state penetration, 
which has been one of the major causes of the conflict in southern Thailand.305 This conflict is 
of concern to the Malaysian government, due to its interest in protecting the Malay identity 
and the Malay culture, while abiding by the ASEAN principle of non-interference in another 
country’s internal affairs. For this reason, the southern conflict is a sensitive issue in bilateral 
relations. Moreover, it also has wider regional implications, since it involves differentiation 
                                                          
301
 Andrew D.W. Forbes, “Thailand’s Muslim Minorities: Assimilation, Secession, or Coexistence?” Asian 
Survey 22, No. 11 (Nov., 1984): 1064; Nantawan Haemindra, “The Problem of the Thai-Muslims in the Four 
Southern Provinces of Thailand (Part Two),” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 8, No. 1 (1977): 86. 
302
 See S.P. Harish, “Ethnic or Religious Cleavage? Investigating the Nature of the Conflict in Southern 
Thailand,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 28, No. 1 (April 2006): 54. 
303
 Mahmud, The Malays of Patani, 4-6. King Chulalongkorn’s reign: 1868-1901. 
304
 Ibid., 15, 18; Astri Suhrke, “Irredentism Contained: The Thai-Muslim Case,” Comparative Politics 7, No. 2 
(Jan., 1975): 198; Forbes, “Thailand’s Muslim Minorities,” 1059; Carment, “Managing Interstate Ethnic 
Tensions,” 5; Surin Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of the Malay-Muslims of Southern 
Thailand (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 57-58; W.K. Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The 
Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 
1990); Chidchanok Rahimmula, “Peace Resolution: A Case Study of Separatist and Terrorist Movement in 
Southern Border Provinces of Thailand,” in S. Yunanto et al., eds., Militant Islamic Movements in Indonesia 
and Southeast Asia (Jakarta: FES and The RIDEP Institute, 2003). Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram was in 
office 1938-1944, and 1948-1957. 
305
 Thanet Aphornsuwan, “Origins of Malay Muslim “Separatism” in Southern Thailand,” in Michael J. 
Montesano and Patrick Jory, eds., Thai South and Malay North: Ethnic Interactions on a Plural Peninsula 
(Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2008), 94. 
143 
 
and violence between ethnic groups of ASEAN member states, rather than assimilation and 
community building, both within and across national boundaries. 
The Benefits and Drawbacks of Cross-Border Assimilation 
 At present, there is a high degree of cross-border assimilation between ethnic Malays 
in southern Thailand and northern Malaysia: such cross-border assimilation is good for 
regional community building; however, it can also be a source of tension between the Thai 
and Malaysian governments, when the former is confronted with problems from the southern 
conflict. Because the three southernmost provinces of Thailand are highly assimilated with 
the more ethnically and culturally similar northern states of Malaysia, their separatist 
movements have sometimes been viewed with suspicion from the central Thai government, 
as receiving support from their Malaysian counterpart. The majority of Thailand’s three 
southernmost provinces, approximately 80%, are populated by ethnic Malays, with estimates 
of the total ethnic Malay population ranging from 1.4 million to 1.5 million.306 More recently, 
the 2000 census showed that Narathiwat province has around 546,450 Muslims (82% of the 
population), Pattani 482,760 (81%), and Yala 286,000 (69%).307 The ethnic Malay population 
in the border area is predominantly Muslim. They are highly assimilated to their fellow 
Muslims in the northern states of Malaysia, and have maintained religious and cultural links 
with them. Assimilation is facilitated by the fact that a Malay dialect, “Jawi,” is spoken at 
home in the three southernmost provinces, and is also spoken in the neighbouring Malaysian 
states of Kelantan and Terenngganu.308 Moreover, assimilation is also facilitated by a 
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continuous flow of cross-border migration, which maintains cross-border contacts and cross-
border activities. Many Malay-Muslims in the south of Thailand have crossed the border to 
attend educational institutions in Malaysia, while some Malaysians have crossed over to 
Thailand to study at renowned Islamic schools, or “pondoks.” In addition, many Thai 
Muslims have also sought employment in Malaysia. They initially crossed the border to work 
during the rice harvest season. However, as the Malaysian economy expanded towards the 
end of the Cold War to the present, an increasing number of Thai Muslims have migrated to 
Malaysia to work in a wide range of agricultural and secondary industries, and to open food 
stalls.309 There are no exact figures for the population of southern Thai Muslims in Malaysia, 
but it is estimated that the total is around 300,000.310 Thus, the Thai-Malaysian relationship 
already consists of a high degree of assimilation and interactions between the two peoples, 
namely, border communities, and, as such, should constitute a strong case for regional 
community building.  
However, the positive impact of cross-border assimilation has sometimes been 
undermined by Thailand’s domestic politics, which is why the Thai-Malaysian relationship is 
an interesting case study for an analysis on advances and limitations to regional community 
building. The Thai-Malaysian relationship is confronted by the potential spill-over of the 
conflict in southern Thailand into Malaysia, and the involvement of Malaysia in debates on 
local governance and identity; in cases where the southern conflict spills over into Malaysia, 
or the Malaysian government comments on the southern conflict, bilateral relations are under 
threat of deterioration due to either suspicions of Malaysia’s support for the separatist 
movement, or perceptions of interference in Thailand’s internal affairs. Scholars of Thai-
Malaysian relations find that the southern conflict is primarily rooted in local grievances; 
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however, they also acknowledge the impact, and implications, of the conflict on Thai-
Malaysian relations due to the issue of politics, nationalism, history, and identity.311 
Numerous studies point to the issue of different identities, including different cultures, as an 
important underlying causal factor of the southern conflict. For example, a report by the 
International Crisis Group in August 2008 argues that the religious, racial, and linguistic 
differences between the minority Malay Muslims and the Buddhist majority in Thailand have 
resulted in a deep sense of alienation; this sense of alienation was worsened by the violation 
of human rights by Thai security forces, including extrajudicial killings and forced 
disappearances, which led to resentment against the central government.312 In this regard, the 
southern conflict has been described as a vertical conflict, between the central government 
and a minority at the periphery, which is fighting for political and cultural self-determination, 
as well as a more equal distribution of economic rights.313 The identity and economic well-
being of Malay-Muslims in southern Thailand are perceived as under threat, since religious 
and racial differences have led to an apparent discrimination against them: Malay-Muslims 
who return from their studies abroad are unable to obtain a job in either administrative or 
economic affairs.314 This apparent social discrimination and exclusion, together with the 
problems of poor socio-economic conditions, and corruption by state actors, became the main 
sources of the southern conflict, rather than the issue of separatism.315 Thus, the southern 
conflict, and any negative impact on Thai-Malaysian relations as a result of the conflict, are 
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predominantly based on the Thai state’s policies, and, as such, need to be resolved from 
there, in order to promote assimilation at the local, national, and regional levels.  
Failed Attempts to Resolve the Southern Conflict 
While there have been attempts by some Thai governments to address the causes of 
the southern conflict during the Cold War, in order to dissuade border communities from 
joining communism, and to strengthen Thai-Malaysian cooperation against communists in 
the border area, these attempts have largely been unsustainable. During the 1970s, the Thai 
government sought to quell the conflict in southern Thailand, and to dissuade people in the 
border area from joining communism, by initiating projects to promote socio-economic 
development (e.g., agricultural enterprises, the construction of roads, colleges and 
universities), projects to promote freedom of religion, as well as the incorporation of more 
Muslims into state institutions.316 In the 1980s, Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda 
(1980-1988) sought to address the problem of communists in the border area by improving 
border security, and supporting economic development, and the cultural rights of the 
historically marginalized south.317 This included the state’s encouragement for the 
establishment of mosques and Muslim religious schools, or “pondoks.” These policies 
contributed to a brief period of peace in the border area during the 1990s. However, this 
peaceful situation did not last: the underlying political subordination and social 
discrimination of Malay-Muslims, together with the rise of Islamism in Southeast Asia, and 
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the state’s policies of centralization, led to the resurgence of the southern conflict in 2001.318 
Political and cultural discrimination against Muslims continued to prevail, as demonstrated 
by the under-representation of Malay-Muslims in the civil service, and education system.319 
Moreover, earnings in the region are unequally distributed to the disadvantage of Malay-
Muslims, since Thai Buddhists dominate administration offices, and Sino-Thais control large 
sections of the local economy; these factors account for the higher levels of poverty, less 
education opportunities, and the broad exclusion of Malay-Muslims from the formal labour 
market, and employment opportunities outside the agricultural and service sectors.320 Thus, 
state policies to promote development in southern Thailand have failed to reduce the national 
economic disparity between the south and the centre, and to address the local grievances 
behind the southern conflict, which has a negative impact on Thai-Malaysian relations. 
II. Prospects for Assimilation: The International Trend towards Economic 
Integration, and Shared Political and Security Interests (1980s-1990s) 
 
In the late 1980s to 1990s, governments worldwide were motivated to protect their 
security and economic interests by increasing regional and sub-regional economic 
integration: such initiatives provided an opportunity for improving the quality of intra-
regional relations, and for promoting assimilation into a regional community. For example, 
north-south economic cooperation, or cooperation between developed and developing 
economies, was promoted through the establishment of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
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Cooperation Forum (APEC) in 1989.321 In addition, developing countries were also motivated 
to strengthen economic cooperation, and economic growth among themselves, after the 
Group of 77, or the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
failed to reduce the disparities in the international economic system. At the time, internal 
factors also encouraged, and motivated regional and sub-regional economic cooperation. 
These internal factors include an economy that is liberalizing, outward-looking, and reducing 
barriers to trade.322 The combination of external factors – an international trend toward 
regional economic integration – and internal factors related to an expanding economy, 
motivated ASEAN member states to discuss an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992, 
and to initiate sub-regional economic cooperation frameworks, or “growth triangles” to 
promote mutual economic benefits among neighbouring areas. This includes the Indonesia-
Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT), which was formed by the governments of 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand in 1993 to accelerate economic growth in the peripheral, 
less developed provinces.  
The IMT-GT and the Reversal of Differentiation 
The IMT-GT is significant for this chapter, since it demonstrates that state actors have 
become less defensive of their border areas, which represent a critical demarcation of state 
sovereignty and national identity; moreover, the IMT-GT also indicates efforts by state actors 
to promote economic partnership and mutual benefits, which is intended to sustain peace and 
stability in the border areas, to reverse any differentiation of the other as an external security 
threat, and thereby facilitate assimilation into a regional community. As officially stated on 
the IMT-GT website, the IMT-GT is intended to promote economic growth, to promote 
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peaceful international relations, and to improve the physical connectivity, among the 
concerned parties, as well as to contribute to the realization of an ASEAN Economic 
Community.323 At present, it is composed of 14 provinces in southern Thailand, 8 states of 
Peninsular Malaysia, and 10 provinces of Sumatra in Indonesia.324 Academia tends to view 
growth triangles, such as the IMT-GT, as indicators of close economic relations and cross-
border migration. As such, they define growth triangles as “a few neighbouring provinces of 
different countries interlinked closely through trade, investment, and personal movement 
across national borders.”325 Financial institutions, such as the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), have provided financial and technical support to the IMT-GT since 2007, and views 
growth triangles as a means to promote mutual economic benefits and to facilitate integration 
between diverse countries.326 More specifically, the ADB refers to the concept of growth 
triangles as the 
exploitation of complementarity among geographically contiguous countries to help them 
gain greater competitive advantages in export promotion. Growth triangles help solve the 
practical problems of regional integration among countries at different stages of economic 
development, and sometimes, even with different social and economic systems.327 
 
Thus, growth triangles are expected to promote closer relations between diverse regional 
states, and to facilitate assimilation into a regional community. 
The IMT-GT was intended to improve Thai-Malaysian relations by promoting 
economic growth and stability in the border area, and by advancing the economic well-being 
of the ethnic Malay minority in southern Thailand; moreover, it was intended to reverse 
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differentiation of the Thai government by the ethnic Malaysian society, both in southern 
Thailand and Malaysia, and to facilitate assimilation in southern Thailand, for national 
security and for the improvement of bilateral relations. State actors supported the IMT-GT, 
since they expected the liberalization of regulatory regimes, and the promotion of mutual 
benefits from their different economic strengths, to facilitate economic development in the 
relatively poor national peripheries.328 In 1998, the southern Thai provinces of Narathiwat and 
Yala had the first and third highest poverty levels in the country; moreover, unemployment 
was also high throughout the southern region.329 Returns in the dominant agricultural sectors 
of fisheries and rubber were diminishing, due to resource depletion and falling market prices. 
At the same time, the rise of drug usage in border communities also worsened the economic 
situation there in the 1990s.330 From a political economy perspective, the IMT-GT was 
significant since it sought to advance the role of the ethnic Malay population in economic 
development, by promoting their relations with sub-regional economic partners of similar 
ethnic, linguistic, and religious backgrounds.  
Before the IMT-GT was established, the Thai government treated the Malay identity 
as a problem to be overcome; however, after the establishment of the IMT-GT, the Thai 
government came to identify the Malay identity as social capital, in terms of the Malay 
minority’s capacity for networking with economic partners across the border, and thereby 
facilitating cross-border economic exchanges.331 The Thai government’s recognition and 
promotion of the Malay identity are processes which are related to the empowerment of local 
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organizations, and perceived as state-society collaboration for peace building.332 In this 
regard, they constitute important processes to reverse Malay-Muslims’ differentiation of the 
Thai government as a threat to their identity and socio-economic welfare, and to facilitate the 
maintenance of peace in the border areas.  
Prospects for Assimilation: Multi-Dimensional Mutual Interests 
In the post-Cold War period, there was a momentum for bilateral cooperation between 
Thailand and Malaysia, for the following reasons. First, the Thai and Malaysian governments 
had just defeated the communists in the border area through joint efforts, and subsequently 
established a Thai-Malaysian Joint Commission for Bilateral Cooperation in 1987.333 This 
Commission has since promoted closer relations and cooperation between the two 
countries.334 Second, the Thai and Malaysian governments both participated in discussions to 
consolidate ASEAN in the post-Cold War period, such as discussions on an ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992, and were driven by security and economic interests to 
consolidate the ASEAN region through other means, such as sub-regional and bilateral 
cooperation. Third, the establishment of the IMT-GT, and its aims (economic growth, 
peaceful relations and sub-regional connectivity) also encouraged cooperation in other areas, 
in order to consolidate border security and to strengthen intra-regional relations. Fourth, 
given that Thailand and Malaysia are neighbouring countries with a shared border, they have 
a mutual interest in maintaining security and stability. Moreover, it is in their political and 
security interests to demonstrate their recognized mutual interest in promoting each other’s 
security, and thereby reverse any differentiation of the other as an external security threat. All 
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of these background conditions motivated the expansion of bilateral cooperation in the 1990s, 
to the extent that it included the exchange of political activists. In 1994, Thailand arrested and 
handed over the head of a deviant Islamic sect, Darul Arqam; in response, Malaysia 
substantially withdrew its covert support for southern insurgent groups (support can be traced 
back to the 1960s), and handed over five separatist leaders of a secessionist organization, the 
Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) in 1998.335 Under Mahathir’s premiership in 
1998, there were also successful joint police raids against secessionists in northern Malaysia. 
This bilateral cooperation led to the arrest of several leaders, and in the following months, it 
was reported that “over 900 militants…joined a government-sponsored ‘rehabilitation’ 
program, pledging to become active participants in peaceful national development.”336 Thus, 
shared economic interests and joint economic development can encourage the expansion of 
intra-regional cooperation into other areas, while shared political and security interests appear 
to be the main catalysts for accelerating the improvement of bilateral relations. 
In the 1990s, the Malaysian and Thai governments were driven by political and 
economic interests to promote interactions, and close relations, between their border 
communities; as such, they were deconstructing their shared border from the top-down, and 
promoting bilateral assimilation for mutual benefits, as well as for the benefit of regional 
security and regional community building as a whole. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad (1981-2003) sought to sustain economic development and to consolidate a national 
identity, by promoting his vision of a technology-driven Islamic modernity; this vision was 
extended to the Thai border provinces in the 1990s, as part of his concept of a borderless 
Malay civilization, and regional community building.337 Such Pan-Malay sentiment from 
Malaysia was traditionally perceived as a threat to the Thai government’s control of the 
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southernmost provinces. However, in the 1990s, the concept of a borderless Malay 
civilization was compatible with the Thai government’s aim to satisfy the domestic demand 
for trade by promoting economic cooperation with neighbouring countries, including cross-
border economic exchanges.338 Mahathir sought to promote the political and economic 
interests of the Malaysian race, in accordance to his Vision 2020, which included the 
development of a democratic society and one where there is a fair and equitable distribution 
of wealth.339 At the same time, he also sought to reassure the Thai government that he did not 
seek to subvert the Malay Muslim minority in South Thailand. For this reason, he stated in 
1998 that “Thais in Malaysia are loyal to Malaysia and likewise the Muslims in Thailand 
should be loyal to Thailand.”340 The IMT-GT was intended to advance the economic well-
being of the Malays in southern Thailand, and to create incentives for them not to stir up 
violence in the south, as a form of protest against the central government. However, 
economic benefits from the IMT-GT have been unequally distributed and have mainly been 
concentrated in Songkhla province, rather than the southernmost provinces of Narathiwat, 
Pattani and Yala, which have a majority ethnic Malay population.341 As a result, the IMT-GT 
produced “extremely little” for the majority Malay Muslim population in Thailand’s southern 
provinces, which meant that poor socio-economic conditions persisted and continued to drive 
the southern conflict.342  Thus, border security remained an issue in the Thai-Malaysian 
relationship, due to the poor socio-economic conditions of the Malay Muslim minority in 
southern Thailand, and the resultant southern conflict; such persistence of the issue of 
                                                          
338
 King, “The Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle.” 
339
 Mahathir introduced his Vision 2020 in 1991. See Office of the Prime Minister of Malaysia, “The Way 
Forward,” http://www.pmo.gov.my/?menu=page&page=1904 [accessed on 14/02/12]. 
340
 Quoted in ibid., 99. 
341
 Ibid., 100; see also Asian Development Bank, “Country Partnership Strategy: Thailand (2007-2011),” April 
2007, http://www.adb.org/Documents/CPSs/THA/2007/CPS-THA-2007-2011.pdf [accessed on 18/10/11]; 
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Growth Triangles of South East Asia,” 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/pdf/growth_triangle.pdf [accessed on 18/10/11]. 
342
 King, “The Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle,” 104. 
154 
 
security in intra-regional relations undermines the process of realizing an ASEAN Political 
Security Community, and the process of ASEAN community building as a whole. 
 
III. An Interval of One-Sided Differentiation: The Escalating Conflict in Southern 
Thailand versus Cooperation for Political and Security Interests (2001-2006) 
 
 
 In the post-Cold War period, differentiation was revived in Thai-Malaysian relations, 
due to an escalation of the conflict in southern Thailand. Such differentiation had previously 
occurred in the pre-Cold War and Cold War period, when Thai governments differentiated 
their Malaysian counterpart as a security threat, due to its history of providing refuge for 
Malay Muslims from the south of Thailand.343 More specifically, support for the insurgents in 
southern Thailand has historically been centred in the state of Kelantan, in northern Malaysia, 
especially when Malaysia regained its independence during the Cold War, and there was a 
strong sense of Malay nationalism.344 The issue of Malaysia’s support for the Malay Muslims 
in southern Thailand, and differentiation of Malaysia, became subdued when the Thai and 
Malaysian governments collaborated against the communists in the border area from the mid-
1970s to late 1980s. However, the issue was revived by Thai Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra in 2004, in reaction to the deteriorating situation in southern Thailand and the 
need to protect his political regime, and to shield it from blame. Thaksin sought to defend his 
government, and to distance it from the deteriorating southern conflict, by externalizing its 
causes. More specifically, he differentiated Malaysia as a combat training ground for the 
southern insurgents, and Indonesia as a source of the fundamentalist ideology behind the 
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terrorist movements in Thailand.345 In this regard, political interests led to differentiation, 
which strained the Thai-Malaysian relationship, and undermined the process of regional 
community building. 
Thaksin’s policy towards Malaysia demonstrates how political interests can 
undermine regional community building at both the bilateral and regional level; at the 
bilateral level, differentiation was pursued to protect the political regime, while at the 
regional level, Thaksin undermined the process of regional community building by implying 
that Malaysia had broken the regional norm of non-interference, through its interference in 
Thailand’s internal affairs. Thaksin sought to protect his government from being blamed for a 
combination of policy flaws with regard to the southern conflict, which included policy flaws 
from previous governments as well as his own.346 The most significant policy initiative to 
address the conflict in a comprehensive and systematic manner occurred under the 
premiership of Prem Tinsulanond (1980-1988). Prem sought to improve border security by 
establishing a new government agency, the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre 
(SBPAC) in 1981, which was intended to coordinate civilian administration in developing the 
southern border provinces, and to effectively address the local grievances there; moreover, 
Prem also sought to improve the image of the Thai government among the local Muslims by 
demonstrating its concern for their socio-economic welfare.347 The SBPAC had its 
weaknesses and strengths. With regard to weaknesses, it was undermined by pervasive 
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corruption and competition among the civilian administration of the southern border 
provinces, and was ineffective in gathering intelligence.348 However, the SBPAC had worked 
hard to cultivate trust between state actors on the one hand, and Muslim leaders and 
communities on the other, to the extent that the ruling Democrat Party (1997-2001) 
successfully managed to co-opt the Malay Muslim elite.349 Moreover, the SPBAC developed 
a reputation for improving governance and border security, and was viewed by the local 
people as a “key conflict management structure,” as well as “a beacon of ideas of 
administrative justice” for the south of Thailand.350 Thus, despite its weaknesses, the SPBAC 
made a significant contribution to the management of the southern conflict and improvement 
of border security; however, it was dissolved by Thaksin in mid-2002 for political interests, 
leading to a re-escalation of the southern conflict and deteriorating Thai-Malaysian relations.  
Thai-Malaysian relations worsened under Thaksin’s premiership, mainly because 
Thaksin was more interested in centralizing, rather than decentralizing, state power, as 
demanded by the Malay Muslims in the south; and because he chose to discard previous 
efforts to improve the southern conflict by his political opposition. Thaksin’s centralizing 
policies partly contributed to the resurgence of a separatist movement and violence in the 
south of Thailand in December 2001, after a number of policemen died in separate attacks.351 
His subsequent dissolution of the SBPAC in mid-2002 further worsened the situation, by 
estranging the Malay Muslim elite that had successfully been co-opted by the Democrat 
Party, and by removing the only venue for discussion among all the relevant stakeholders: the 
only venue where “soldiers, police, Muslim leaders and religious teachers, and local officials 
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met to exchange views and compare notes.”352 Thaksin dissolved the SBPAC because it was 
controlled by his opposition, the Democrat Party, and because it had close ties with former 
Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond, who was known to oppose Thaksin.353  The resultant lack 
of interactions and cooperation among relevant stakeholders, and distant relationship between 
the south and central government, led to a resurgence of the southern conflict. Moreover, the 
underlying separatist movement had also gained momentum in reaction to Thaksin’s 
nationalist discourse, which projected an image of Buddhist superiority, and the increasing 
religious intolerance that formed part of Thaksin’s centralisation policy.354 This underlying 
separatist movement culminated in a series of violent incidents in 2004, which undermined 
border security and worsened Thai-Malaysian relations. In January 2004, at least a hundred 
armed men, who were believed to be Muslim insurgents, raided an army depot in Narathiwat 
province, and killed four Thai soldiers. The incident triggered a series of violent clashes in 
Thailand’s three southernmost provinces, plus four districts in Songkhla.355 The most serious 
clashes include the Krue Sae Mosque incident in April, when Muslim militants were brutally 
executed by the Thai state in retaliation for their terrorist attacks on police outposts. Another 
tragic event was the Tak Bai incident in Narathiwat province, when hundreds of local 
Muslims were arrested during a protest and were tightly packed into army trucks to be taken 
to a military camp; 78 detainees suffocated to death along the journey.356 It was after these 
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two incidents that Thaksin realized the need to defend his government’s policies, and decided 
to do so by externalizing the causes of the deteriorating situation in southern Thailand to 
Malaysia and Indonesia.357 His differentiation of these two countries, and public accusations, 
were pursued for domestic political gains, to the expense of private diplomacy, which could 
potentially have strengthened national security, while maintaining regional solidarity. Thus, 
Thaksin’s centralisation policies vis-à-vis the south of Thailand, and his prioritisation of 
regime security over good intra-regional relations, led to the use of differentiation in both 
domestic and foreign policy, and restricted regional community building. 
  
Political and Security Interests, and the Reversal of Differentiation 
 
 
The Malaysian government chose to maintain national security and domestic political 
interests, and to promote a good image of Malaysia and Malaysia’s status in the international 
community, by reversing differentiation. These political and security incentives were present 
since 2001, and have continued to motivate the Malaysian government’s aim to reverse 
differentiation. The Malaysian government has been concerned about the violence in southern 
Thailand, since it could potentially stir up Islamic fundamentalism in Malaysia.358 This 
concern was particularly acute after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 (9/11) in the 
United States, due to possible links between local Muslim militants and Al Qaeda, which 
carried out the attacks. In addition to concerns over Muslim militants, the Malaysian 
government was also motivated to be cooperative vis-à-vis the conflict in southern Thailand, 
due to the need to continue improving the image of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, after 
the sacking of his Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in 1998. This cooperative stance is 
evident in the emergence of new arrangements and agreements from 2001 onwards. For 
example, in December 2002, a first ever joint cabinet meeting was held, in which both sides 
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agreed to intensify their fight against terrorism and to increase bilateral economic 
cooperation.359 Subsequently, an agreement was signed in May 2003, which included 
provisions to pursue joint security patrols, to standardize military operational procedures, and 
to further develop bilateral economic activities.360 In July, Mahathir and Thaksin inaugurated 
an annual summit, the “Annual Consultation,” and agreed to “a degree of integration of the 
five southern provinces of Thailand and the northern Malaysian states of Kedah, Perlis and 
Kelantan.”361 This aim was later consolidated as the “Joint Development Strategy,” which 
sought wider socio-economic cooperation in the border area. However, despite these good 
intentions, concrete outcomes from the Annual Consultation have generally been modest.362 
The Malaysian government gave importance to a Joint Development Strategy (JDS), since it 
found that one of the fundamental causes of the conflict in southern Thailand was the poor-
socio economic conditions.363 The aim of the JDS was to increase economic linkages, and to 
boost development, between three provinces in southern Thailand – Yala, Narathiwat and 
Pattani – and the economically more developed states of northern Malaysia – Kelantan, 
Perak, Perlis and Kedah.364 However, cooperation through the JDS has been marginal in the 
bilateral relationship. For example, in 2004-2011, there were only three meetings of the 
Thailand-Malaysia Committee on the JDS.365 Nevertheless, two Thai diplomats note that the 
JDS has had a positive impact on bilateral relations. They state that the JDS benefits the 
border communities and that it contributes to improved relations between the state officials 
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involved.366 In this regard, developmental cooperation played a role in reducing incentives to 
incite violence; however, as shown earlier on in this chapter, such bilateral cooperation was 
undermined by the continued marginalization of the Malay Muslim minority in Southern 
Thailand. 
In 2004, Thaksin sought to protect his political regime by simultaneously 
externalizing the causes of the southern conflict to Malaysia, and requesting the Malaysian 
government to send Islamic teachers to the south of Thailand, so that they could teach a 
moderate form of Islam and turn Muslims away from militant doctrines.367 In this regard, 
differentiation of Malaysia was pursued for domestic political interests, while cooperation 
with Malaysia was pursued for national security. Many Malay-Muslims in the south of 
Thailand were already going to study abroad in the Middle East and Pakistan, before 
returning home to teach in religious schools.368 According to a study by the Council on 
Foreign Relations in 2008, this import of overseas education resulted in the growth of more 
radical Islamic teachings in the south of Thailand over the years.369 Thaksin’s government 
became aware of this and subsequently encouraged Muslim teachers in the south of Thailand 
to study in Malaysia, so that they may promote moderate Islam when they return home.370 In 
this endeavour, his government provided scholarships for Malay-Muslims in southern 
Thailand to study in Malaysia; these scholarships were also intended to improve the 
employment and entrepreneurship opportunities for Malay-Muslims, who are among the 
poorest of Thailand’s population. In 2003, Thaksin’s government had already invested 145 
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thousand Baht for educational scholarships, as part of the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand 
Growth Triangle (IMT-GT) project; in 2004, it invested eight thousand Baht (the reduced 
amount was partly due to reduced funds for international cooperation and partly due to more 
funds being transferred to other bilateral projects, such as those with Laos and Timor 
Leste).371 Nevertheless, despite the provision of scholarships, poor socio-economic conditions 
persisted in Thailand’s southern provinces into 2005, and continued to drive the southern 
conflict, as well as to maintain Thai-Malaysian tensions, based on the poor conditions of the 
Muslim minority.372 
Moreover, the southern conflict also strained bilateral relations, due to the issue of 
Thai Muslims fleeing security forces across the border, subsequently being recognized by the 
Malaysian government as political refugees, and being given asylum. This issue became 
particularly acute in August 2005, when the Malaysian Foreign Minister, Syed Hamid Albar, 
stated that the Thai Muslims would only be released upon the Thai government’s guarantee 
of their human rights; to which Thaksin protested against what he described as interference in 
Thailand’s internal affairs.373 To prevent the Thai-Malaysian relationship from further 
deteriorating, the Thai and Malaysian Foreign Ministries sought to reverse differentiation 
between their state leaders, and to promote a cooperative mind-set between the two 
governments through the following agreement: “1) the conflict in the south must not give rise 
to bilateral conflict; 2) both sides must exchange information and monitor the situation 
closely; 3) both must not give wrong information to the media.”374 However, despite these 
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efforts, Thaksin decided to maintain his political interests by continuing to differentiate 
Malaysia, based on its alleged interference in southern Thailand. In this case, the pursuit of 
differentiation can be interpreted as a strategic choice by political leaders to maintain their 
interests, rather than an imposed choice that was dictated by historical legacy or domestic 
demand. 
 The Malaysian government chose to promote the reversal of differentiation for 
national security interests, especially after Thaksin’s accusations of its involvement in 2004. 
It sought to reverse Thailand’s differentiation of Malaysia as a training ground, and refuge, 
for southern Muslim separatists, in order to maintain peaceful borders, and to prevent spill-
over of Thailand’s southern conflict into Malaysia. In this endeavour, the Malaysian 
government proposed to do away with the Thai-Malaysian dual citizenship in 2004, since it 
enabled insurgents to carry out violent attacks in southern Thailand before fleeing across the 
border into Malaysia to escape arrest.375 Subsequently, the Thai and Malaysian governments 
agreed to introduce a “smart card” border pass system, which was intended to facilitate the 
identification of insurgents in southern Thailand, while maintaining regular border 
exchanges.376 However, despite the introduction of “smart cards,” some people still 
maintained dual citizenship, in order to maximise their employment opportunities and to 
maintain economic benefits, such as land and income, on both sides of the border.377 In this 
regard, border assimilation has both benefits and drawbacks. On the one hand, it facilitates 
regional community building through good people-to-people relations across borders. On the 
other hand, it also undermines border security by enabling southern insurgents to escape 
security forces and by providing them with an easily accessible refuge. Thus, efforts by the 
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Malaysian and Thai governments to improve border security were complicated by the need to 
balance the promotion of regional community building with regional security. 
In addition to facilitating the identification of southern insurgents while maintaining 
regular cross-border activities, the Malaysian government also pursued the reversal of 
differentiation by initiating bilateral meetings to promote dialogue and cooperation. For 
example, Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar and Deputy Prime Minister Najib 
Razak flew to Bangkok in May 2004, to reaffirm their commitment to non-intervention, to 
express their support for Thaksin’s argument that poverty was the main cause of the southern 
conflict, and that the conflict could be resolved by the Thai government.378 A succession of 
Malaysian Prime Ministers – Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003), Abdullah Badawi (2003-
2009), and Najib Razul Razak (2009-the present) - have sought to improve Thai-Malaysian 
relations, and to reverse Thailand’s differentiation of Malaysia, by emphasizing their policy 
of good neighbourliness and mutual economic benefits through bilateral relations.379 All of 
these three governments have cooperated with Thailand, in terms of sharing intelligence and 
helping with the arrest of separatists.380 In addition, in 2005, Abdullah Badawi and Mahathir 
Mohamad held informal discussions with the head of Thailand’s National Reconciliation 
Commission, which was charged with recommending policies, measures, mechanisms and 
ways conducive to reconciliation and peace in Thai society, particularly the three southern 
border provinces.381 Abdullah Badawi and Mahathir Mohamad sought to reassure the head of 
Thailand’s National Reconciliation Commission, Anand Panyarachun, that Malaysia did not 
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support the separatist movement in southern Thailand.382 Mahathir also met with Thaksin in 
December 2005 to discuss Thailand’s southern conflict. The result was a Joint Development 
and Peace Plan for Southern Thailand, or the Mahathir Plan, which focused on the promotion 
of Malay culture and economic development in southern Thailand, as well as the creation of 
an independent tribunal to try security officers involved in human rights violations.383 The 
Mahathir Plan has thus far not been implemented by Thai governments, due to other pressing 
domestic political developments, such as the increasing political and social polarization, and 
protests, as well as the rapid turn-over of different administrations, which makes it difficult to 
form consistent, long-term policies. Thus, successive Malaysian governments have continued 
to promote the reversal of differentiation; however their efforts have been hindered by 
Thailand’s domestic politics, and the preference of some Thai leaders, such as Thaksin, to 
pursue differentiation.  
 In addition to political and security incentives, the Malaysian government was also 
motivated to reverse differentiation, in order to promote a good image of Malaysia, and to 
strengthen Malaysia’s status in the international community. The Malaysian government was 
motivated to reverse differentiation, to demonstrate its recognition of Thailand and 
Malaysia’s common membership in ASEAN, and its promotion of ASEAN solidarity. 
Moreover, its membership of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) also created an 
incentive to project a proactive role, in terms of securing the interests of fellow Muslims.384 
By expressing concern, and seeking reassurances from the Thai government on the protected 
interests of Malay-Muslims, the Malaysian government also sought to promote mutually 
beneficial bilateral exchanges (e.g., in technology), as well as to maintain support from the 
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domestic Muslim population.385 In this endeavour, the Malaysian government has sponsored a 
number of educational and economic projects, which seek to quell the separatist conflict in 
southern Thailand.386 In addition, it was also in Malaysia’s interest to reverse Thailand’s 
differentiation, due to the possible negative impact on Malaysia’s role as a facilitator of peace 
in other regional insurgencies.387 In 2006, Malaysia was facilitating the peace process 
between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Malaysia 
was also part of the Aceh Monitoring Mission, which was responsible for monitoring the 
implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Indonesian government 
and the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), of the Free Aceh Movement. Thus, there were both 
domestic and international considerations which motivated successive Malaysian 
governments to follow developments in southern Thailand, and to facilitate its resolution 
whenever possible. 
IV. Prospects for Community Building: Expanded Bilateral Cooperation, Mutual 
Reversal of Differentiation, and On-Going Cross-Border Assimilation (2007-2009) 
 
The Thai and Malaysian government aimed to improve border security by promoting 
bilateral cooperation in education, which was intended to improve the economic prospects of 
the Muslim minority in southern Thailand, as well as to bridge cultural and religious 
differences, namely, differences between Thai Buddhists and Malay Muslims.388 With this 
objective in mind, the Thai and Malaysian governments signed an agreement to provide 
scholarships for Malay-Muslims in the south of Thailand in 2007. The agreement established 
contacts between the two countries’ education institutions, especially in southern Thailand, in 
the areas of religious education, curriculum development and training, as well as student 
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exchanges.389 In this regard, it sought to cater to the different religious and cultural 
preferences of Malay-Muslims in the south of Thailand, and to enable them to maintain, and 
to consolidate their identity, thereby reversing their differentiation of the Thai government as 
a threatening hegemon. By catering to the different preferences of Malay-Muslims, the Thai 
government sought to demonstrate its recognition, and respect, for their different culture. 
Moreover, the Thai government’s policy can also be interpreted as an attempt to demonstrate 
its attention to minority rights (in this case, the Malay-Muslim population in southern 
Thailand), to the Malaysian government and the international community, thereby promoting 
good bilateral relations and a positive international image. The Thai-Malaysian agreement in 
2007 included the training of four thousand Malay-Muslims from the south of Thailand at 
institutes of education in Malaysia.390 With regard to student exchanges, there have been 
exchanges between law undergraduates at Thailand’s Prince of Songkla University (PSU), in 
the south of Thailand, and the University of Malaya (UM), to promote better understanding 
of each other’s legal systems.391 Such exchanges are intended to reverse differentiation of the 
other as an unfamiliar, and alien entity, and to facilitate assimilation into a regional 
community, where regional states are aware of, and can coexist, with each other’s 
differences. Thus, the reversal of differentiation was initially driven by security interests, 
which led to expanded bilateral cooperation, into such areas as education, and increasing 
bilateral people-to-people exchanges. 
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New Governments and the Reversal of Differentiation (2008-2009) 
Malaysia’s policy of reversing Thailand’s differentiation and improving the bilateral 
relationship, continued into Najib Razak’s administration (2009 to the present), as evidenced 
by the Prime Minister’s speeches, the increase in joint projects, and the naming of a 
Friendship Bridge to symbolize improved bilateral relations.392 Prime Minister Najib Razak 
sought to convey Malaysia’s concern, and to demonstrate that Malaysia was playing a 
proactive role to the Malay-Muslims in southern Thailand; at the same time, he also 
emphasized his respect for Thailand’s territorial integrity and the ASEAN Way of non-
interference in another country’s internal affairs. As a result, he presented Malaysia as a 
willing participant and facilitator in the resolution of Thailand’s southern conflict, rather than 
one of the main actors.393 In an interview with the press in 2009, Najib Razak related his 
discussions with the Malay-Muslims in southern Thailand as follows: 
What I’ve been telling them, what we have been telling them, is to be part of some form of 
autonomy. You may not even want to call it autonomy, but at least some form of them 
participating in things that matter to them. For example, in education, in selecting their local 
leaders, in employment, the question of religious education. These are things that matter to 
them. It does not intrude into the fundamental question related to the Constitution of Thailand 
– or how Thailand is governed. But these are things that the government can consider for their 
people… 
I want to make it very clear that this is a domestic consideration. This is internal. We want to 
be as helpful as possible. You the Thais, must be comfortable with the level of autonomy. 
…our part is to be supportive, that’s all. But we’re not going to negotiate on your behalf. 
We’re not going to go beyond what a good neighbour would do. We must respect Thailand’s 
sovereignty.394 
Moreover, Najib Razak sought to reverse the Thai government’s differentiation of Malaysia 
as a supporter of the separatist movement in southern Thailand, by stating that the Malay-
Muslims there 
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should be good Muslims and good Thai citizens. They must be loyal to Thailand, to the King, 
to the constitution in Thailand, but at the same time they should be good Muslims and they 
should be allowed to be good Muslims. And the system here in Thailand should allow for that 
– as much as we allow in Malaysia.395 
In this regard, Najib Razak reiterated the Malaysian government’s respect for Thailand’s 
territorial integrity, and sought to erase any suspicion or doubt as to whether his government 
supported the creation of a separate, independent state. To further demonstrate his 
government’s respect for Thailand’s territorial integrity, Najib chose to assess the conflict in 
the south of Thailand by visiting the area with Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, rather 
than making a unilateral visit, and to emphasize Malaysia’s support in helping to maintain 
peaceful borders and cross-border exchanges.396 This cooperative stance was reciprocated by 
Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2011), who similarly chose to pursue political 
and security interests by reversing differentiation and improving the Thai-Malaysian 
relationship. 
 Abhisit was motivated to improve the situation in southern Thailand and Thai-
Malaysian relations, in order to consolidate the legitimacy of his government, by 
demonstrating its aim to promote equitable economic development and social justice, as well 
as a peaceful region.397 Abhisit sought to improve relations between the central government 
and the southern provinces by promoting a bottom-up approach, whereby local communities 
are able to discuss and present proposals on the kind of development projects they want, and 
the Cabinet responds by approving these projects. Such a bottom-up approach led to 
increasing interactions between local people and government officials, and improved 
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relations between these two actors.398 However, Abhisit acknowledged that there were still 
incidents of abuses of power in the southern provinces, which made it difficult to build trust 
between the local people on the one hand, and government officials and security forces on the 
other. Although his government did attempt to address this problem by setting up a more 
transparent and accountable complaints system, this system failed to effectively check the 
abuses of power by security forces, especially given the fact that the military dominated 
policy-making in the southern provinces.399 This is one of the reasons why resentment against 
the central government was maintained and why violence persisted in southern Thailand. 
Nevertheless, efforts by Abhisit’s government to engage the local communities and to 
provide funding for developmental projects demonstrated the aim to cater to the needs of the 
Malay Muslim minority and to improve border security, for political and national interests, 
including the improvement of Thai-Malaysian relations and sub-regional security. In terms of 
Thai-Malaysian relations, Abhisit sought to distance himself from the negative impact of 
previous policies of differentiation, and to strengthen his government’s legitimacy by 
demonstrating its aim to improve Thailand’s relations with neighbouring countries. In this 
endeavour, he promoted Thai-Malaysian cooperation on security, intelligence, and law 
enforcement, and supported the continuation of joint development between Thailand’s 
southernmost provinces and the northern states of Malaysia.400 Thus, the reversal of 
differentiation under Abhisit’s premiership was motivated by the need to repair bilateral 
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relations after the Thaksin era, and to consolidate his regime legitimacy at the domestic level 
and the international level, vis-à-vis other countries.  
Underlying People-Centred, Cross-Border Assimilation 
 Irrespective of fluctuations in state-centred differentiation, a high degree of 
assimilation has existed, and will continue to exist, between the Thai and Malaysian border 
communities, due to the historical legacy of a Greater Pattani Kingdom, and cross-border 
kinship ties, especially between communities in Kelantan, Malaysia, and Narathiwat in 
Thailand. Kinship ties generate a “feeling of fraternity,” and are a major factor behind 
mobility across the Thai-Malaysian border.401 For example, people will cross the border to 
reunite with their family and to take part in cultural activities.402 A “feeling of fraternity” is 
also facilitated by the media and cultural diplomacy, namely, how Kelantanese watch Thai 
television programmes, and how Thai university students visit Kelantan to teach Thai 
culture.403 Various universities in Thailand organize annual visits to Kelantan; during these 
week-long visits, Thai students would teach Thai dance, basic Thai, and kick-boxing to 
Kelantanese teenagers.404 Assimilation through bilateral exchanges is also promoted by the 
holiday and pilgrimage tours that are jointly organized by Kelantan’s Buddhist temples and 
travel agents in Narathiwat. These tours unite Kelantan and Narathiwat villagers, and have 
been facilitated by the development of infrastructure and transportation, for example, the Thai 
and Malaysian governments’ operated ferry service between the two countries.405 Thus, 
despite Thailand’s southern conflict and state-centred differentiation, cross-border 
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assimilation is maintained through kinship ties, the positive role of the media, as well as 
bilateral people-to-people exchanges. 
 Moreover, economic incentives also promote cross-border interactions and 
assimilation, which can be interpreted as a process of bridging between nation-states, and as 
an underlying process of regional community building that becomes strengthened through 
state policies to maintain border security. Malay-Muslims in the south of Thailand have 
economic incentives to assume a Malaysian identity, since they can migrate there for a 
livelihood with a sustainable, higher income; for example, they can work as fishermen in the 
Malaysian archipelago of Langkawi.406 Many Malay-Muslims from southern Thailand hold 
Malaysian identification cards, and are on an electoral roll in Kelantan, in northern 
Malaysia.407 On the part of Malaysia, Thai identity cards are mainly obtained to facilitate 
border crossings for family visits and leisure, as well as for participation in cultural events. 
Malaysians found that Thai identity cards could easily be obtained by bribing Thai officials in 
Narathiwat, or registering a birthday in Thailand with the help of a relative or friend who was 
a Thai citizen.408 Alternatively, some Kelantanese obtained Thai citizenship by investing in 
land, in Narathiwat, for rubber and fruit tree plantations. They are officially supposed to 
surrender their Malaysian citizenship after assuming the Thai nationality. However, most of 
them did not, since dual citizenship facilitates cross-border mobility, and enables individuals 
to maintain their economic interests, such as land and income, in both countries.409 Thus, 
economic incentives contribute to the maintenance of cross-border assimilation and dual 
citizenship. 
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Dual citizenship lessens the distinctiveness of national identity, since people in the 
border area are able to live a “pluri-local social life,” to have “social relations which 
encompass social worlds in Thailand and Malaysia,” and, in doing so, promote intra-regional, 
people-centred community building.410 People in the border area are constantly deconstructing 
the border, and carrying out the “transnationalisation” of everyday life through cross-border 
activities, in order to maintain assimilation.411 Their practice of dual citizenship represents a 
post-national form of belonging, and serves as a model for a regional community, whereby 
there is a high frequency of cross-border activities and a shared regional identity. Moreover, 
the practice of dual citizenship on the Thai-Malaysian border also serves as a model for 
regional community building, whereby intra-regional borders are deconstructed, and society 
is actively involved in the process of promoting regional assimilation. Irrespective of whether 
dual nationality is pursued to facilitate family contacts or economic benefits, it is an indicator 
of the high degree of assimilation between border communities, and constitutes a striking 
contrast to state-centred differentiation, which results from state policies and state discourse. 
Given that differentiation is predominantly state-centred, the reversal of differentiation, and 
prevention of its recurrence, is ultimately dependent on the political will of state actors to 
cultivate a discourse, and to institutionalize policies, that would facilitate such processes. 
Moreover, as demonstrated by the case of Thai-Malaysian relations, the media and cultural 
diplomacy also play an important role in reversing differentiation, and promoting 
assimilation; and have the potential to be used for larger scale impact, in order to promote 
assimilation into an ASEAN Community.  
Cross-border assimilation, a peaceful border area, and border security, are all 
threatened by Thailand’s domestic politics. More specifically, they are threatened by any 
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efforts on the part of the Thai government to centralize governance, and to impose their 
definition of a Thai identity, as well as the government’s failure to significantly improve the 
socio-economic conditions of Malay-Muslims in the south of Thailand. All of these factors 
add fuel to the southern conflict, and have the potential to trigger a vicious cycle, whereby 
protests lead to violent clashes and the government’s suppression of protesters, which lead to 
refugees fleeing across the border, and to tensions and conflict between the Thai and 
Malaysian governments. The southern conflict is predominantly home-grown, and, as such, 
requires immediate domestic remedies, so that it does not cause further damage to the 
bilateral relationship, in terms of differentiation, and restricted progress towards assimilation 
into a peaceful, ASEAN Community. 
V. Conclusion 
This chapter tested ASEAN’s progress in regional community building, based on the 
extent to which there has been a shift from differentiation to assimilation in the Thai-
Malaysian relationship. The chapter identified Thailand’s domestic politics as the main 
source of differentiation for the following reasons. Thailand’s domestic politics has 
contributed to the present southern conflict, which has a historical legacy of producing 
differentiation in the Thai-Malaysian relationship. In the early 20
th
 century, the Thai 
government’s centralisation policies contributed to the emergence of a separatist movement 
in southern Thailand, and attempts by separatists to obtain support from the Malaysian 
government, and to use Malaysia as a refuge from Thai security forces. Implications of 
Malaysia’s involvement in the southern conflict created tensions between the Thai and 
Malaysian governments. However, the issue of Thailand’s southern conflict became 
overshadowed by the threat to both governments’ regime security, emanating from a 
communist insurgency in the border area, in the 1970s. This shared threat provided an 
incentive for bilateral cooperation against the communists, which subsequently paved the 
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way for the institutionalization of bilateral cooperation through a Joint Commission, as well 
as the expansion of bilateral cooperation into other areas. Thus, the initial reversal of 
differentiation was stimulated by shared political and security interests, which became 
prioritized over the plight of an ethnic Malay minority in southern Thailand. 
Following the successful bilateral cooperation against the communists in 1989, further 
incentives for the reversal of differentiation emerged, namely, an international trend towards 
economic integration, and prospects for promoting economic growth and stability in the 
border area. These economic and security incentives motivated the establishment of an 
Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT) in 1993, which reversed 
differentiation by promoting economic partnership for mutual benefits. Moreover, the IMT-
GT was intended to address the causes of Thailand’s southern conflict by advancing the role 
of the ethnic Malay minority in economic development. However, their poor socio-economic 
conditions persisted, and continued to drive the southern conflict and to undermine border 
security, thereby demonstrating how improvements in Thai-Malaysian relations remain 
hindered by Thailand’s domestic politics. 
The Thai-Malaysian relationship is significant for demonstrating how domestic 
political interests can fuel one-sided differentiation, to the expense of improved bilateral 
relations and regional community building. This was particularly the case in 2001-2006, 
when Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra sought to find a scapegoat for the negative 
impact of his policies, by externalizing the causes of the deteriorating situation in southern 
Thailand to Malaysia and Indonesia. However, instead of reciprocating differentiation, the 
Malaysian government decided to pursue its political and security interests by promoting the 
reversal of differentiation. This pursuit of the same interests, through different strategies, 
demonstrates how the act of differentiation is a choice made by state leaders, rather than an 
imposed choice from domestic or international considerations. For example, Thaksin 
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differentiated the Malaysian government as a cause of the southern conflict, in order to 
protect his political regime; however, there is evidence to suggest that he did not completely 
perceive the Malaysian government as a threat, since he requested its cooperation in 
spreading the teachings of moderate Islam in southern Thailand. Thus, the Thai-Malaysian 
relationship emphasizes the importance of state leaders’ choices and strategies for the 
reversal of differentiation and regional community building. 
At the same time, the Thai-Malaysian relationship also demonstrates how underlying 
people-centred processes of community building continue to take place, irrespective of state-
centred differentiation. This is due to the historical legacy of a Greater Pattani Kingdom, 
cross-border kinship ties, economic incentives for seeking dual citizenship, as well as 
bilateral people-to-people exchanges, which are encouraged by both the Thai and Malaysian 
governments, and their universities. As such, the Thai-Malaysian relationship has witnessed 
progress in assimilation, in terms of an expansion of the existent cross-border assimilation, 
towards wider people-to-people exchanges to improve and consolidate good bilateral 
relations. The only obstacles to improvements in Thai-Malaysian relations are the Thai 
government’s policies towards the south, which can either improve or escalate the southern 
conflict and border insecurity; and the Thai government’s choice of policy towards Malaysia, 
which can be complete differentiation, a combination of differentiation and cooperation, or 
the reversal of differentiation. Most recently, the Thai government has reciprocated 
Malaysia’s efforts to reverse differentiation, and thus contributed to progress towards 
assimilation in the bilateral relationship, as well as progress towards regional community 
building, based on mutual, positive identification and peaceful relations between regional 
states.  
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Chapter Five: Participatory Regionalism – Widening ASEAN Regionalism to Civil 
Society Organizations (CSOs) 
 
 This chapter tests ASEAN’s progress towards a regional community based on the 
significance of new regionalism, as indicated by participatory regionalism. Participatory 
regionalism is defined as the participation of civil society organizations (CSOs) in regional 
policy-making. It is one of the key characteristics associated with liberal democracies, 
whereby economic growth is expected to lead to the growth of the middle class, which will 
support the expansion of political space for CSOs, and, thus, greater political participation. 
Moreover, political theorists expect economic growth to lead to urbanization, higher 
standards of living and educational levels, as well as increased exposure to the mass media, 
which facilitates broad political participation.412 Such participation is characteristic of a 
democratic political system. As argued by the political theorist Charles Tilly: 
A regime is democratic to the degree that political relations between the state and its citizens 
feature broad, equal, protected, mutually binding consultation. Democratization then means 
net movement toward broader, more equal, more protected, and more mutually binding 
consultation.413 
 
This chapter interprets “mutually binding consultation” as consultations between state actors 
and CSO representatives, in which current policies are evaluated, and alternative policies are 
discussed; and state actors are obliged to follow up on CSOs’ policy proposals – either by 
explaining why they cannot be pursued, or arranging future meetings for further discussion. If 
such consultations take place at the domestic level, scholars of regionalism predict that the 
states involved would support similar processes at the regional level, due to the argument that 
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regional institutions reflect domestic political dynamics.414 In this regard, one would expect a 
link between democratization and state-CSO consulations in ASEAN member states, and 
these states’ support for democratic values and participatory regionalism in ASEAN. 
Conversely, one would expect the lack of democratization and state-CSO consultations in 
other ASEAN member states to be linked to these states’ reluctance to include democratic 
values, and to support participatory regionalism, in ASEAN.  
This chapter adopts Robert Dahl’s indicators for democratic international 
organizations to assess participatory regionalism in ASEAN. Dahl uses the same indicators to 
test for democracy in national systems and international organizations. These include the 
creation of institutions that enable citizens to participate, the availability of information on 
the political process for the population, and the existence of public debate.415 Dahl is sceptical 
of democracy in international organizations. In brief, he argues that populations in general 
have difficulty in participating in the policy-making of national governments, which suggests 
that this difficulty would be even greater in international organizations.416 Nevertheless, the 
ASEAN Civil Society Conferences (ACSC), which have taken place in Southeast Asia since 
2005 suggest the emergence of democratic political processes in terms of enabling CSOs to 
articulate their preferences to the government through a joint statement.417 The question is 
whether these preferences are actually considered by governments and whether they are 
translated into policies. 
Based on the three indicators for participatory regionalism – public participation, 
availability of information, and public debate – a spectrum of participatory regionalism can 
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be created. On one end of the spectrum is what I will call closed participatory regionalism, 
which is characterized by i) selected public participation that is limited to specific social 
groups, for example, students and pro-government CSOs; ii) availability of information on 
fait accompli, or official documents which have already been agreed on by state actors; iii) 
the presentation of the results of a public debate on regionalism to state actors, whereby these 
results are not given feedback or acted upon. On the other end of the spectrum of 
participatory regionalism is open participatory regionalism, which features i) open public 
participation, whereby anyone can participate; ii) availability of draft policies for feedback 
and voting; iii) the presentation of the results of a public debate on regionalism to state actors, 
whereby these results are given feedback and there is a negotiated outcome between state 
actors and CSOs. 
Existing studies on participatory regionalism in ASEAN argue that it is either non-
existent, or that it is closed, as defined above. Scholars have criticized ASEAN’s engagement 
with CSOs as “superficial,” and producing “a change in rhetoric rather than in policy.” 
Moreover, they also criticise ASEAN’s inclusion of CSOs in ASEAN regionalism as  
“limited to conferences, symposia, and seminars,” whereby CSOs can voice their opinions, 
but cannot participate in the decision-making on ASEAN policies.
418
 The explanations 
provided for the limited role of CSOs include the tradition of exclusive state-led regionalism, 
and incompatible preferences for the future of ASEAN regionalism between the 
democratizing and authoritarian ASEAN member states.419 The lack of progress in widening 
ASEAN regionalism to new regional actors led scholars, such as David Jones, to conclude 
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that ASEAN remains an intergovernmental association, and “a state-driven process rooted in 
consciousness of relative power.”420 
This chapter builds on existing studies by analysing the different explanations for 
ASEAN’s widening of regional processes to CSOs, and how CSOs have sought to magnify 
their allocated space within ASEAN regionalism, through capacity-building and the 
organization of activities parallel to that of ASEAN member states.421 The chapter highlights 
the problem of states’ preference for closed participatory regionalism, in contrast to CSOs’ 
preference for open participatory regionalism. States interpret participatory regionalism as 
raising awareness on ASEAN, including the public in certain ASEAN themed activities 
which are not political, for example, ASEAN’s promotion of cultural and educational 
exchanges within the region. CSOs share this interpretation, but go further in their advocacy 
of participatory regionalism by linking the process to democratization. This chapter not only 
analyses the role of ASEAN member states in facilitating, or limiting, participatory 
regionalism, but also the role of CSOs. Thus, it demonstrates the parallel processes of state-
led and CSO-led regionalism, and the interactions between them that determine progress in 
community building.  
The first section of this chapter will trace the opening of ASEAN regionalism to non-
state actors, starting with the regional network of “think tanks,” ASEAN-ISIS, in 1988, to the 
reinvention of ASEAN in the post-Cold War period, especially after the Asian Financial 
Crisis in 1997. The second section focuses on the link between national and regional 
institutions. The section firstly demonstrates how democratization in ASEAN as a whole does 
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not seem to be a prerequisite for participatory regionalism. Rather, participatory regionalism 
mainly emerged, and progressed, as a result of the following supportive dynamics in these 
ASEAN member states: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand’s prior 
engagement with development-oriented CSOs, as well as Indonesia’s democratization. 
Conversely, the section also demonstrates how participatory regionalism is restricted by the 
less open, and less democratic ASEAN member states. After focusing on the states’ supply 
side of participatory regionalism, the third section will focus on the demand side, based on 
what CSOs want out of participatory regionalism, and the extent to which they have achieved 
their aims. More specifically, the section will focus on CSOs’ demands for the ASEAN 
Charter and their reaction to the final product. The chapter will then conclude, in brief, that 
there is on and off closed participatory regionalism, and that progress towards open 
participatory regionalism depends on democratizing ASEAN member states. 
I. Widening ASEAN Regionalism 
 
 ASEAN regionalism was firstly widened to the regional network of “think tanks”, 
ASEAN-ISIS, which grew out of a meeting organized by the Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, for research institutions in the ASEAN region in 
1988.422 ASEAN-ISIS is an association of non-governmental organizations registered with 
ASEAN. Its founding members include the Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) of Indonesia, the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) of Malaysia, 
the Institute of Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS) of the Philippines, the Singapore 
Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), and the Institute of Security and International Studies 
(ISIS) of Thailand. Its stated purpose is 
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to encourage cooperation and coordination of activities among policy-oriented ASEAN 
scholars and analysts, and to promote policy-oriented studies of, and exchanges of 
information and viewpoints on, various strategic and international issues affecting Southeast 
Asia’s and ASEAN’s peace, security and well-being.423 
 
ASEAN-ISIS pursues “track two” diplomacy, which has been defined by the Director of the 
Philippines  Institute for Strategic and Development Studies as “the generation and conduct 
of foreign policy by nonstate actors, including government officials in their private 
capacity.”424 Such diplomacy includes “the participation of scholars, analysts, media, 
business, people’s sector representatives, and other opinion makers who shape and influence 
foreign policy and/or actually facilitate the conduct of foreign policy by government officials 
through various consultations and cooperative activities, networking and policy advocacy.”425 
ASEAN member states came to recognize ASEAN-ISIS for their expertise in analysing 
regional affairs and in proposing new policies to maintain regional security, namely, the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).426 For this reason, they institutionalized the meeting 
between the Heads of ASEAN-ISIS and the ASEAN Officials Meeting (SOM) in 1993. 
At the time, the end of the Cold War had stimulated new expectations of regionalism. 
For example, ASEAN was confronted with pressure from business groups to adopt further 
economic and business functions, as well as pressure from civil society to widen ASEAN 
regionalism beyond state actors.427 Subsequently, regional developments motivated the 
reinvention of ASEAN. These include: the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis (1997), the 
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forest fires in Indonesia and subsequent regional haze (1997), as well as the regional impact 
of domestic politics, namely, the political coup in Cambodia (1997) and East Timor’s vote for 
independence (1999).428 ASEAN leaders realized the urgency of reversing the negative 
perception of ASEAN, after they were criticized for their handling of the financial and 
environmental crises. As stated by the former Singaporean Foreign Minister, Professor S. 
Jayakumar: “If we continue to be perceived as ineffective, we can be marginalized as our 
Dialogue Partners and international investors relegate us to the sidelines. The danger is 
real.”429 Moreover, the failure of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) rescue packages to 
restore confidence and stability in the Thai and Indonesian currency and stock markets by 
December 1997 also motivated the consolidation of regional mechanisms to boost economic 
recovery and to maintain economic security. For example, ASEAN leaders deepened and 
accelerated the implementation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the ASEAN 
Investment Area (AIA) and the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO) scheme. With regard 
to the forest fires in Indonesia, ASEAN increasingly opened up its proceedings to 
international organizations, such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 
and CSOs. CSOs were able to meet ASEAN environment officials and to give them 
recommendations, thereby making an entry into the process of ASEAN policy-making.430 In 
response to domestic developments which have a regional impact, such as the coup in 
Cambodia and subsequent delay in Cambodia’s ASEAN membership, ASEAN leaders 
informally adopted “enhanced interaction” as a model for intra-regional relations. “Enhanced 
interaction” encourages ASEAN member states to comment on domestic developments that 
affect ASEAN.  
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The reinvention of ASEAN was manifested in ASEAN leaders’ ambitious “ASEAN 
Vision 2020,” which was issued in December 1997, just a few months after the Financial 
Crisis struck. The Vision took account of ASEAN’s previous achievements and set out goals 
to consolidate them in three areas: regional cooperation, economic growth, and community 
building.431 The Vision recognized the role of CSOs in helping disadvantaged social groups. It 
stated that a “community of caring societies” was to be realized and that it would be one 
“where the civil society is empowered and gives special attention to the disadvantaged, 
disabled, and marginalized.”432 Moreover, the Vision also expressed support for participatory 
regionalism by envisaging “Southeast Asian nations as being governed with the consent and 
greater participation of the people, with its focus on the welfare and dignity of the human 
person and the good of the community.”433  
In accordance with these aims, Carolina Hernandez (Director of the Institute for 
Strategic and Development Studies, Manila) proposed that ASEAN-ISIS create an ASEAN 
People’s Assembly (APA) as a regional mechanism in the year 2000. APA took the form of 
annual meetings between CSOs, which were overseen by the ASEAN-ISIS network of think 
tanks. These think tanks then conveyed the outcome of the APA meetings to Foreign 
Ministry officials. Prior to APA, Hernandez observed that 
If (the people) were involved, it was usually on the basis of a top-down approach, where 
implementation, rather than planning and strategizing, was open only to select circles seen as 
cooperative, rather than constructively critical or destructively confrontational.434 
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According to the ASEAN-ISIS concept paper, APA was intended to promote greater 
awareness of ASEAN member states and an ASEAN Community, facilitate increased people-
to-people relations within the region, as well as discuss socio-economic problems and their 
possible solutions.435 APA served as a foundation for participatory regionalism by providing a 
platform for CSOs in Southeast Asia to discuss their shared regional concerns, such as the 
protection of human rights, and to develop joint positions and joint policy proposals.  
ASEAN governments allowed CSOs to participate in regional affairs as observers and 
commentators in APA, under the supervision of ASEAN-ISIS. ASEAN-ISIS adopted a 
cautious approach to widening regionalism to CSOs, due to the potential for state-CSO 
interactions to supplant interactions between ASEAN and ASEAN-ISIS as an indicator of 
inclusive regionalism.436 Some scholars, such as See Seng Tan, argue that ASEAN-ISIS 
projected themselves as mediators between states and CSOs, in order to protect their 
privileged access to state actors. Moreover, it is argued that this mediation resulted in states’ 
perceptions of ASEAN-ISIS as a gate-keeper to the traditional state-led regionalism.437 
However, ASEAN-ISIS’ role as gate-keeper did not last. CSOs such as Focus on the Global 
South, observed that APA’s proposals to ASEAN were not producing any new policies.438 
Moreover, differences also emerged between ASEAN-ISIS and some CSOs on how ASEAN 
integration should be pursued.439 For example, ASEAN-ISIS supports open regionalism: a 
process which involves “regional economic integration without discrimination against 
economies outside the region.”440 On the other hand, national and regional CSOs fear the 
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potential negative impact of open regionalism, and instead support closed regionalism, where 
external trade policies are not so open to commerce with countries outside the region.441 
ASEAN-ISIS contributed to the emergence of participatory regionalism by initiating APA; 
however, CSOs soon came to realize its limitations, and ASEAN leaders would soon have to 
initiate a state-CSO meeting to follow up on their rhetoric on an ASEAN Community.  
 ASEAN leaders continued to express their support for participatory regionalism in 
subsequent statements on the reinvention of ASEAN, namely, the “ASEAN Concord II” (or 
Bali Concord II), which was adopted at the Ninth ASEAN Summit in October 2003. The 
“ASEAN Concord II” declared the aim to establish an ASEAN Community comprising three 
pillars: an ASEAN Security Community (ASC), an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), 
and an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). With regard to participatory 
regionalism, the “ASEAN Concord II” expressed the aim to include “the active involvement 
of all sectors of society, in particular women, youth, and local communities.”442  
Among the ASEAN leaders, former Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi 
(2003-2009) supported a people-centred approach to regionalism and played an important 
role in the emergence of ASEAN-CSO meetings. In a speech on the ASEAN Community in 
August 2004, he emphasized the need for a “people-centred ASEAN” and stated that “there 
must be adequate provisions for greater participation by the civil society in the ASEAN 
processes.”443 Abdullah Badawi proposed the establishment of an ASEAN Studies Centre at 
the Universiti I Technologi Mara (UiTM), which was then delegated the task of hosting the 
first ASEAN Civil Society Conference (ACSC) by the Malaysian government, under 
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Malaysia’s ASEAN Chairmanship in 2005.444 The ASEAN Civil Society Conference was 
intended to be an advanced form of APA, to include a meeting between CSOs and state 
leaders. In this regard, it was intended to promote participatory regionalism. However, one 
should note that the ASEAN Civil Society Conference also reflected competition for space 
within ASEAN regionalism between ASEAN-ISIS and CSOs, for the status of primary 
representatives of non-state actors. Thus, participatory regionalism is a contested political 
space, in which the friction and discord among non-state actors can potentially undermine 
progress in regional community building.  
In any case, the first ASEAN Civil Society Conference (ACSC) was held parallel to 
the 11
th
 ASEAN Summit in December 2005. It was supported by the ASEAN Secretariat and 
the Third World Network (TWN: a Malaysian CSO), and was attended by more than 100 
participants from CSOs throughout Southeast Asia. The ACSC was intended as a platform for 
CSOs’ engagement with ASEAN at the 11th ASEAN Summit and was a major milestone in 
participatory regionalism. At the 11
th
 ASEAN Summit, ASEAN leaders also adopted the 
Kuala Lumpur Declaration, which announced the drafting process for an ASEAN Charter: a 
legal and institutional framework for ASEAN.445 The ASEAN Charter was an attempt by 
ASEAN member states to reform ASEAN for the twenty-first century. It was intended to put 
ASEAN on a firmer institutional basis and to equip ASEAN with a legal personality that is 
separate from member states’ national identity. This aim can be traced to the early 1970s 
when the founding members of ASEAN considered consolidating the association by drawing 
up a constitution.446 However, instead of producing a constitution, ASEAN leaders produced 
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the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, and the Declaration of ASEAN 
Concord in 1976. In the latter document, they acknowledged the need to improve “ASEAN 
machinery to strengthen political cooperation,” and committed themselves to study “the 
desirability of a new constitutional framework for ASEAN.”447 These aims did not produce 
any immediate results, and it was not until the early 2000s, when plans for an ASEAN 
Community were announced, that such a constitutional framework became necessary and the 
idea of underpinning ASEAN with a constitution resurfaced. In 2003, ASEAN leaders agreed 
to realize an ASEAN Community and issued the Vientiane Action Program (VAP) in the 
following year, which listed action steps for community building for the years 2004-2010. 
These action steps included “the development of an ASEAN Charter” and “setting up 
relevant mechanisms” for that purpose.448 
ASEAN leaders planned to launch their Charter in 2007 to celebrate ASEAN’s 
fortieth anniversary. Surin Pitsuwan, ASEAN Secretary-General (2008-2013), stated that 
ASEAN leaders came up with the idea for an ASEAN Charter to underpin the ASEAN 
Community, which requires “ grassroots support, including the participation of CSOs” to be 
complete.449 ASEAN leaders initiated an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on the ASEAN 
Charter to draft recommendations on the Charter’s content and to submit them at the 12th 
ASEAN Summit.450 The terms of reference for the EPG stated that the ASEAN Charter 
drafting process should include “region-wide consultations (with) all relevant stakeholders in 
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ASEAN…especially representatives of civil society.”451 Thus, provisions were made for civil 
society’s participation in a significant process to consolidate the ASEAN Community. 
II. The Link between National and Regional Institutions 
 
One expects democratization in ASEAN member states to produce participatory 
regionalism, given that participatory regionalism is associated with democratic regional 
institutions, and that regional institutions reflect domestic political dynamics. However, this 
section firstly demonstrates how democratization in ASEAN as a whole does not seem to be a 
prerequisite for participatory regionalism. Rather, participatory regionalism mainly emerged 
as a result of the following supportive national dynamics in these ASEAN member states: 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand’s prior engagement with development-
oriented CSOs, as well as Indonesia’s democratization. These national dynamics provide an 
opening for public participation in policy-making and are more likely to generate support for 
similar processes at the regional level. 
The Lack of Democratization in Southeast Asia 
 
While ASEAN member states have expressed their commitment to economic and 
social development (e.g. in the ASEAN Declaration of 1967), this has not always been 
accompanied by political liberalization and reform. ASEAN member states equated national 
security with regime security, and justified regime security as an important condition for 
national development. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, military-backed regimes in Burma, 
Indonesia, Laos, Thailand, North and South Vietnam suppressed civil society groups that 
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were critical of, or perceived as a threat to the state.452 In the 1970s, the emergence of 
communist regimes in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam erased any prospect for the development 
of civil society in these countries. Civil society groups were relatively active for a while in 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore. However, by the 1970s, their respective 
governments reacted against this mounting political challenge. The states of Malaysia and 
Singapore used a combination of legal and coercive mechanisms to exert control. For 
example, they have the ability to arrest and place political suspects under detention without 
trial, and have also constrained the rights of CSOs to mobilize and stage protests.453 President 
Marcos of the Philippines resorted to martial law. With regard to Singapore, Prime Minister 
Lee Kuan Yew (1959-1990) argued that “the exuberance of democracy leads to undisciplined 
and disorderly conditions which are inimical to development.”454 The historian Franklin 
Weinstein notes that these arguments were shared by other countries in Southeast Asia: 
To be sure, the ruling elites see their national responsibilities in broader terms than the 
preservation of their own privileges. Egalitarian ideologies have become part of the everyday 
rhetoric of political discourse in Southeast Asia. But when these leaders are forced to make 
hard decisions, they tend to interpret any threat to their own survival as a challenge to national 
security.455 
 
Thus, one would not expect ASEAN member states to promote democratization at the 
national and regional level until national security and stability was secured.456  
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In the post-Cold War period, political scientists criticized some ASEAN member 
states, such as Thailand, for implementing “minimal democracy,” whereby democracy is 
“just a system in which rulers are selected by competitive elections.”457 Minimal democracy is 
the appearance of democracy without content or depth. According to political scientists 
David Beetham and Kevin Boyle, democracy has four main components: i) free and fair 
elections; ii) open and accountable government; iii) civil and political rights; and iv) a 
democratic or civil society.458 All of these components are difficult to define in practice. 
However, Southeast Asia offers relatively clear-cut cases of non or limited democracies. For 
example, Brunei Darussalam is ruled by the monarchy and is highly centralized. Cambodian 
leaders are characterized as having authoritarian tendencies.459 Some elections in Indonesia 
have been criticized for not providing a free and fair choice among political alternatives. For 
example, there are times when more than half of the Electoral College, which chooses the 
president, is nominated by the government. Moreover, there has not always been a choice of 
presidential candidates, and opposition parties are said to be weakened – through 
manipulation, harassment or ideological dilution – by the ruling regime.460 Politics in the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) is described as an outcome of “a remarkably 
secretive, but unquestionably cohesive, ruling elite.”461 Myanmar is ruled by a military 
government, and although elections were held in 2010, this was the first election in 20 years. 
Moreover, the elections were also criticized for being neither free nor fair.462 Singapore has 
experienced increasing regulation and management of civil society through the development 
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of new mechanisms to co-opt ethnic, business and social groups.463 As observed by Garry 
Rodan, a scholar on Southeast Asia, the major change in state-civil society relations in 
Singapore since the 1990s is “the expanding realm of the state through the extension and 
refinement of the mechanisms of political co-optation, not a more expansive civil society.”464 
Thailand has experienced 18 military coups in 60 years (the latest one was as recent as 2006) 
and is currently faced with deep political polarization and conflict.465 Finally, the Vietnamese 
government has been challenged by the mass media to provide greater accountability and 
transparency in its selection of leaders.466 Given that the widening of ASEAN regionalism to 
CSOs took place between 1997 and 2005 when most member states were far from being 
stable democracies, it would seem that democratization is not a prerequisite or cause for 
participatory regionalism.  
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand’s Engagement with Development-
Oriented CSOs 
 
Rather than democratization in ASEAN as a whole, it was some ASEAN member 
states’ openness to development-oriented CSOs, and their individual processes of 
democratization, that account for the emergence and progress of participatory regionalism in 
ASEAN. These ASEAN member states are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand, which saw a rapid growth of CSOs and increasing CSO activism.467 The growth of 
CSOs in Indonesia was stimulated by the perceived inability of political parties and students’ 
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organizations to articulate and to represent the interests of the common people from the late 
1960s onwards. As a result, development-oriented CSOs emerged, and constitute the 
foundation of the modern CSO sector. These CSOs sought to bridge the gap between the 
needs of the disadvantaged people in Indonesian society and the goals of the national 
development program. They attempted to respond to the problems articulated by the 
grassroots level of society, and to facilitate development through new ways that had not been 
pursued by the government or businesses, namely, the promotion of community-based self-
sufficiency. During this period, CSOs became increasingly aware of the need for more direct 
people’s participation in development. They found that the promotion of community-based 
development could have more direct impact on the poor, than government’s policies.468 The 
1970s saw the emergence of more development-oriented CSOs, which addressed issues such 
as public health and small-scale industrial development. This new generation of CSOs 
emphasized project innovation and were able to influence national development programs. 
For example, the CSO Yayasan Indonesia Sejahtera initiated a concept, which later produced 
the community-based health care program that was adopted by the government. Over the 
years, CSOs have grown larger in membership and have also become more credible as 
innovators of development approaches. 
It has been argued that the major achievement of CSOs at the national level has been 
the increasing awareness of issues that are of concern to the grassroots level of society, such 
as the environment, and the inclusion of these issues on the national political agenda.469 Over 
time, Indonesia’s national political agenda has seen a widening and deepening of issues 
raised by CSOs, since the number of CSOs has increased and a bigger portion of the 
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government bureaucracy has been exposed to their proposals. Nevertheless, it has been noted 
by observers that state-CSO relations alternate between cooperation and conflict. Some CSOs 
have been co-opted into government programs, some are in conflict with government 
programs, and some are co-opted into some government programs and in conflict with 
others.470 The relationship between the Indonesian government and CSOs is complex. Some 
government officials fear that effective CSO programs may undermine the government’s 
influence on local communities. They prefer to control CSOs by co-opting them into national 
development programs, and thereby portraying an image of public support for such programs. 
In any case, the Indonesian government has been open to cooperation with CSOs at the 
national level, which provided a strong foundation for promoting openness to CSOs at the 
regional and international level. 
In Malaysia, the state-CSO relationship is characterized by active collaboration in 
areas of social development, and by tension in areas of political reform: these characteristics 
were arguably extended to the regional level in ASEAN-CSO relations. The Malaysian 
government tends to accept input from CSOs and to facilitate CSO projects in the areas of 
youth development and social welfare. The Federation of Malaysian Consumers Association 
(FOMCA), for example, acts as an advisor on various committees in the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Finance.471 FOMCA’s main area of 
concern is consumerism, although it also works in other areas, such as community 
development. The Malaysian government is willing to cooperate with CSOs like FOMCA, 
which do not advocate political reform, but is less inclined to cooperate with those that do. 
CSOs which advocate political reform call for accountability to public interests, transparency 
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and a people-oriented political system.472 In any case, the Malaysian government has at the 
very least provided some space for CSOs, even if it is only those working on development. 
After 1990, the government invited welfare and development-oriented CSOs, such as the 
National Council of Women’s Organizations and Friends of the Earth Malaysia to participate 
in the National Economic Consultation Council to decide on National Economic Policy.
473
 
This willingness to engage with development-oriented CSOs at the national level arguably 
provided a supportive backdrop to the government’s decision to initiate an ASEAN Civil 
Society Conference in 2005. 
In the Philippines, the government was similarly willing to engage with CSOs to 
facilitate social and economic development. Under President Aquino, the 1987 Constitution 
encouraged the role of CSOs in community development. Moreover, the 1987-1992 Medium-
Term Development Plan also recognized CSOs as partners in the national development 
effort.474 Under Aquino’s presidency, CSOs increased in number and contributed to the 
process of nation-building through developmental work. Subsequently, the participation of 
CSOs in all levels of decision-making was institutionalized in the Local Government Code of 
1991. Under the Code, CSOs participate in the decision-making of local development 
councils. They are allocated a quota of seats in local branches of government and are also 
given sectoral representation in the local legislative bodies.475 Furthermore, the Aquino 
administration also encouraged CSOs to be in touch with government agencies and to 
participate in the implementation of government projects. Thus, the Philippines was open to 
CSOs’ political participation at the domestic level, and would similarly become open to their 
participation at the regional level.  
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President Ramos, Aquino’s successor, continued to support the growth of CSOs. 
Ramos even appointed prominent figures of the CSO community to his cabinet, such as Juan 
Flavier as Secretary of Health, Ernesto Garilao as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and Angel 
Alcala as Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources. Under the Ramos administration, 
a larger number of CSOs were involved in national social and economic development. In 
1995, the database of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) showed that 
a total of 14,398 CSOs were accredited to the local development councils, local school 
boards, local health boards, as well as peace and order councils.476 Several national summits 
were held with the aim to strengthen state-CSO collaboration. For example, one of the most 
important summits was the Government Organization-Non-Government Organization 
Conference on Partnership for Local Development in October 1993. Through this conference, 
the Ramos government sought to encourage the participation of CSOs in local governance 
and to encourage joint projects between government agencies and CSOs. The Ramos 
government’s support for CSOs has left a legacy to the present. Many national government 
agencies, such as the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Department of Health, and the 
Department of Agriculture, now have close cooperative relationships with CSOs. They 
consult CSOs on policy-making and cooperate with CSOs on joint projects.477 Many 
consultation mechanisms between the government and CSOs have become institutionalized, 
for example, the Sta Catalina Forum on decentralization and people empowerment. 
Moreover, support for “people-centred development” has been articulated and supported at 
the international level, for example, in the “Manila Declaration on a Social Development 
Strategy for the ESCAP Region Towards the Year 2000 and Beyond,” which was issued in 
1991. Thus, the Philippines government supported the involvement of CSOs in development 
at the national and international level, and would later support participatory regionalism in 
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ASEAN. For example, in October 2009, Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo stated 
that the Philippines supports engagement with CSOs to advance democratic processes, and 
looks forward to cooperating with CSOs in new bodies, such as the ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR).478 
Similar to the aforementioned ASEAN member states, Thailand also encouraged a 
developmental role for CSOs at the national level. In the 1990s, Thailand saw the emergence 
of dialogue and cooperation between government organizations and CSOs, as well as the 
establishment of a Joint Coordination Committee between the two actors. The Thai 
government promoted the role of CSOs in rural development, partly to cut back on the 
government’s budget, and partly due to the government’s recognition of CSOs’ expertise.479 
For example, the government’s Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation (later 
renamed the Thailand International Cooperation for Development Agency) and the National 
Education Commission consider annual proposals for development, which are provided by 
CSOs. More significantly, CSOs were consulted and allowed to participate in the drafting of 
the 1997 constitution. As a result, they were able to raise awareness on social problems and to 
express their ideas on how these problems should be solved. Moreover, the 1997 constitution 
heralded a phase of political reform, which produced new CSOs that were able to monitor the 
reform process, for example, the Protection of Civil Rights and Freedom Group.480 Thailand’s 
openness to CSOs at the national level would later be extended to the regional level, 
especially under Thailand’s ASEAN Chairmanship in 2009. 
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Indonesia’s Democratization in the post-Cold War Period 
 
In the post-Cold War period, pro-democratic CSOs grew significantly in Indonesia, as 
well as Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.481 Jörn Dosch argues that this growth was 
partly due to democratization, which produced new institutional frameworks for agenda-
setting and policy-making that were open to CSOs. Democratization and the openness to 
CSOs at the national level was extended to the regional level, especially in the case of 
Indonesia. According to Termsak Chalermpalanupap (Director of the Political and Security 
Directorate, ASEAN Secretariat), the inclusion of democratic values in the ASEAN Political-
Security Community (APSC) was predominantly inspired by the democratization of 
Indonesia since the end of the Suharto era in 1998.482 During the process of democratization, 
foreign policy-making became much more democratic and pluralistic, with the Indonesian 
House of Representatives having an increasing influence over policy-making.483 
Democratization in Indonesia inspired Indonesia’s support for democratization within other 
ASEAN member states. This is evident in the Indonesian delegation’s proposal for an 
ASEAN Security Community (later renamed the ASEAN Political-Security Community) at 
the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting in June 2003. According to the proposal, the ASEAN 
Security Community’s (ASC) tasks would include “political development,” which essentially 
meant encouraging the democratization of Southeast Asia. In the non-paper “Towards an 
ASEAN Security Community,” the Indonesian Foreign Ministry defined political 
development as the imperative of ASEAN member states: (a) to promote people’s 
participation; (b) to implement good governance; (c) to strengthen judicial institutions and 
legal reforms; and (d) to promote human rights and obligations through the establishment of 
                                                          
481
 See Jörn Dosch, “Sovereignty Rules: Human Security, Civil Society, and the Limits of Liberal Reform,” in 
Hard Choices: Security, Democracy and Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Stanford and Singapore: The Walter H. 
Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 61. 
482
 Chalermpalanupap, “Institutional Reform,” 111. 
483
 See Jürgen Rüland, “Deepening ASEAN cooperation through democratization? The Indonesian legislature 
and foreign policymaking,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 9 (2009): 373-402. 
198 
 
the ASEAN Commission on Human Rights.”484 Many ASEAN member states opposed 
Indonesia’s detailed democracy agenda. However, given Indonesia’s central position and 
prominent role in ASEAN regionalism, as the largest founding member and one of the most 
developed economies, the option of dismissing the ASC idea was not considered by other 
ASEAN member states. Instead, the ASC Plan of Action was watered-down and only 
included a short statement on the promotion of political development to achieve 
democracy.485 
Indonesia strongly argued that regional security could not be maintained unless 
ASEAN member states paid more attention to political development. While noting that 
political development was traditionally considered an internal affair, Indonesia pointed out 
that there was room for cooperation through regional encouragement for political 
development inside ASEAN member states. For Indonesia, this regional effort was necessary 
to revitalize ASEAN for the new challenges of the twenty-first century.
486
 Indonesia 
intentionally used the term “political development” over “democracy,” as the former was 
more open to interpretation and less controversial. However, Indonesia did interpret “political 
development” as democratization, which included the promotion of people’s political 
participation. Indonesia’s support for democratic values as part of the ASEAN Community 
can thus be seen as a projection of its own democratization since the end of President 
Suharto’s era in 1998.  
Dian Triansysh Djani (Director General for ASEAN Affairs at the Indonesian Foreign 
Ministry) stated in June 2007 that Indonesia would always be at the forefront of efforts to 
                                                          
484
 Quoted in Rizal Sukma, “Democracy Building in South East Asia: The ASEAN Security Community and 
Options for the European Union,” International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Sweden, 
2009, http://www.idea.int/resources/analysis/upload/Sukma_paper14.pdf [accessed on 20/07/11]. 
485
 ASEAN Secretariat, “ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action,” http://www.asean.org/16826.htm 
[accessed on 20/07/11]. 
486
 See Sukma, “Political Development: A Democracy Agenda for ASEAN?” 137. 
199 
 
ensure that democratic values and human rights are included in the ASEAN Charter.487 In 
addition to the Indonesian government, the Centre for International and Strategic Studies 
(CSIS), Jakarta, and the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS), Manila, also 
pushed hard for the ASEAN Charter to support democracy and human rights.488 These two 
think tanks were able to obtain at least silent consent from the other institutes within the 
ASEAN-ISIS network at an ASEAN-ISIS conference on human rights. Their activism in 
promoting democracy and human rights reflects the progress of democratization in their 
respective countries. Rizal Sukma, a CSIS policy scholar, was one of the most influential 
advocates. He stated in 2007 that “the inclusion of human rights and democratic principles in 
the charter is non-negotiable. Indonesia must fight for it because we will have no basis for 
protecting people’s rights if the principles are not included in the charter.”489 In 2008, the 
Indonesian House of Representatives recommended ratification of the ASEAN Charter while 
insisting that the government lobby for early amendments, including “greater popular 
involvement in ASEAN.”490  
The promotion of democratization and openness to non-state actors within an ASEAN 
Community was regarded by the Indonesian political elite as a means of legitimizing their 
claim to regional leadership.491 To consolidate this claim, President Yudhoyono established 
the intergovernmental Bali Democracy Forum, which has been taking place annually since 
2008. The Forum is for leaders of Asia-Pacific countries to discuss the challenges of 
democratization, and to help each other through the process.492 Yudhoyono’s speeches at the 
Forum demonstrate how a discourse on democratization is used to promote Indonesia’s role 
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in the international community. For example, at the second Bali Democracy Forum in 2009, 
he stated: 
I am optimistic that the Bali Democracy Forum will continue to grow and become the leading 
forum for democracy in Asia. We have an increase in the number of participating countries 
from 32 to 36 this year. The number of observers has also increased from 8 last year to 12 this 
year.493 
 
Indonesia projects itself as a role model for democratization by mentioning its on-going 
efforts to promote the process at all levels, which includes strengthening CSOs. As argued, 
and explained by Marty Natalegawa (Indonesia’s Foreign Minister) at the third Bali 
Democracy Forum in 2010: 
The need for democratization is deeply felt by many countries, as we pursue the democratic 
ideal: democracy at the level of the United Nations, democracy at the regional level, and 
democracy within the nation…To this day Indonesia continues to nurture its young 
democracy…and to strengthen the roles of the mass media and civil society.494 
 
Indonesia’s process of democratization and its bureaucratic activism played a major role in 
pushing forward participatory regionalism in the politically diverse Southeast Asian context. 
Moreover, the case of Indonesia also demonstrates how the impetus for participatory 
regionalism is provided by democratizing ASEAN member states. Conversely, one would 
expect the momentum for participatory regionalism to be dulled or stopped by the less 
democratic or authoritarian member states. Below are some examples to test this hypothesis. 
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Democratizing ASEAN Member States and Participatory Regionalism 
 
The state’s democratization and openness to CSOs in Thailand arguably contributed 
to progress in participatory regionalism under Thailand’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2009. 
During this chairmanship, the Foreign Ministry sponsored the inauguration of an ASEAN 
People’s Forum (APF) and delegated the task of organizing this Forum to the Institute of 
Security and International Studies (ISIS), at Chulalongkorn University. The Forum was 
intended to address ASEAN’s “participation deficit,” to enable CSOs to discuss their 
concerns over the three pillars of the ASEAN Community, and have these concerns presented 
as a summarizing statement to ASEAN leaders.495 The ASEAN People’s Forum between 
CSOs takes place before the ASEAN Civil Society Conference, between CSOs and state 
leaders. The first ASEAN Peoples’ Forum and fourth ASEAN Civil Society Conference 
(APF1/ACSC4) took place in February 2009, and took some regimes by surprise. Cambodian 
Prime Minister Hun Sen was disturbed by the selection process of CSO representatives, 
especially those from his country, while Myanmar objected to the CSO representative, who 
was a Myanmar citizen in exile. To save the meeting, the ASEAN Chair, Thai Prime Minister 
Abhisit Vejjajiva, and his Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya, had to arrange a separate meeting 
with the Myanmar group led by Khin Omar, coordinator of the Burmese Partnership 
Network, Cambodian representatives and Pen Somony, program coordinator for the 
Cambodian Volunteers for Civil Society. Not only was the meeting threatened by objections 
from the Cambodian and Myanmar leaders, but it was also challenged by Brunei and 
Singapore, whose authorities have constantly questioned the legitimacy of CSO 
representatives and their mandate as non-state actors.496 Moreover, the Laotian representative 
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also proposed that a meeting between states and CSOs should be optional in future. Thus, 
participatory regionalism was restricted by the less democratic ASEAN member states.  
Moreover, even if ASEAN-CSO meetings take place, some ASEAN member states 
can undermine participatory regionalism by using their choice of CSO representatives. For 
example, the names of all the nominated CSO representatives had to be submitted for 
approval by ASEAN senior officials before the 15
th
 ASEAN Summit, which undermined 
CSOs’ independence. CSOs’ independence was further undermined at the ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting in July 2009, when Singaporean officials stated that they would appoint 
their own CSO representatives. This went against the purpose of civil society speaking by 
itself for itself. Consequently, CSO representatives from Brunei, Thailand, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Vietnam protested by not entering the meeting.497 According to Debbie 
Stothard, coordinator of the Southeast Asia-based Alternative ASEAN network on Burma 
(Altsean Burma): 
Some ASEAN member states said that they would only meet with civil society they recognize 
or “good civil society” that supports the ruling party, which tend to be those that are oriented 
toward charity work and not toward human rights issues. Cambodia and Laos are two 
governments which said that they would only meet with civil society that has been approved 
by them.498  
 
A year later, under Vietnam’s chairmanship of ASEAN in 2010, there was no progress at all 
on participatory regionalism. As noted by CSOs at a press conference in October 2010, 
Vietnam restricted participatory regionalism by preventing some civil society groups from 
attending the sixth ASEAN People’s Forum (APF VI). Jenina Chavez, Philippines program 
coordinator for the CSO Focus on the Global South, observed that 
it was so different from what happened in Thailand in 2009 where the process was open and 
participatory. Some officials of the ASEAN Secretariat even graced the civil society 
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conference. This year, there will be no (meeting) with civil society in the ASEAN Summit in 
Hanoi. Vietnam tried very hard and was very concerned to be a good host but it failed.499  
 
Thus, a less democratic ASEAN Chair can restrict participatory regionalism by only allowing 
the participation of pro-state CSOs or cancelling ASEAN-CSO meetings altogether. This 
confirms that participatory regionalism is dependent on the initiatives of democratizing 
ASEAN member states, as well as their ability to persuade other member states to accept 
their agenda and proposed processes. 
III. The ASEAN Charter and Participatory Regionalism 
 
 The previous section focused on the supply side of participatory regionalism through 
ASEAN-CSO meetings; this section will focus on the demand side, based on what CSOs’ 
want out of participatory regionalism and the extent to which they have achieved their aims. 
Community building in theory and practice implies regionalism that is not only determined 
by state actors, but also deliberated by civil society, if not society at large. For international 
relations (IR) theorists, community building requires the emergence of a “responsive regional 
civil society,” or CSOs within the region which have developed a regional mind-set through 
discussions on shared concerns, leading to joint positions and joint policy proposals.500 
Moreover, community building is indicated by the emergence of participatory regionalism. 
This involves the creation of institutions that enable citizens to participate, the availability of 
information on the political process for the population, and the existence of public debate.501 
This section will test the significance of participatory regionalism in ASEAN by analysing 
the impact of CSOs during the drafting process for an ASEAN Charter. 
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CSOs aimed to use their meetings with ASEAN leaders at the ASEAN Civil Society 
Conference (ACSC), to create a space for themselves within the ASEAN community building 
process. They wanted to identify shared concerns among CSOs in Southeast Asia, and to 
discuss these concerns and the realization of an ASEAN Community with ASEAN leaders.502 
CSOs’ concerns are mainly centred around democratization and human rights, and principles 
in the ASEAN Community documents and the ASEAN Charter. They can be summarized as 
follows: transparency, ASEAN-CSO collaboration, democratization, human rights, socio-
economic justice, and an ASEAN identity that reflects the region’s diversity.503 In accordance 
with the aim of the ASEAN Charter “to promote a people-oriented ASEAN,” ASEAN leaders 
listened to CSOs’ concerns and demands.504 However, given that state-CSO meetings had not 
been institutionalized and that there were no formalized procedures, ASEAN leaders were not 
obliged to respond to CSOs, or to make a commitment to consider their demands, let alone 
act upon them. As such, the ACSC was a very one-sided meeting. Nevertheless, ASEAN 
leaders were reminded of the growing dissatisfaction among academia and CSOs with regard 
to the exclusive, elite nature of ASEAN. Moreover, the ACSC also set a precedent for CSOs’ 
presentation of views on major ASEAN developments, and included CSOs, albeit marginally, 
in the drafting process for an ASEAN Charter.   
The drafting process for an ASEAN Charter motivated CSOs to come together, so that 
they could brainstorm their contribution and strengthen future CSO meetings with ASEAN. 
After the first meeting between CSOs and ASEAN leaders at the ASEAN Civil Society 
Conference (ACSC) in December 2005, five regional and international CSOs, including 
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Forum Asia, the Southeast Asian Committee for Advocacy (SEACA), the Third World 
Network (TWN), and the Asian Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in 
Rural Asia (AsiaDHRRA), met in February 2006, for a meeting on Strategic Action Planning 
for Advocacy. These CSOs decided that there was a need for a new mechanism for the 
sharing of information and resources, and for CSOs’ engagement with ASEAN. This new 
mechanism was to replace the ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA), which was facilitated and 
overseen by ASEAN-ISIS, and thus not wholly made of CSOs. As a result, a new regional 
network exclusively for CSOs was established: the Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy 
(SAPA).505 Subsequently, a SAPA Working Group on ASEAN (SAPA WG on ASEAN) was 
created, to brainstorm and submit proposals to the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on the 
ASEAN Charter. SAPA’s meetings with the EPG and submissions on the ASEAN Charter 
were made in April, June and November 2006. SAPA’s proposals on the ASEAN Charter 
were significant for their instrumental and discursive value.506 The proposals were 
instrumental in terms of articulating concrete demands to governments to produce material 
change. These demands were summarized by Jenina Chavez, from SAPA, as follows: 
mechanisms to ensure the equitable distribution of, and protection from the negative impacts 
of, integration; positive assistance from the bigger and stronger to the smaller and weaker 
members; the establishment of a regional instrument on migration; the establishment of a 
regional human rights mechanism; the protection of the regional environment; increasing the 
capacity of members to protect their citizens from regionally pervasive communicable or 
infectious diseases.507 
 
SAPA’s proposals also had a discursive value in terms of promoting discourse on democracy 
and human security. For example, at their first meeting with the Eminent Persons Group 
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(EPG) on the ASEAN Charter, SAPA reiterated their calls for democratic, inclusive and 
transparent processes of consultation between ASEAN and CSOs in the realization of the 
Charter. In terms of human security, SAPA’s report to the EPG argued that the protection of 
human security should over-ride ASEAN’s principle of non-interference, and that this 
principle should be revised accordingly in the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) Plan of 
Action. 
 To promote the norms of democratization and human security, SAPA made some 
radical demands, such as the demand for CSOs’ access to decision-making at all levels and 
full participation in all areas. Chanida Bamford, Director of the CSO Focus on the Global 
South, in Thailand, justified these demands as follows: 
In terms of people’s participation in ASEAN, SAPA thinks it is best not to provide any 
recommendations because we don’t want it to be too rigid. People’s participation has to be 
justified in all areas. We’re worried that if we put forward recommendations in one area for 
civil society participation, then we’ll be restricting ourselves more than if we just leave it 
open.508 
Southeast Asian scholars note the following constraints in including people’s participation in 
all areas. First, ASEAN member states may not be able to bear the additional cost of state-
CSO consultations on all regional affairs. Second, such consultations may actually slow down 
ASEAN integration and community building. Third, the provision for people-centred 
regionalism could potentially break up the unity of ASEAN. For example, ASEAN’s growing 
inclination toward more active engagement with civil society under Thailand’s chairmanship 
in 2009, caused the Myanmar military junta to reconsider its position in ASEAN, and to look 
to other regional organizations, such as the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC).509 ASEAN officials were very much aware of these constraints and 
tried to lower the expectations of CSOs during the few ASEAN-CSO meetings on the 
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ASEAN Charter.510 The limited public consultation on the ASEAN Charter confirmed CSOs’ 
expectation of a state-centred, rather than people-centred Charter. As argued by Anil Netto, a 
civil society actor: 
The EPG says it has met civil society groups but many have not heard about the 
Charter…Critics suspect the lack of public consultation over the Charter could be due to the 
real intention behind the blueprint. They see the Charter as giving a legal personality to 
ASEAN, paving the way for a regional economic framework that would facilitate investment 
and trade in the region, while the interests of ordinary people – workers, the poor and the 
marginalized – could come a distant second.511  
 
Thus, CSOs did not see the drafting process for the ASEAN Charter as a process that 
advanced participatory regionalism, nor did they expect the Charter to effectively address the 
concerns of the grassroots of society. 
CSOs sought to be recognized by ASEAN as a new regional actor and worked on 
capacity building activities, such as research. At the third ASEAN Civil Society Conference 
(ACSC) in November 2007, CSOs expressed their aim to further strengthen regional civil 
society through research on regional affairs.512 At the time, CSO research projects included 
“Research on Political Space for Advocacy in South East Asia Region” and “Research on 
Regional Responses to Transboundary Issues.”513 Both projects demonstrate that CSOs were 
becoming increasingly proactive in their engagement with ASEAN and expanding the scope 
of such engagement. Moreover, the third ACSC also saw CSOs’ more specified short-term 
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demands in the finalization of an ASEAN Charter. First, that ASEAN leaders “ensure 
transparency through the disclosure of the draft ASEAN Charter for meaningful public 
consultations and discussions, and guarantee substantive people participation at the national 
and regional levels in the adoption of the ASEAN Charter.”514 Second, that ASEAN leaders 
organize a “democratic referendum process at the national level to allow peoples in each 
country to give direct mandate to the ASEAN Charter.”515 The latter demand was unrealistic, 
but its purpose was to highlight the fact that most people did not know about the ASEAN 
Charter and that some CSOs which did, such as those from Myanmar, were not being 
recognized or consulted by their governments.516 In any case, neither of CSOs’ demands were 
met since it was hard enough already to reach agreement between state representatives from 
the ten ASEAN member states, let alone the ASEAN peoples, on the contents of the ASEAN 
Charter.517 Given that a draft ASEAN Charter was not circulated for CSOs and the ASEAN 
population at large to consider, one could argue that ASEAN leaders restricted participatory 
regionalism in the final stages of drafting the Charter. This is based on the absence of three 
indicators for participatory regionalism: citizen participation, the availability of information, 
and public debate. Since participatory regionalism was either limited, or restricted throughout 
the drafting process for an ASEAN Charter, many CSOs, such as the South East Asian 
Committee for Advocacy (SEACA), criticized the three ASEAN-CSO meetings as simply 
being a public relations exercise.518 
While provisions were made for CSOs’ participation in the drafting process for an 
ASEAN Charter, the extent of their participation, and whether or not their recommendations 
would be included, was ultimately determined by ASEAN leaders. As argued by Ambassador 
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Barry Desker, former Singaporean diplomat and the current Dean of the S. Rajaratnam 
School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University: 
The language of the documents (on the ASEAN Community) talk about people-centeredness 
and all that, but if you look at the way in which those agreements arose, the negotiating 
process of which they were the outcome, you will find that it was a very bureaucratic and 
diplomat dominated process…The steps which were taken in actually drafting the Charter 
proper ensured that it was designed as a bureaucrat-led process.519 
 
The ASEAN Charter was not intended for circulation before being signed by the ASEAN 
leaders. However, the final draft of the Charter was leaked by the Thai independent media, 
Prachathai, and the Philippine Centre for Investigative Journalism, which posted it on their 
websites. As a result, CSOs were able to see the exclusion of their submitted 
recommendations, such as a clause on migrant workers’ rights, earlier than expected. They 
found that the final Charter did not heed their calls for mechanisms that would ensure people 
participation and transparency, nor did it provide an official recognition of interactions 
between state and non-state actors.520 The ASEAN Charter maintains ASEAN’s top-down 
intergovernmental nature, namely, state-centred mechanisms in ASEAN’s policy-making 
process: the ASEAN Summit (the Heads of State of Government), the ASEAN Coordinating 
Council, the ASEAN Community Councils and ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies: all of 
which comprise ASEAN officials. Most importantly, the ASEAN Charter seems to have 
closed off any path towards a role for CSOs in decision-making by not making provisions for 
ASEAN’s dialogue and consultations with CSOs, or action plans and discussions on this 
topic for future policy. Thus, the ASEAN Charter did not oblige ASEAN member states to 
promote participatory regionalism, nor did it stimulate progress from the limited practice of 
closed participatory regionalism towards the CSOs’ preferred open participatory regionalism. 
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Given that the drafting process for an ASEAN Charter allowed minimal participatory 
regionalism, the South East Asian Committee for Advocacy (SEACA) sought to promote 
open participatory regionalism, where any CSO and individual can participate. In this 
endeavour, SEACA initiated a process for drawing up an alternative ASEAN People’s 
Charter at the second ASEAN Civil Society Conference (ACSC) in December 2006. SEACA 
is a CSO which focuses on advocacy capacity building for CSOs in South East Asia. It was 
established in 1999 and is sponsored by the Catholic Institute for International Relations 
(CIIR), and supported by the Department for International Development (DFI) of the United 
Kingdom.521 SEACA encouraged CSOs to organize brainstorming sessions on the ASEAN 
Community in Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, in 
May 2008.522 Subsequently, the regional network of CSOs, Solidarity for Asian People’s 
Advocacy (SAPA), further promoted public participation in ASEAN regionalism by 
establishing an ASEAN People’s Center (APC), as a CSO equivalent to the states’ ASEAN 
Secretariat, in January 2009. The ASEAN People’s Center seeks to facilitate the exchange of 
information between SAPA and ASEAN, and to encourage dialogue and cooperation 
between them.523 The ASEAN People’s Centre followed SAPA’s agenda. It initially focused 
on CSOs’ drafting of the terms of reference for an ASEAN Human Rights Body, the three 
ASEAN Community blueprints, implementation of the Declaration on the Promotion and 
Protection on the Rights of Migrant Workers and the drafting of multilateral instruments on 
the rights of migrant workers. Thus, the ASEAN People’s Centre promoted open 
participatory regionalism by providing space for CSOs to draft ASEAN documents. 
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Outside the ASEAN People’s Centre, CSOs continue to lobby ASEAN diplomats at 
seminars to promote open participatory regionalism.  For example, they raised their concerns 
about the lack of access to ASEAN related information at a seminar organized by Thammasat 
University in Thailand, in February 2009. Wachara Yindeelarb (from the “we love our 
neighbours” radio station) noted that not all CSOs in Thailand were aware that proposals 
could be made to the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter. Moreover, he also 
pointed out that not all CSOs had access to online information about ASEAN, and suggested 
that this information also be disseminated through other media, such as TV, national radio, 
and local radio, otherwise it would only be CSOs with an office and CSOs in Bangkok which 
know about ASEAN.524 This lack of accessibility to information on ASEAN is a problem 
throughout the whole region, both in terms of substance and language, and was reiterated by 
CSO representatives in their open letter to ASEAN leaders in October 2009. The letter called 
on ASEAN  
to create in consultation with people’s organizations, mechanisms to ensure meaningful 
participation of the people in policy making. These mechanisms must include information 
disclosure, translation of ASEAN documents, and people’s participation in monitoring 
mechanisms.525 
 
Chaovarit Salitul (a Thai diplomat) explained that there were domestic constraints in 
disseminating information on ASEAN, such as problems with funding.526 Thus, open 
participatory regionalism is restricted by the lack of ASEAN awareness and domestic 
constraints in addressing this problem. 
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CSOs have been very active in promoting progress towards open participatory 
regionalism. However, they have still not been able to influence political reforms, given their 
repeated calls for democratic processes and the apparent lack of enthusiasm on the part of 
ASEAN member states to further engage with them. Five years after the first ASEAN Civil 
Society Conference (ACSC), CSOs are still issuing the same demands, which presumably 
means that very little has changed. In their final statement for the ASEAN People’s Forum VI 
in September 2010, CSOs repeated their disappointment over the fact that “ASEAN (had) not 
made significant progress in ensuring increased transparency and access to information and 
meaningful participation in ASEAN affairs.”527 CSOs argue that their meetings with ASEAN 
leaders are just a means to counter criticisms on the democratic deficit in ASEAN. They find 
that state-civil society interactions are more symbolic than substantial, and that they simply 
give the impression of consultation.528 CSOs may provide feedback on policies, but 
governments tend to continue with their preferred policies anyway.529 As lamented by Chalida 
Tajaroensuk, Director of the People’s Empowerment Foundation (PEF) Thailand: “the 
ASEAN Civil Society Conference is just an annual conference. We do not see the state taking 
any action on our recommendations.”530 Moreover, two scholars from the Singapore Institute 
of International Affairs (SIIA) observe that ASEAN member states have not clearly shown 
that they are willing to accept and implement recommendations from CSOs on ASEAN 
community building.531 Thus, there is, at best on and off closed participatory regionalism, 
depending on the ASEAN Chair, and no provisions for progress towards open participatory 
regionalism. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
This chapter sought to assess ASEAN’s progress towards a regional community based 
on the significance of participatory regionalism. Participatory regionalism is a spectrum, 
based on the extent of three factors: public participation, the availability of information, and 
public debate on regionalism. With regard to public participation, ASEAN member states 
have invited certain social groups, such as students and CSOs, to ASEAN themed 
conferences. Most significantly, ASEAN leaders have been meeting with CSOs at the 
ASEAN Civil Society Conference since 2005, and enabled CSOs to present proposals on the 
ASEAN Charter to the Eminent Persons Group (EPG), which was delegated the task of 
drafting ideas for such a Charter. In terms of the availability of information on ASEAN, 
ASEAN officials may point to hard copies in libraries and/or online documents on the 
ASEAN Secretariat website. As for public debate, one could argue that CSOs’ meetings 
constitute a limited degree of public debate on ASEAN regionalism. ASEAN-ISIS does 
organize seminars on ASEAN regionalism, but these tend to consist of discussions between 
academia, diplomats, and state actors, rather than a platform for public debate. As such, state 
actors can claim that they facilitated two out of the three factors which indicate progress 
along the spectrum of participatory regionalism , as evidenced by selected public 
participation, and the availability of official ASEAN documents for public consumption. This 
degree of participatory regionalism may be sufficient for elected state actors to maintain 
legitimacy. However, for members of academia who envisage more progress in participatory 
regionalism, this stage is described as a preliminary “trust-building dialogue,” which requires 
added momentum (i.e. more participation) from CSOs to realize an ASEAN Community.532 
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For most CSOs, the current degree of participatory regionalism in ASEAN is 
insufficient. CSOs which participated in the drafting process for an ASEAN Charter aimed to 
present concrete demands to ASEAN governments, and to promote the norms of democracy 
and human rights. They were disappointed by the lack of results and the fact that 
authoritarian countries were not being penalized for their repressive political system, or that 
ASEAN member states with human rights abuses were not being shamed and pressured into 
reform. Given that many CSOs were dissatisfied with their space for participation within 
ASEAN, they decided to strengthen themselves, in order to increase ASEAN recognition and 
cooperation with ASEAN. The biggest step in making CSOs more visible to ASEAN is 
arguably the establishment of an ASEAN People’s Centre, later renamed the Southeast Asia 
People’s Centre, as an equivalent to the ASEAN Secretariat in coordinating regional actors 
and policies. Regional cooperation among CSOs is an indicator of people-centred 
regionalism, and demonstrates the development of a regional mind-set through proposals for 
regional policies. In this regard, a sense of solidarity and community building is taking place 
among CSOs. The question is how to consolidate the bridge between state-centred 
community building and CSO-centred community building. 
ASEAN member states allow closed participatory regionalism, in terms of including 
non-state actors in certain ASEAN themed activities, and enabling CSOs to present their 
thoughts on ASEAN regionalism. Democratizing ASEAN member states are more willing to 
make provisions for progress towards open participatory regionalism, where any CSO can 
participate and where CSOs are consulted on regional policies. Thus, progress in 
participatory regionalism, and community building, may ultimately depend on 
democratization in Southeast Asia as a whole.  
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Chapter Six: ASEAN Regionalism and Human Rights 
 
  This chapter tests ASEAN’s progress towards a regional community, based on the 
extent to which human rights, and civil society organizations (CSOs) which work on human 
rights, have become part of ASEAN regionalism. According to the new regionalism approach 
(NRA), progress towards a regional community is indicated by two main factors: 1) the 
expansion of areas for regional cooperation, which go beyond the traditional state-centred 
security and economic cooperation towards more people-centred areas, such as the promotion 
of democracy and human rights; 2) the participation of non-state actors, namely CSOs, in 
regional affairs.533 A regional human rights discourse and human rights institution would 
indicate that countries abide by the same values and that they identify themselves as part of a 
common regional entity that upholds them. Conversely, a political struggle over the regional 
human rights discourse and human rights implementation would indicate a fragmented, rather 
than a collective regional community building process. Such fragmentation, be it between 
states, or between states and civil society, highlights persisting obstacles to a regional 
community.534  
 Previous studies on regionalism in Europe and international relations (IR) theory 
provide possible explanations as to why countries would adopt, and cooperate with each other 
on human rights. For example, Andrew Moravcsik argues that European states accepted 
binding human rights treaties after the Second World War, mainly as a means of political 
survival; moreover, those states that were in transition towards a liberal or democratic society 
were most likely to ratify human rights instruments to protect their fragile regime against 
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non-democratic opponents.
535
 In terms of IR theory, ideational theorists argue that states 
change their behaviour because of the cost of deviance from the norms of international 
society, “changing models of appropriate and legitimate statehood, and because the political 
pressures of other states and non-state actors affect their understanding of their identity and 
standing in the international community of states.”536 According to this approach, the 
adoption of human rights norms and treaties are important, as it signals that a particular state 
belongs to the community of law-abiding, democratic states. 
 Regional cooperation in new areas, especially politically sensitive ones like human 
rights, is bound to be difficult. It is therefore no surprise that the emergence and consolidation 
of human rights, as part of ASEAN regionalism, has been characterized by resistance, and a 
cautious, incremental, step-by-step recognition and promotion of related norms. Progress in 
ASEAN regionalism and human rights can be viewed as part of a spectrum, which I have 
created, based on inter-state and state-CSO cooperation in this area. This spectrum is 
composed of three factors: states’ treatment of norms on human rights, states’ discourse and 
policies on human rights, and the nature of agenda-setting and policy implementation. On one 
end of the spectrum, states recognize and promote norms on human rights, while maintaining 
the exclusively state-centred nature of agenda-setting and policy implementation. In practice, 
this situation is characterized by state-initiated regional institutions on human rights, which 
do not have the mandate to receive complaints on human rights abuses or to investigate them, 
nor do they make provisions for CSOs’ participation. Instead, they promote human rights 
without advocating political reform, for example, by raising awareness, and facilitating 
research and training on the protection of human rights. On the other end of the spectrum on 
new regionalism and human rights, states create incentives for norm-compliance, or 
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disincentives for non-compliance; they promote, as well as protect human rights, and make 
provisions for CSO participation in agenda-setting and policy implementation. This is 
characterized by state-initiated regional institutions on human rights with the power to act as 
a regional police, who can investigate complaints from individual countries, and to monitor 
and enforce human rights.537  
 This chapter demonstrates why ASEAN community building, at the time of writing, 
remains at the state-centred end of the spectrum, that is, states recognize and promote norms 
on human rights, while maintaining the exclusively state-centred nature of agenda-setting and 
policy implementation. The chapter is divided into three sections. Section I traces the 
emergence of human rights as part of ASEAN regionalism, focusing on external and regional 
causes, such as the United Nations (UN) World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, and 
the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, respectively. Section II outlines the role of regional actors, 
such as the regional network of “think tanks,” ASEAN-ISIS, in promoting an ASEAN 
Human Rights Mechanism. Finally, section III provides the case study on the process of 
realizing an ASEAN Human Rights Body and its current achievements, in order to analyse 
the extent to which ASEAN member states have harmonized their human rights policies, and 
the extent to which they enable civil society’s participation in this area. The chapter 
concludes that ASEAN member states have adopted human rights as part of ASEAN 
regionalism, in terms of institutionalizing their recognition and promotion of human rights 
norms. However, they still disagree on the extent to which there should be regional 
cooperation on human rights, and the extent to which they should cooperate with CSOs in 
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this area. Thus, community building remains a fragmented, state-centred process, rather than 
a collective process with increased participatory regionalism.  
I. The emergence of human rights as part of ASEAN Regionalism 
 
Towards the end of the Cold War, the rejection of authoritarian rule and democratic 
transitions in Eastern Europe encouraged the West to influence democratization in other parts 
of the world by linking overseas development assistance (ODA) to progress in “good 
governance.” The term “good governance” was used by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries at their July 1991 Summit to refer to 
democracy, human rights, market liberalization, and sustainable development in developing 
countries.538 In response, developing countries resisted this linkage and conditionality, and 
formed their own regional discourse, an “Asian values discourse,” on human rights.539 This 
discourse was propagated by Southeast Asia’s leaders such as Singaporean Prime Minister 
Lee Kuan Yew (1959-1990) and Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003), 
who spoke out against Western conceptions of human rights and what they saw as Western 
attempts to interfere in their domestic affairs.540 The Asian values discourse emphasized 
cultural values, such as respect for authority and the primacy of community over individual 
rights. It was a defensive mechanism to insulate regimes against external pressure for 
political reforms, and one through which ASEAN member states can reiterate the ASEAN 
                                                          
538
 Carolina G. Hernandez, “ASEAN Perspectives on Human Rights and Democracy in International Relations,” 
Peace, Conflict Resolution and Human Rights Occasional Papers, Series No. 95-96 (Quezon City: University of 
the Philippines, 1995), 1. 
539
 See Jusuf Wanandi, “Human Rights and Democracy in the ASEAN Nations: The Next 25 Years,” The 
Indonesian Quarterly 21 (1993): 14-37. 
540
 See Vitit Muntarbhorn, “Towards an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism?” in Towards an ASEAN Human 
Rights Mechanism: Proposals, Declarations and Related Documents (Manila: Working Group for an ASEAN 
Human Rights Mechanism, 1999), 9-14; Michael Richardson, “East Asia Spurns West’s Cultural Model, 
Ascendant Asia Spurns Western Culture,” International Herald Tribune, 13 July 1992, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/13/news/13iht-orie.html?pagewanted=1 [accessed on 29/07/11]. 
219 
 
norms of non-interference in another country’s internal affairs.541 ASEAN leaders articulated 
the Asian values discourse in international settings, such as the UN-sponsored Asia-Pacific 
Regional Conference on Human Rights, and the subsequent UN World Conference on 
Human Rights in 1993. They argued that Western societies do not have the right to impose 
their human rights standards on the non-Western world and that the right to development is a 
fundamental human right, which is a foundation for all others.542 
The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action which resulted from the World 
Conference on Human Rights was arguably the strongest call by the international community 
for “regional and sub-regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights 
where they do not already exist.”543 The Declaration stated that human rights are universal, 
while noting the significance of national and regional particularities in the promotion and 
protection of human rights. Southeast Asian state representatives were sceptical about the 
implementation of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. As Bilahari Kausikan 
(a senior Foreign Ministry official from Singapore) commented: the promotion of human 
rights by all countries “will always be selective, even cynical, and concern for human rights 
will always be balanced against other national interests…such as the territorial integrity of 
the state or the fundamental nature of their political systems.”544 Nevertheless, shortly after 
the World Conference on Human Rights, ASEAN Foreign Ministers declared their collective 
response at the 26
th
 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM): “in support of the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action…ASEAN should also consider the establishment of an 
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appropriate regional mechanism on human rights.”545 Kausikan explained that two external 
factors persuaded ASEAN member states to re-examine their own human rights standards: 1) 
the emerging global culture of human rights (as shown in international law on human rights, 
and codified in United Nations Declarations); 2) the emphasis of human rights in the foreign 
policy of the major powers, the United States and many European countries, which turned 
human rights into an international issue.546  
 At the regional level, the Asian Financial Crisis and the forest fires in Indonesia in 
1997 provided further stimulus to incorporate human rights into ASEAN regionalism. 
ASEAN leaders were criticized by both the international community and their own citizens 
for their ineffectiveness in handling the financial and environmental crises.547 As such, they 
realized the urgency of reversing the negative perception of ASEAN, and reinventing 
ASEAN to maintain its relevance. This reinvention of ASEAN was manifested in ASEAN 
leaders’ ambitious joint statement on an “ASEAN Vision 2020,” which was issued in 
December 1997. The statement envisioned a region “where all people enjoy equitable access 
to opportunities for total human development”; moreover, it also promoted human security by 
urging ASEAN member states to move toward “being governed with the consent and greater 
participation of the people” and “to focus on the welfare and dignity of the human person and 
the good of the community.”548 The concept of human security is a departure from the state-
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centred security and economic cooperation of old regionalism. It originated from the Human 
Development Report in 1994, which was produced by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP). According to this concept, the individual, rather than the state, is the 
primary referent of security. Human security is broadly defined as “freedom from want” and 
“freedom from fear,” with threats to security expanding beyond external military threats to 
include domestic challenges, such as political instability, social unrest, environmental 
security and food security.549 ASEAN member states have an incentive to promote the UN’s 
concept of human rights and security, not only to show themselves as legitimate members of 
the international community, but also because they are subject to monitoring by the UN 
Human Rights Committee: a body of independent experts, which monitors the 
implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by state parties.
550
  
 ASEAN member states reaffirmed their recognition and commitment to UN 
conventions on human rights in their “Hanoi Plan of Action” in 1998, which follows up from 
the “ASEAN Vision 2020.” These commitments are summarized as follows: 
 Enhancing the exchange of information in the field of human rights in order to promote and 
protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms of all peoples in accordance with the 
United Nations (UN) Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights; 
 Working towards the full implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and other 
international instruments on women and children.551 
 
Political scientists argue that ASEAN member states participate in human rights treaties to 
satisfy their domestic constituencies.552 By demonstrating their commitment to the 
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international rule of law, an ASEAN member state “signals to the citizenry that its 
government is not out of step with international mores (insofar as they are reflected by human 
rights) or that it is in fact “liberalizing” and answering the call to accountability.”553 However, 
ASEAN member states can avoid full implementation of international human rights 
instruments by making reservations, which is defined as a unilateral statement, purporting to 
exclude or modify the legal effect of provision(s) of a treaty in its/their application to the 
reserving state.554 For example, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) are two of the most 
heavily reserved human rights treaties among ASEAN member states.555 Malaysia ratified 
CEDAW with reservations, such as the right, according to Sharia law, whereby some posts in 
the Shariah court cannot be held by women. Singapore’s reservations required the respect for 
cultural peculiarities, such as the right for Muslims to marry up to four wives.556 Thus, there is 
the precedent within ASEAN of recognizing and promoting international human rights 
norms, while making reservations, or selective implementation. This practice of international 
human rights promotion and selective implementation would similarly be applied to 
ASEAN’s regional human rights mechanism; that is, the mechanism primarily recognizes and 
promotes human rights, but its implementation is negotiated, this time with civil society 
organizations, rather than international organizations and Western states. 
 The practice of promoting human rights norms while maintaining the status quo 
continued into the drafting process for an ASEAN Charter. However, it has been argued that 
the finalization of an ASEAN Charter in 2008 ushered in a “norms cascade” with regard to 
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human rights.
557
 This is when support for particular norms gathers slowly until it reaches a 
“tipping” point, after which the adoption of these norms by other states in the region occurs 
more rapidly, producing a “cascade” effect.558 ASEAN member states reaffirmed their 
recognition of the norms of human rights in their Charter. Yet, their records on compliance as 
a whole continue to be poor, and they do not appear to be willing to subject themselves to 
monitoring by an independent and powerful human rights body at the regional level.
559
  
The ASEAN Charter, which came into effect in December 2008, committed ASEAN 
member states to the establishment of an ASEAN Human Rights Body (AHRB), but did not 
specify which human rights convention, or standards, would be used to evaluate compliance 
in Southeast Asia. Moreover, it also did not specify the precise role of the Human Rights 
Body, including its power or functions. This lack of provisions and information on the 
realization of an AHRB led to doubts about its capacity to protect human rights. CSOs 
anticipated that the AHRB would be “more into rhetoric than real action,” while Singapore’s 
Foreign Minister, George Yeo, commented: “I’m not sure if it will have teeth, but it will 
certainly have a tongue. It will certainly have moral influence if nothing else.”560 These 
predictions were fairly accurate when the ASEAN Human Rights Body was finally 
inaugurated as the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in 
October 2009. The AICHR is significant for institutionalizing human rights as part of 
ASEAN regionalism. As the name suggests, it is a new state-centred regional institution, and 
is primarily composed of former, or current, state representatives from ASEAN member 
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states, with the exception of Indonesia and Thailand, whose representatives are from civil 
society and academia, respectively. The AICHR is intended to promote human rights by 
encouraging ASEAN member states to join and to implement international human rights 
instruments, and by raising awareness and providing training on human rights. It provides for 
the promotion, rather than protection, of human rights, and its representatives are not obliged 
to consult CSOs. Thus, victims of human rights violations cannot rely on the AICHR for 
protection, and CSOs may not always be able to meet with AICHR representatives: this 
reinforces the reality and perception of state-centred regionalism, and the lack of progress 
towards a more people-centred regionalism, and collective regional efforts to realize an 
ASEAN Community.  
II. The Role of Regional Actors in Promoting an ASEAN Human Rights 
Mechanism 
ASEAN-ISIS and AIPO 
The regional network of “think tanks,” ASEAN-ISIS, has kept ASEAN member 
states’ aware of the increasing importance of human rights promotion in the post-Cold War 
period. As early as 1992, ASEAN-ISIS submitted a policy paper to ASEAN, entitled “The 
Environment and Human Rights in International Relations.” According to this paper, there 
was an 
increasing tendency by the industrial countries to make economic and political cooperation 
with developing countries contingent…upon human rights criteria based on Western 
perceptions and priorities in civil and political rights without due emphasis given to other 
dimensions of human rights which are of equal and sometimes of ever greater concern to the 
developing ASEAN nations.561 
 
ASEAN-ISIS recommended that ASEAN member states emphasize all aspects of human 
rights and the “situational uniqueness” of human rights in Southeast Asia, which they did at 
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the UN World Conference on Human Rights. ASEAN-ISIS became part of the regional 
discourse on human rights due to their recognition of the growing importance of human rights 
in international relations, and their useful recommendations to ASEAN member states. The 
ASEAN-ISIS Heads of Institutes defined human rights as a regional concern, which required 
discussions and policies at the regional level, especially after the ASEAN Declaration to 
consider a regional human rights mechanism.562 
 This ASEAN Declaration created the possibility for regional pressure to implement 
human rights. According to human rights activists, regional pressure can be very influential, 
since “regional political and economic interdependence generates greater external pressure on 
countries to exhibit a commitment to human rights norms.”563 As such, the ASEAN Inter-
Parliamentary Organization (AIPO) and ASEAN-ISIS promoted the establishment of a 
regional human rights mechanism in the hope that it would be able to generate such regional 
pressure between ASEAN member states and to protect human rights.564 AIPO adopted a 
“Declaration of Human Rights,” which stated that it was the “task and responsibility of 
Member States to establish an appropriate regional mechanism on human rights.”565 ASEAN-
ISIS also exerted pressure on ASEAN member states to abide by their statement on the 
possibility of setting up a regional human rights mechanism. Carolina Hernandez, Director of 
the Institute of Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS), the Philippines’ member of 
ASEAN-ISIS, came up with the idea for an ASEAN-ISIS Colloquium on Human Rights 
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(AICOHR) to promote informal dialogue on human rights between government officials, 
academics, and related experts.566 The first AICOHR was subsequently organized by the 
ISDS in 1993, and received strong support from the Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS), the Indonesian member of ASEAN-ISIS.  
In its first five years, AICOHR failed to attract CSOs working on human rights due to 
their suspicion of ASEAN-ISIS’ relations with ASEAN governments. However, CSO 
participation increased in AICOHR’s sixth and seventh year, in 1999 and 2000, respectively, 
once they realized that the AICOHR could be used as a platform for dialogue to advance their 
own agendas. Regional civil society networks on human rights, such as Forum-Asia, and 
national networks, such as the Philippe Alliance of Human Rights Advocates, became regular 
participants at the AICOHR. The AICOHR did not produce new policies or treaties on human 
rights. However, it did contribute to community building by providing a platform for 
confidence building between states and CSOs. As noted by Herman Kraft from ISDS, the 
AICOHR was important because it put forward 
the idea that human rights can be discussed in a public forum in an open and candid manner 
without having to worry about political repercussions. It became part of the process which 
made human rights and the language of human rights an increasingly acceptable part of the 
political discourse in ASEAN.567 
 
According to the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, AICOHR 
contributed to an increasing number of human rights advocates and supporters within 
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ASEAN governments from 1993 - 2008.568 An additional explanation for this apparent 
increase in human rights supporters is the fact that ASEAN leaders signed the ASEAN 
Charter in November 2007, which expressed their commitment to establish an ASEAN 
Human Rights Body.569 The Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism 
argued that CSOs should use AICOHR as a platform to strengthen their relationship with 
human rights supporters in ASEAN governments, and to increase their chances of changing 
ASEAN leaders’ mind-set on human rights.570 In this regard, a lasting impact of the ASEAN-
ISIS initiated AICOHR has been its ability to bring state actors and CSOs together to discuss 
human rights, and to partly influence state actors’ increasing support for a regional human 
rights mechanism. 
The Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism and National Human Rights 
Institutions 
 
The Law Association for Asia and Pacific (LAWASIA) organized a series of 
meetings in 1995 to discuss the possibility of institutionalizing human rights as part of 
ASEAN regionalism; these meetings produced the Working Group for an ASEAN Human 
Rights Mechanism in 1996, which has been indefatigable in promoting human rights within 
an ASEAN framework.571  The Working Group is a coalition of national working groups from 
ASEAN member states, which comprise representatives from government institutions, 
parliamentary human rights committees, academia and non-governmental organizations 
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(NGOs).572 Its secretariat is based in the Human Rights Centre of the Ateneo de Manila 
University in the Philippines. The Working Group has worked with ASEAN member states 
on human rights and has applied the UN building blocks approach. This includes four main 
activities: promoting human rights action plans, supporting the establishment of national 
human rights institutions, fostering human rights education, and realizing economic, social, 
and cultural rights, as well as the right to development.
573
 The Working Group engaged a 
range of regional stakeholders, including commissioners from the national human rights 
commissions in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, which together formed a 
network of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs), that is, a network of independent, 
professional institutions, in 2007.574 That same year, the NHRIs submitted a joint position 
paper to the High Level task Force for an ASEAN Human Rights Body, which called for the 
ASEAN Charter to include provisions on the role of the NHRIs, and for the establishment of 
a human rights mechanism.
575
 Since then, the NHRIs have participated in meetings between 
ASEAN officials and CSOs, and have promoted their own role in any regional mechanism on 
human rights.  
The Working Group sought the NHRIs’ support for an independent and effective 
ASEAN Human Rights Body (AHRB), and was able to gain their support on two points in 
January 2008. First, that members of the AHRB should be nominated by the National Human 
Rights Institutions and CSOs, and then appointed by the Foreign Ministry of ASEAN 
member states. Second, that the AHRB should have the mandate and the power to monitor 
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human rights issues within the region.576 The Working Group served as a bridge between 
national institutions and regional institutions, to promote harmonization between them. 
Moreover, due to its inclusion of both state and civil society actors, the Working Group also 
serves as a bridge between states and CSOs, and constitutes an important coalition that can 
facilitate a collective, rather than fragmented, community building process. As argued by a 
representative of a donor organization based in Bangkok: 
The most influential organization working for the establishment of an ASEAN human rights 
body is the Working Group, which includes some individuals who are working in both 
government and civil society organizations. Multiple connections with leaders at the higher 
level and civil society groups are necessary in any attempt to find common ground among 
stakeholders in Southeast Asia.577 
 
However, while the Working Group was a major actor in promoting an AHRB, state-CSO 
meetings organized by the Working Group were not always fruitful due to the lack of 
attendance by some ASEAN member states and the reluctance of those who did attend to 
commit to any reforms or new policies.578 
CSOs: SAPA 
 
Civil society’s advocacy on human rights has been led by the regional network of 
CSOs, Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy (SAPA), which was introduced in chapter 
five. SAPA formed working groups and task forces for engagement with ASEAN, such as the 
SAPA Task Force on ASEAN and Human Rights in 2006. This Task Force comprises 
national and regional organizations, such as the Asian Forum for Human Rights and 
Development (Forum Asia), and has established “focal points” (people who coordinate the 
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Task Force’s work) in each ASEAN member state (excepting Brunei Darussalam, Laos, and 
Myanmar, whose focal points are in Thailand). Moreover, the Task Force also engages in 
capacity building by establishing thematic “focal points” in such areas as children and 
migrant workers. 
SAPA challenged the official ASEAN position on human rights, thereby highlighting 
a fragmented community building process, by issuing the following demands to ASEAN 
leaders during the drafting process for an ASEAN Charter. SAPA demanded an effective 
ASEAN human rights mechanism, which would be able to promote, as well as protect human 
rights. In addition, SAPA also demanded the explicit recognition of the rights of vulnerable 
social groups, such as migrant workers, women and children, while stressing that the state is 
not the only referent of security, but also the people.579 When it came to drafting the terms of 
reference, or the guiding principles, for the ASEAN Human Rights Body (AHRB), SAPA 
demanded an “inclusive process…ensuring the widest representation of organisations in the 
drafting, adoption, and implementation.”580 SAPA demanded a mechanism to protect “Human 
Rights Defenders” from oppressive regimes. A “human rights defender” is defined as 
“anyone who, individually or in association with others, promotes and strives for the 
protection and fulfilment of human rights and basic freedoms, whether at the national or 
international level, regardless of her or his role in society.”581 SAPA’s advocacy on human 
rights included calls for the right of rural communities to access and to manage natural 
resources, so that they may secure their livelihoods, as well as commitments by transnational 
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corporations to abide by international human rights standards. SAPA sought to “empower,” 
or to strengthen the capacity of rural communities, so that they may contribute to sustainable 
development in the region.582 In this endeavour, SAPA lobbied senior officials from related 
ministries in Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, as well as those from related 
divisions in the ASEAN Secretariat in 2009; for example, the Ministry of Social Labour and 
Welfare in Laos, the Ministry of Human Resources in Malaysia, and the Socio-Cultural 
Community (ASCC) Department of the ASEAN Secretariat.583  
III. Case Study: The Process of Realizing an ASEAN Human Rights Body and Its 
Current Achievements 
 
The realization of an ASEAN Human Rights Body (AHRB), as stipulated in the 
ASEAN Charter, is significant for two main reasons: first, it demonstrates the 
institutionalization of a new, and people-centred issue, as opposed to old, state-security-
economic-centred issues, as part of ASEAN regionalism; second, it contributes towards a 
regional identity by promoting common standards and common conduct in state-society and 
inter-state relations. The ASEAN member states which have national human rights 
commissions – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand – were more willing to 
support human rights at the regional level. As such, they led the Working Group for an 
ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism. Brunei and Singapore adopted a neutral stance, while 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam were unenthusiastic.584  
The Working Group and CSOs were successful in getting ASEAN member states to 
go through the process of establishing an ASEAN Human Rights Body (AHRB); however, 
they have thus far failed in their endeavours to create a new regional institution, which would 
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be more characteristic of participatory regionalism. ASEAN Foreign Ministers established a 
High Level Panel (HLP) to draft the Terms of Reference (TOR), or the guiding principles, for 
the AHRB in February 2008. Members of the HLP were mainly from the Foreign Ministry of 
ASEAN member states and thus fully aware of the difficulties in providing for a proactive, 
people-centred regional mechanism due to ASEAN’s political diversity and states’ preference 
to have control over regional institutions.585 Nevertheless, the HLP did meet with CSOs in 
September 2008 and March 2009. CSO participants at these meetings included those from the 
Working Group, the national human rights commissions, the Solidarity for Asian People’s 
Advocacy (SAPA), and the Women’s Caucus for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism. 
They expressed their preference for the AHRB to be institutionalized as a commission, which 
would be bound by the same obligations as the national human rights commissions, as 
described below. 
National Human Rights Commissions are guided by the UN’s principles on national 
institutions, or the “Paris Principles,” which include having a comprehensive mandate to deal 
with human rights violations, and membership that is independent from government and that 
is drawn from a wide spectrum of civil society.
586
 Within ASEAN, there are four such 
commissions: the commission of Indonesia (known by its acronym, Komnas HAM), 
Malaysia (SUHAKAM), the Philippines (CHRP), and Thailand (Khamakarn Sit). These 
commissions show how it is already difficult enough to implement the Paris Principles at the 
national level, let alone for ASEAN member states to implement them at the regional level 
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through an ASEAN Human Rights Body.
587
 For example, Malaysia’s commission does not 
explicitly promote the role of civil society in human rights, unlike the other three 
commissions. In Indonesia, the secretary-general of the national human rights commission 
must be a civil servant, which compromises the commission’s independence from the 
government. The independence of Thailand’s commission is compromised by the fact that its 
secretariat is part of the state bureaucracy, and that its officials can thus be subject to political 
interference. Thus, the institutionalization of an ASEAN Human Rights Body as a 
“commission” does not necessarily mean that it will provide a role for CSOs or that it will be 
free of state actors.  
In their meetings with CSOs, the High Level Panel (HLP) for an ASEAN Human 
Rights Body reiterated that the ASEAN principle of non-interference was non-negotiable and 
that it was also stipulated in the UN Charter. Moreover, some members of the HLP stressed 
that the terms of reference (TOR) is a political compromise between ASEAN member states 
and that it cannot be expected to address and/or resolve all the human rights issues within the 
region. ASEAN member states were divided between those which have national human rights 
commissions – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand – and those which do not – 
Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.588 When it came to drafting the TOR, Indonesia and 
Thailand supported the inclusion of fact-finding, annual reports, and regional rights 
monitoring, which would facilitate progress from promotion to protection of human rights.589 
In addition, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand also supported a participatory and 
                                                          
587
 The following points in this paragraph are derived from Maznah Mohamad, “Towards a Human Rights 
Regime in Southeast Asia: Charting the Course of State Commitment,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, No. 2 
(Aug., 2002): 240-241. 
588
 Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, “ASEAN Rights Panel Aims to Finish Work 
Next Year,” 2008, http://www.aseanhrmech.org/news/singapore-hosts-the-7th-workshop.html [accessed on 
10/02/11]. 
589
 Chongkittavorn, “ASEAN human rights remain a pipe dream”; Simon Tay, “ASEAN Human Rights Body: 
Talks Begin, Differences Emerge,” Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 23 July 2008, 
http://www.siiaonline.org/?q=programmes/insights/asean-human-rights-body-talks-begin-differences-emerge 
[accessed on 28/07/11]. 
234 
 
consultative process for the AHRB, which includes CSOs as stakeholders.590 However, all of 
these progressive clauses were unsurprisingly rejected in the final TOR, which catered more 
for the “promotion” rather than the “protection” of human rights. Activities to promote 
human rights include raising human rights awareness, promoting capacity building, 
encouraging member states “to consider acceding to and ratifying international human rights 
instruments,” and promoting the implementation of “ASEAN instruments related to human 
rights.”591 With regard to the “protection” of human rights, the TOR does not elaborate on 
what activities this would involve. The TOR limits the AHRB to a consultative function, and 
does not give it a mandate to monitor and to investigate human rights issues, as proposed by 
CSOs. Moreover, the TOR does not mention CSOs, nor oblige ASEAN member states to 
consult them.
592
 The TOR reflects ASEAN member states’ prioritization of regional unity, 
whereby the “primary responsibility to promote and protect human rights,” rests “with each 
Member State” and whereby the “pursuance of a constructive…non-
confrontational…evolutionary approach” is emphasized.593 As such, ASEAN’s progress on 
human rights is restricted to the lowest common denominator, especially in terms of the 
AHRB’s provision for decision-making through consensus. Amnesty International correctly 
pointed out that this provision “means that each state would be able to reject any criticism of 
its own human rights record by veto,” and that “this could lead either to paralysis or to the 
adoption of weak positions based on the lowest common denominator.”594 Given these 
characteristics, CSOs viewed the TOR of the AHRB as a means for ASEAN member states to 
appease the international community on human rights while avoiding reform.  
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On the other hand, ASEAN member states defended the TOR as a document that 
abided by the ASEAN norm of working at “a pace comfortable to the slowest member.”595 As 
explained by Usana Berananda from the Thai Foreign Ministry, the TOR provides ASEAN 
member states with a “comfort level” from which they may come to realize the need for a 
stronger ASEAN human rights body.596 Termsak Chalermpalanupap, the ASEAN Secretariat 
official who served as an adviser to the High Level Panel (HLP), defended the AHRB’s 
principles and functions as maintaining regional unity and providing a space for mutual 
learning within a politically diverse region: 
Like all other ASEAN organs or bodies, the AHRB shall operate through consultation and 
consensus, with firm respect for the sovereign equality of all Member States. Good points can 
be made and constructive actions can be agreed upon in friendly discussion and persuasion. 
No “biting” is ever required, ASEAN would not have come this far if its Member States want 
to bite one another with sharp teeth just to get things done their own way… 
Owing to the unique political diversity in ASEAN’s membership, cooperation on human 
rights has to begin somewhere, at a point where every Member State is comfortable and 
agreeable…the most important added value of the AHRB is in providing a new venue and a 
new learning process for the diverse ASEAN Member States to cooperate on human rights at 
the regional level. In doing so, the AHRB is expected to develop functions, including various 
aspects of human rights protection.597 
 
Thus, for ASEAN member states, the AHRB indicated progress in community building by 
providing a starting point for regional learning and cooperation on human rights. 
However, the ASEAN Human Rights Body (AHRB) became finalized and 
inaugurated as the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR): the 
name change itself already highlights the state-centred nature of this new ASEAN institution, 
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which was later composed of a majority of state actors, and was ultimately run by ASEAN 
member states. Only two ASEAN member states – Indonesia and Thailand – used an open 
and transparent process to appoint their representatives to the AICHR. In both countries, the 
position was advertised and the public was able to nominate candidates to their government’s 
select committee. As a result, independent human rights experts were appointed as the 
Indonesian and Thai representatives to the AICHR: Rafendi Djamin and Sriprapha 
Petcharamesreewere, respectively. The former is the Coordinator of the National Human 
Rights Working Group in Indonesia, and also the convener of the SAPA Task Force on 
ASEAN and Human Rights (SAPA TF – AHR).598 The latter is a professor and a former 
Director of the Office of Human Rights Studies and Social Development at Mahidol 
University, Thailand, and has spent 30 years of her career in academia and human rights 
advocacy. With regard to other ASEAN member states, the appointment process was closed, 
and their representatives to the AICHR had a career in diplomacy or other branches of the 
civil service. Many of them had not resigned from their government posts and had no prior 
experience in the area of human rights. As such, the SAPA Task Force pointed out that these 
representatives’ direct or indirect affiliation to their government, together with their lack of 
experience of human rights, seriously undermined the independence and effectiveness of the 
AICHR.599 
Nevertheless, after the AICHR was established, CSOs continued their advocacy for 
ASEAN’s protection of human rights and directed their efforts towards the draft for AICHR’s 
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rules of procedure. Khin Omar, a representative of the SAPA Task Force on ASEAN and 
Burma, stated that AICHR’s rules of procedure should include means to protect individuals 
or groups, who provide information, cooperate with AICHR, attend public hearings and give 
testimony.600 However, when the AICHR was under Vietnam’s Chairmanship in 2010, CSOs 
were not even allowed to discuss the rules of procedure with ASEAN governments. As a 
result, an important opportunity was missed to receive CSOs’ proposals, which would have 
significantly strengthened AICHR’s credibility and relevance to Southeast Asian peoples as a 
mechanism to address human rights issues. CSOs’ proposals included the development of a 
petition mechanism, which would receive and respond to cases of human rights violations, 
conduct on site observation, as well as a public hearing or inquiry. Moreover, CSOs also 
proposed the establishment of sub-commissions, working groups and committees for specific 
tasks, and, if necessary, the appointment of independent human rights rapporteurs.601 The 
AICHR’s refusal to meet with CSOs from the SAPA Task Force on ASEAN and Human 
Rights in March 2010 highlighted the unwillingness of some ASEAN member states to meet 
CSOs and to abide by one of the objectives of the ASEAN Charter, which is “to promote a 
people-oriented ASEAN in which all sectors of society are encouraged to participate in, and 
benefit from, the process of ASEAN integration and community building.”602 The then 
Vietnamese Chair justified AICHR’s refusal to meet with CSOs by stating that there was still 
no clear mechanism on how AICHR should engage with external parties. He added that 
AICHR will meet with CSOs once the mechanism for engagement has been clarified. 
However, this assurance was not enough compensation for the damage done to AICHR’s 
credibility. As stated by Yap Swee Seng, the co-convenor of the SAPA Task Force, and 
Executive Director of Forum-Asia: 
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As a human rights institution, the refusal to meet with civil society is in itself a contradiction 
of the spirit and principles of human rights. How can we expect this institution to promote and 
protect human rights in future? The High Level Panel that drafted the Terms of Reference 
(TOR) of the AICHR met with civil society and national human rights institutions three times 
before they finalized the TOR, I don’t see why the AICHR cannot meet and consult with civil 
society before they finalize the (rules of procedure). This is definitely a regression in terms of 
civil society participation.603 
 
The AICHR’s credibility was not only undermined by its refusal to meet with CSOs, but also 
by the Vietnamese Chair’s response to CSOs’ earlier submission of human rights violations 
to the AICHR. At the time, the Vietnamese Chair explained that there was similarly no clear 
mechanism on how AICHR should handle cases on human rights, and reiterated the ASEAN 
principle of non-interference.604 This incident confirmed two things. First, that some ASEAN 
member states remain unwilling to address, and to resolve human rights issues. Second, that 
there can only be progress in the promotion and protection of human rights if AICHR is 
independent from ASEAN member states. The main problem here is incompatible views 
between CSOs and ASEAN member states: CSOs envision AICHR as a means to correct 
domestic shortcomings, while ASEAN member states see AICHR as a means to consolidate 
their defence against external interference in these shortcomings. As stated by Max M. de 
Mesa (Chairperson of the Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates – PAHRA): “ the 
human rights body could be the collective effort to redress deficiencies of domestic efforts to 
promote and protect human rights, as well as to progressively realize their enjoyment in the 
ASEAN Community.”605 
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However, in their evaluation of AICHR’s achievements after one year, the SAPA 
Task Force on ASEAN and Human Rights criticized AICHR for being yet another state-
centred regional institution, with no sign of becoming more people-centred.606 For this reason, 
the SAPA Task Force questioned whether AICHR was “little more than a legitimacy-seeking 
‘window-dressing’ exercise, not to be followed by any concrete implementation.”607 This 
question was particularly valid given AICHR’s weak foundation in increasing ASEAN 
member states’ protection of human rights, and two other factors which restrict participatory 
regionalism in human rights issues. First, difficulty in accessing information on the AICHR’s 
activities; and second, the lack of results-oriented consultation with CSOs, as well as 
provision for the participation of CSOs and other stakeholders (such as the four national 
human rights institutions within ASEAN) in AICHR’s activities.  
Given these weaknesses, a group of human rights activists in Southeast Asia, who are 
mostly affiliated with the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, came 
up with the idea to establish a Human Rights Resource Center for ASEAN (HRRCA) in 
2010. These human rights activists include Marzuki Darusman (Indonesian human rights 
campaigner), Dato Param Cumaraswamy (Malaysian lawyer), Kavi Chongkittavorn (Thai 
journalist), and Ambassador Ong Keng Yong (Singaporean ASEAN Secretary-General 2003-
2007). The Human Rights Resource Center for ASEAN is a non-profit foundation under 
Indonesian law, and is based at the University of Indonesia, in Jakarta. It is independently 
funded by various donors, such as the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and the Canadian Development Agency.
608
 The Centre serves as a central hub, 
which is linked to a network of universities that provide research and training on human 
rights in Southeast Asia. Current partner institutions include the University of Indonesia, 
                                                          
606
 SAPA Task Force on ASEAN and Human Rights, “Hiding behind Its Limits.” 
607
 Ibid. 
608
 Human Rights Resource Centre for ASEAN, “HRRCA Institutional Profile,” 
http://www.hrcca.org/system/files/HRRCA%20profile.pdf [accessed on 29/07/11]. 
240 
 
Ateneo University School of Law (Philippines), the University of Malaya (Malaysia), the 
National University of Singapore, Singapore Management University and Pannasastra 
University of Cambodia.
609
 The Centre draws upon academic and civil society expertise on 
human rights to provide training and reports on a range of human rights issues in the region. 
It promotes the idea of human rights as part of ASEAN regionalism, and the idea of ASEAN 
as a regional community, thereby reinforcing the efforts of the Working Group. The 
establishment of the Centre adds to the list of new ASEAN entities, such as the Working 
Group and AICHR, which were created to promote human rights within ASEAN. Thus, 
ASEAN community building has at least progressed in terms of raising regional awareness 
on social issues, such as human rights, and in terms of expanding ASEAN institutions beyond 
the traditional areas of security and economic cooperation. 
However, some ASEAN member states still refuse to meet with CSOs or to make the 
AICHR more effective, and more recognizable, as a relevant regional mechanism. The SAPA 
Task Force did note that a few of AICHR’s members, such as the Philippines and Thailand, 
held consultations with CSOs at the national level, and that AICHR met the Working Group 
in September 2010 and July 2011 to discuss the implementation of AICHR’s goals.610 In 
between these two meetings, ASEAN member states demonstrated their support for the 
promotion of human rights by co-organizing the following activities with the Working 
Group: 
 Workshop on Developing National Human Rights Action Plans in ASEAN (12-13 November 
2010, Manila) 
 Informational Programme for the Principal Assistants of the ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights (20-27 November 2010, Strasbourg and Berlin) 
 Workshop on Corporate Social Responsibility within an ASEAN Human Rights Framework 
(30 November-1 December 2010, Singapore) 
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 Discussion on the Human Rights Implications of the ASEAN Community Blueprints (22-23 
February 2011, Luang Prabang)611 
 
 
The problem is ASEAN member states realize that they can promote human rights without 
implementing political reforms by agreeing to raise awareness, and to facilitate research and 
training on the promotion and protection of human rights. They have established a regional 
institution on the people-centred issue of human rights, but have not committed this 
institution to consultation with CSOs or human rights protection. Two years after the 
establishment of AICHR in 2011, CSOs still criticize AICHR for being “a shield for ASEAN 
to deflect world scrutiny from its troubling human rights record,” and for having national 
representatives who “don’t want to meet with civil society organizations – except those they 
think like them.”612 Thus, ASEAN member states seem to be neither open to the international 
community nor to each other on human rights, which highlights the underlying different 
standards and practices. ASEAN member states are still at the state-centred end of the 
spectrum on regionalism and human rights, that is, they recognize and promote human rights 
norms, while maintaining the exclusively state-centred nature of agenda-setting and policy 
implementation. Until they reach the international standards on human rights, and harmonize 
their human rights standards and practices, they will continue to be separate from both the 
international community, and from each other, on human rights issues.  
IV. Conclusion 
 
 According to the new regionalism approach, progress towards the realization of a 
regional community is indicated by the widening of regional processes to non-state actors, 
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namely, civil society organizations (CSOs), and states’ cooperation in an increasing number 
of areas beyond the traditional state-centred security and economic interests. This chapter 
tested ASEAN’s progress in community building based on ASEAN’s adoption of human 
rights and provisions for CSO participation in this area. The emergence of a human rights 
discourse and human rights policies in ASEAN was stimulated by both external and internal 
factors. In terms of external factors, there was pressure from the West’s emphasis on 
democratization and human rights in their foreign policy, as well as the UN World 
Conference on Human Rights in 1993, and the resultant consensus on the need for regional 
human rights mechanisms. With regard to internal factors, ASEAN member states realized 
the need to reinvent ASEAN for its survival in the post-Cold War period, and democratizing 
ASEAN member states became more willing to talk and work with CSOs on human rights. 
Moreover, academia, CSOs and independent, professional institutions, such as ASEAN-ISIS, 
the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, SAPA, and National Human 
Rights Institutions, also promoted human rights within an ASEAN framework, and were able 
to engage in dialogue, and to discuss proposals with some ASEAN officials. Not all ASEAN 
member states attended meetings with the Working Group, and those that did attend were 
unwilling to commit to any proposals due to their challenge to the traditional state-centred 
ASEAN Way of non-interference and decision-making through consensus. 
 ASEAN member states established an ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on 
Human Rights (AICHR), and ensured that they would have control over it by creating a High 
Level Panel (HLP) to draft its Terms of Reference (TOR). As such, the promotion and 
protection of human rights in ASEAN has progressed asymmetrically, with ASEAN member 
states being able to agree and to make provisions for the former, rather than the latter. 
Progress in human rights is overall marked by a political struggle and compromise between 
democratizing and authoritarian ASEAN member states, and between states and civil society. 
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The AICHR maintains ASEAN member states’ defensive mechanisms against external 
interference and their exclusive role in agenda-setting. Moreover, the AICHR does not make 
provisions for progress towards people-centred regionalism, since it does not provide for the 
investigation of individual, or collective, complaints, nor does it provide for civil society’s 
participation. In this regard, the AICHR has contributed to community building in terms of 
institutionalizing ASEAN member states’ recognition and promotion of human rights norms, 
and thereby facilitating the emergence of a regional position and identity on human rights. 
However, ASEAN member states still disagree on the extent to which there should be 
regional cooperation on human rights, and the extent to which they should cooperate with 
CSOs in this area. Thus, community building remains a fragmented, state-centred process, 
rather than a collective process with increased participatory regionalism.  
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Chapter Seven: Transnational Civil Society Networks (TCSN) and Community 
Building 
 
 This chapter evaluates ASEAN’s progress in regional community building, based on 
the development and impact of transnational civil society networks (TCSN) in creating multi-
level linkages in ASEAN discourse and policy, that is, the linking of the domestic and the 
regional into an integrated framework. TCSN are composed of civil society organizations 
(CSOs), which present themselves as protectors of the interests of local communities, by 
ensuring that state policies at all levels – be they national, regional, or international – cater to 
these interests. TCSN create multi-level linkages on many scales, ranging from developments 
and policies at the global level, to those at the local level. They are part of a broad 
transnational activism, which has been described by some scholars as a process of 
“globalization from below,” and by others as “globalization from the middle.”613 More 
specifically, transnational activism is defined as “social movements and other civil society 
organisations and individuals operating across state borders,” who engage in political 
activities to raise awareness of local communities’ interests, and to secure these interests in 
state policies.614 International relations theorist, Michael Edwards, identifies two main reasons 
for the legitimacy of civil society’s political role at the national level and beyond. These are: 
1) representation, which gives them a right to participate in policy-making, and 2) 
effectiveness in identifying issues of concern and initiating collective action, which gives 
them a right to be heard.615 A fellow IR theorist, Mary Kaldor, comments on the political 
implications of transnational activism, as constituting a “demand for a radical extension of 
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democracy across national and social boundaries,” which would facilitate increased 
participatory regionalism.616 Transnational activism has traditionally been associated with 
calls for social justice and balanced economic development in response to trade liberalisation, 
as embodied in the World Trade Organization (WTO) agenda.617 It later became associated 
with other international trends, such as democratization, and increasing interactions between 
state and non-state actors.618 
 This chapter will focus on the emergence and impact of transnational civil society 
networks (TCSN) which work on rural development and food security, since these areas have 
been identified as new security issues in Southeast Asia, and are also people-centred issues, 
as opposed to state-centred. By focusing on TCSN, one can determine their regional 
coverage, and their potential for promoting regional solidarity through CSOs’ dialogue on 
common developmental concerns, and collective efforts to negotiate states’ response to these 
concerns. The identification of TCSN’s agenda sheds light on the prospects and challenges of 
shifting ASEAN’s state-centred regionalism towards a more people-centred one, based on 
similarities and differences between the aspirations of states and TCSN. With regard to the 
focus on rural development and food security, these areas constitute non-traditional security 
issues, and are included within the broad human security framework in the field of 
international relations. The concept of human security originated from the Human 
Development Report in 1994, which was produced by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP). According to this concept, the individual, rather than the state, is the 
primary referent of security. Human security is broadly defined as “freedom from want” and 
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“freedom from fear,” with threats to security expanding beyond external military threats to 
include domestic challenges, such as political instability, social unrest, environmental 
security and food security.619 In terms of intergovernmental discourse, food security was 
defined at the World Food Summit in 1996 as a situation “when all people, at all times, have 
physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary 
need and food preferences for an active and healthy life.”620 In this regard, TCSN extend the 
definition of food security to include participatory regionalism, and seek to push for an 
integrated system of social participation across the national and regional levels. In practice, 
this means that civil society organizations, which are members of a TCSN, will seek to build 
on the momentum of increased political activism at the domestic level by 1) strengthening 
their capacity-building efforts; 2) consolidating horizontal networks across the region for 
advocacy and political leverage vis-à-vis states; 3) lobbying for states’ recognition and a 
process of vertical exchanges on policy-feedback and policy alternatives. 
 In Southeast Asia, the emergence of TCSN was primarily a reaction against repressive 
political systems, and the socio-economic challenges posed by globalisation.621 TCSN in 
Southeast Asia emerged, and have been expanding from the 1990s onwards at a time when 
the region was becoming increasingly linked to the global economy and various social groups 
– such as students, labour and farmers – were organizing themselves as part of a collective 
reaction against trade liberalisation.622 These social groups and TCSN started to link the local 
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problems of communities in developing countries to policies made at the global level, 
through international meetings of heads of state. TCSN noted the difficulties in trying to 
influence policies made by the major powers at the global level, and have instead focused on 
capacity-building to lobby Southeast Asian governments and ASEAN, and to help local 
communities to become more self-sufficient. TCSN became strengthened by the process of 
democratization in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Moreover, they were also strengthened 
by the rising levels of education in these countries, which contributed to greater autonomous 
civic action at both the national and regional level.623 For this reason, IR theorists have 
described these countries as “nodes of transnational activism, which provide not only the 
practical infrastructure required by transnational (CSO) networks, but also a political climate 
that is not too hostile toward civil society activism.”624 Thus, democratization facilitates 
networking and cooperation among civil society organizations, which in turn facilitates, at the 
very least, discourse on national-regional linkages, if not policies to strengthen this linkage 
and to promote an integrated process of community building. 
 TCSN are significant, since they seek to promote normative change to protect human 
security. More specifically, they demonstrate that normative issues are not restricted to states’ 
foreign policies; rather, globalizing trends have now led to the promotion of normative issues 
“from below,” especially on human security issues, which include rural development and 
food security.625 TCSN reflect civil society’s disillusion with the state-led path to 
development and modernization. They emphasize human security as an area for the 
institutionalization of decentralized policy-making and policy implementation.626 Civil 
society organizations, which participate in a TCSN, seek to compensate for their 
                                                          
623
 Daphné Josselin and William Wallace, “Non-state Actors in World Politics: A Framework,” in Daphné 
Josselin and William Wallace, eds., Non-state Actors in World Politics (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 
624
 Piper and Uhlin, “New perspectives on transnational activism,” 14. 
625
 Ariel Colonomos, “Non-State Actors as Moral Entrepreneurs: A Transnational Perspective on Ethics 
Networks,” in Daphné Josselin and William Wallace, eds., Non-state Actors in World Politics (New York: 
Palgrave, 2001), 72. 
626
 Ibid. 
248 
 
marginalization at the national level, by pushing for policies at the regional level that would 
feedback into national policies. However, their success at both the national and regional level 
ultimately depends on their ability to alter governments’ mind-set, and governments’ 
discourse, in order to produce increasing convergence between this mind-set and discourse on 
the one hand, and their proposed policy alternatives on the other. Increasing convergence 
would be indicated by multi-level linkages in state policies, for example, an agreed regional 
standard on food security, and provisions for regional monitoring on each country’s progress 
towards realizing this standard. Such multi-level linkages would facilitate community 
building by producing an integrated, regional approach to human security. 
This chapter is divided into five sections. Section I provides an outline on the 
emergence of ASEAN policies on rural development and food security. The section analyses 
the different causes behind these policies and the extent to which these policies provide a 
basis for multi-level linkages. Section II explains the prospects and challenges for TCSN to 
advance community building based on the existent literature. Section III introduces, and 
explains the selection of TCSN on rural development and food security, and analyses how 
they have thus far contributed to ASEAN community building. Section IV provides 
explanations for TCSN’s lack of impact on ASEAN policies. Finally, section V concludes on 
the factors that have been most prevalent in the emergence of ASEAN’s policies on rural 
development and food security, and what changes need to take place in order for TCSN to 
have a greater impact and for more people-centred regionalism, and multi-level linkages, to 
develop. 
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I. ASEAN Policies on Rural Development and Food Security: Providing the Basis for Multi-
Level Linkage? 
 
 The majority of the founding member states of ASEAN – Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand – have strong socio-economic incentives to support rural 
development and food security. These countries depend on the agricultural sector as a major 
source of gross domestic product (GDP), and also have a high population density in the rural 
areas.627 Most of the rural population in these countries depend on agriculture for their 
livelihood.628 As such, ASEAN member states prioritized agricultural cooperation since as 
early as 1968, as part of the broader aim to accelerate national and regional economic 
development.629 Before then, rural development was assigned a low priority in the 
development strategies of most Asian countries, especially in the 1950s and early 1960s, due 
to the West’s legacy of equating economic development with an industrial revolution. This 
resulted in the imbalanced economic development between the industrial, urban areas, and 
the agricultural, rural areas: a trend which continued into the period from 1970-1994.630 At the 
same time, rural population growth and low agricultural productivity led to the socio-
economic problems of underemployment, unemployment, and poverty. ASEAN cooperation 
to remedy this situation mainly focused on strengthening the capability for agricultural 
development through an exchange of knowledge and experiences, rather than giving a 
                                                          
627
 Rina Oktaviani and Eka Puspitiawati Haryadi, “Impacts of ASEAN Agricultural Trade Liberalization on 
ASEAN-6 Economies and Income Distribution in Indonesia,” Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on 
Trade Working Paper Series, No. 51 (January 2008): 5-36; ASEAN Secretariat, “Country Statistics Profile,” 
http://www.aseansec.org/22122.htm [accessed on 17/08/11]. 
628
 John Wong, ASEAN Economics in Perspective: A Comparative Study of Indonesia, Malaysia, The 
Philippines, Singapore & Thailand (London: Macmillan, 1980), 93; Mya Than, “Food Security in ASEAN,” in 
Mya Than, ed., ASEAN Beyond the Regional Crisis: Challenges and Initiatives (Singapore: ISEAS, 2001), 149; 
Azmi Mat Akhir (Special Assistant to the ASEAN Secretary-General on Institutional Affairs and Special 
Duties), “ASEAN and Agriculture,” Paper presented at the “Regional Conference on Civil Society Engagement 
in the ASEAN,” 3 – 5 October 2005, Bangkok, Thailand, 74-75, 88; Peter Timmer, “Fostering Food Security 
through Regional Cooperation and Integration: The Changing Role of Rice in Asia,” 30 June 2010, 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/34090503/P-Timmer-Fostering-Food-Security-Through-Regional-Cooperation-and-
Integration [accessed on 22/08/11]. 
629
 Akhir, “ASEAN and Agriculture,” 81. 
630
 Than, “Food Security in ASEAN,” 153. 
250 
 
political voice to rural communities, and extending the democratization process beyond the 
national capitals and urban cities.631 Moreover, ASEAN cooperation on rural development 
was limited to interactions between civil servants across the region, rather than inclusive of 
the main actors in agricultural activities, that is, small-holders who live in rural areas.632 
 Given that the agricultural sector is important for economic livelihoods in the majority 
of ASEAN member states, they initiated a regional discourse on the possibility of creating a 
regional approach to rural development and food security, which would provide the basis for 
multi-level linkage in this area. In 1980, the ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Committee on 
Food, Agriculture and Forestry approved the establishment of an ASEAN Agricultural 
Development Planning Centre, which subsequently received funding from the U.S.633 
Although the Center focused mainly on the training of civil servants in agricultural 
development planning at the national level, it did introduce an intergovernmental discourse, 
and objectives to realize a regional approach to rural development and food security. The 
“Declaration of Objectives Regarding The ASEAN Agricultural Development Planning 
Centre” includes aims 
 To submit proposals for the harmonisation of ASEAN agricultural development planning 
methodologies. 
 To serve as a regional data bank for requisite agricultural development planning information. 
 To undertake studies and make recommendations on ASEAN agricultural policies on the 
basis of which ASEAN common agricultural policy (ACAP) in selected areas may be 
formulated.634 
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An evaluation of the ASEAN Agricultural Development Planning Centre by civil servants in 
1985 revealed that the Centre’s training programmes had been successful and that there was 
an added benefit of the exchange of experiences and “camaraderie” between participants 
from the original ASEAN member states: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand.635 However, while the Centre provided a platform for ASEAN civil servants to 
be socialized into an ASEAN mind-set, civil servants who evaluated the Centre’s 
achievements found that the planning “suffered from the lack of a centralising rationale,” and 
that the Centre lacked visibility in ASEAN, and, thus, significance in ASEAN regionalism.636 
Moreover, the evaluation concluded that the Centre ultimately had “limited” policy impact.637 
Nevertheless, the establishment and activities of the Centre demonstrate that ASEAN 
member states have provided for an integrated regional approach to rural development and 
food security since the 1960-1980s, and that this was not a new idea that was presented to 
them by TCSN from the 1980s onwards; rather, TCSN built on existing intergovernmental 
discourse on an integrated, regional developmental approach, and expanded this discourse to 
include democratization and participatory regionalism. 
 The post-Cold War period saw efforts by ASEAN member states to maintain ASEAN 
relevance, especially after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, and to demonstrate that 
ASEAN is a responsible member of the international community: these efforts included 
further cooperation in the broad area of human security, as well as openings for the 
participation of non-state actors in research and policy implementation. In August 2008, the 
ASEAN Ministers of Agriculture and Forestry discussed the concept of an ASEAN 
Integrated Food Security (AIFS) Framework, which consists of information sharing to 
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produce a long-term agricultural development plan.638 More importantly, the Framework 
includes cooperation between ASEAN civil servants and non-state actors, such as scholars 
and farmers, in terms of how to improve agricultural productivity, and how to manage access 
to natural resources, respectively. In this regard, the Framework reflected the trend in 
ASEAN regionalism to provide openings for non-state actors’ participation, and to enable 
them to become regional stakeholders. Moreover, the timing of the Framework in 2008 is 
significant, since ASEAN member states were just finalizing the ASEAN Charter, which 
includes the aim to realize a “people-oriented” ASEAN Community. The realization of such a 
community includes provisions for human security in general, and food security in particular. 
For this reason, the ASEAN Ministers on Agriculture and Forestry saw the need to strengthen 
the ASEAN Integrated Food Security (AIFS) Framework, by establishing an ad-hoc task 
force to produce a Strategic Plan of Action on Food Security for the ASEAN Region (SPA-
FS). This Strategic Plan of Action is of a functional nature, and mainly focuses on national 
capacity-building, as building blocks for regional food security. The Plan consists of five 
main objectives: 1) to strengthen food security at the national level; 2) to promote the food 
market and trade; 3) to strengthen integrated food security information systems to effectively 
forecast, plan and monitor supplies and utilization for basic food commodities; 4) to promote 
sustainable food production; and, 5) to encourage greater investment in food and agro-based 
industry.639 Although it is too early to assess the significance of the ASEAN Integrated Food 
Security (AIFS) Framework and the Strategic Plan, and although a review by ASEAN 
officials is not planned till the end of the first five year cycle in 2013, one can argue that the 
Framework and Strategic Plan are significant for at least two reasons. First, it maintains an 
ASEAN discourse, and promotes ASEAN cooperation, on a human security issue, that is, 
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rural development and food security. Second, it facilitates the shift towards people-centred 
regionalism by including cooperation with non-state actors, such as scholars and farmers. 
This indicates a widening of ASEAN regionalism beyond state actors, which should, 
theoretically, facilitate TCSN’s efforts to promote multi-level linkage and to influence 
ASEAN policies. 
 This section will firstly analyse the external and internal motivating factors behind 
ASEAN policies on rural development and food security, which constitute alternative 
explanations for their development, other than the role of TCSN. The section will then 
analyse how these ASEAN policies have the potential to facilitate the shift towards more 
people-centred regionalism, or what is already out there for TCSN to work on.  
External Motivating Factors 
 
 In the early years after ASEAN’s formation, from 1967 to the 1970s, the main 
external motivating factor for promoting development in general, and rural development and 
food security in particular, was the threat of people joining a communist insurgency and 
overthrowing the political regime. Most ASEAN member states were already preoccupied 
with consolidating their nation state after independence from the colonial powers, and 
realized the additional urgency of providing for people’s welfare to prevent them from 
turning to communism. Moreover, ASEAN member states were motivated to accelerate 
economic development and to become self-sufficient after facing economic threats from the 
US’ unilateral trade policies, for example, the US embargo on soybeans.640 With regard to 
regional cooperation on food supplies, it is the ASEAN Ministers of Agriculture and Forestry 
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(AMAF), which oversee the strengthening of food security in the region.641 The work of these 
ministers is facilitated by the ASEAN Committee on Food, Agriculture and Forestry 
(COFAF) and its Working Group, which initiated a system of regionally coordinated national 
reserves for rice, and a system for information exchange on these reserves, in 1978. These 
systems constitute the foundation for regional cooperation on food security within the 
ASEAN framework. They were strengthened by the establishment of an intergovernmental 
ASEAN Food Security Reserve Board (AFRSB) that same year, which includes coordination 
of periodic information exchange on food, analyses on the policies required for minimum 
food security, and assessment of the ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserves (AERR).642 Thus, 
ASEAN cooperation on food security was primarily of a functional nature, and involved state 
actors and bureaucrats from the related government ministries, while excluding rural 
communities and civil society. 
 Towards the end of the Cold War, new economic threats emerged and stimulated 
ASEAN integration, as well as expanded areas for regional cooperation. These economic 
threats include the socio-economic challenges posed by globalisation and the proliferation of 
economic frameworks (e.g. the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, APEC, in 1989), 
which could marginalize Southeast Asia’s interests. They stimulated an agreement on a 
common effective preferential tariff scheme, for an ASEAN Free Trade Area in 1992; and 
motivated further cooperation on food security, due to the region’s vulnerability to the 
policies of industrialised net food importing countries: Japan, South Korea, and the then 
European Economic Community.643 In its plan to develop an ASEAN Free Trade Area, the 
ASEAN Secretariat reaffirmed and strengthened functional cooperation on food security 
                                                          
641
 See Amelia L. Bello, “Ensuring Food Security – A Case for ASEAN Integration,” Asian Journal of 
Agriculture and Development 2, Nos. 1 & 2 (2005): 87-108. 
642
 The ASEAN Food Security Reserve Board came into force in 1980 when its Secretariat Office was 
established in Thailand. See Than, “Food Security in ASEAN,” 168-169. 
643
 Tyers, “Food Security in ASEAN,” 47. 
255 
 
through the improvement of intergovernmental information exchange, and research training 
for civil servants.644 Moreover, ASEAN member states also indicated their aspiration to reach 
international standards on food security cooperation, by requesting the United Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organization to provide technical assistance in the development of a regional 
food data and information system in 1996. In response, the Food and Agriculture 
organization organized a meeting for the establishment of a Regional Security Information 
System for ASEAN, but found that there was a lack of comprehensive statistical 
information.645 In any case, ASEAN cooperation on food security and their request to the UN, 
indicates the importance given to food security and, thus, the high probability of ASEAN 
member states’ willingness to discuss, and to cooperate with other regional actors on this 
issue. 
 ASEAN member states were motivated to increase their cooperation on human 
security in order to participate in the international trend of promoting social development and 
poverty eradication, and thereby consolidate their membership in the international 
community. Their awareness of the trend in international agreements is reflected in the 
“Ministerial Understanding on ASEAN Cooperation in Rural Development and Poverty 
Eradication,” which mentions, for example, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, the 1996 Rome Declaration on World Food Security, and the United Nations 
Millennium Development Goals.646 ASEAN member states have expressed their commitment 
to international agreements which are related to food security, and their aim to review 
ASEAN frameworks on this issue. However, this does not necessarily mean that any 
developments or improvements will be made. For example, at the 2
nd
 ASEAN-UN Summit in 
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2005, ASEAN leaders committed themselves to the Millennium Development Goals, and 
tasked their senior officials to accelerate the realization of these goals in ASEAN by 
reviewing the Framework Action Plan on Rural Development and Poverty Eradication (2004-
2010).
647
 Thus, they can continue to demonstrate their action plans in this area to the 
international community, without actually implementing them, or expanding them beyond 
intergovernmental, functional cooperation.  
 Subsequent ASEAN statements and frameworks on food security similarly appeared 
to be a reaction to external factors; however, they were different in that they started to include 
cooperation with other regional actors, such as scholars and farmers. In the most recent 
ASEAN Integrated Food Security (AIFS) Framework and Strategic Plan of Action on Food 
Security in the ASEAN Region (SPA-FS) 2009-2013, ASEAN member states explained that 
these new policies were a reaction against the sharp increase in international food prices in 
2007/2008, which raised concerns on the subsequent socio-economic impact on the region.648 
The rise in food prices highlighted how little long-term strategic planning had gone into 
policy-making on the production of rice, and rice supplies, as well as the relationship between 
rice supplies and food security at both the national and regional level; this demonstrates the 
failure of previous attempts by ASEAN governments to coordinate policies, and, thus, to 
create multi-level linkage in the area of food security.649 The inclusion of other regional actors 
in the ASEAN Integrated Food Security (AIFS) Framework identifies them as fellow regional 
stakeholders, and provides an opening for more people-centred regionalism. However, 
ASEAN leaders, as a whole, are more likely to agree on cooperation with academia, in terms 
of research, rather than cooperation with civil society, for fear that the latter will bring up 
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domestic political issues.650 For this reason, cooperation with academia in research may be 
mentioned by state leaders, but cooperation with civil society remains a politically 
contentious and sensitive issue. As a result, there is a lack of intergovernmental discussion on 
cooperation with civil society, which has a negative impact on community building, since it 
reduces the probability of such cooperation becoming a habit, or norm. Nevertheless, the 
omission of civil society makes it easier for ASEAN leaders to promote the development of 
current policies without running into opposition from other member states. For example, at 
the 18
th
 ASEAN Summit in July 2011, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
emphasized the need for an integrated ASEAN food security framework to address the 
anticipated global decline in food supply: the proposed framework would strengthen research 
and development, as well as investment in food security.
651
 As such, it did not include civil 
society, but provided for the role of academia in research, and for more resources being 
directed towards a human security issue. 
Internal Motivating Factors 
 
 External factors aside, ASEAN member states have always paid great attention to the 
security and accessibility of food supplies due to their prioritization of socio-economic 
development. In economic terms, food consumption constitutes a large share of the household 
budget, especially in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, where the 
government’s stabilization of food prices has helped to restrict wage growth while boosting 
industrial development.652 The governments of these countries sought to stabilize food 
markets, with a particular focus on rice: the most important staple food in Southeast Asia. In 
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this endeavour, some of them established specialized state agencies to manage rice and trade 
distribution.653 Thus, food security was prioritized at the national level, and was later extended 
to the regional level when ASEAN member states identified their common interest and shared 
vulnerability to external threats in this area. 
 The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 highlighted ASEAN member states’ shared 
vulnerability to rapid economic development, and their common interest in resolving the 
crisis and restoring socio-economic security, including food security. In October 1997, the 
ASEAN Ministers on Rural Development and Poverty Eradication noted the socio-economic 
disparities between the urban and rural communities, due to inadequate employment 
opportunities in the latter area. In response to this divide and social problems of 
unemployment, the Ministers aimed to provide adequate employment opportunities to 
minimize the rural-to-urban migration, and to promote the development of self-reliant rural 
communities.654 In this endeavour, the ASEAN Senior Officials on Rural Development and 
Poverty Eradication agreed on many activities in 1998, which focused on capacity-building at 
the national level, thereby continuing the trend in ASEAN regionalism to prioritize the 
strengthening of the nation-state, in the belief that this will lead to a strengthened ASEAN as 
a whole. The agreed activities were of a functional nature, rather than a political one, that 
would give voice to rural communities on ASEAN policies. These activities include the 
provision of assistance and relief programmes for vulnerable and disadvantaged people, as 
well as the provision of information on the social impact of the Asian Financial Crisis to 
support ASEAN programmes.655 ASEAN member states’ response to the Financial Crisis was 
motivated by concerns over regime security, should there be a political and social backlash 
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against a lack of remedies, and ineffective solutions. This was particularly the case after food 
shortages in Indonesia exacerbated the domestic political crisis, which led to President 
Suharto’s resignation in 1998. Indonesia experienced food shortages due to the drought 
caused by the El Nino weather phenomenon. Moreover, Indonesia was also confronted with 
the problems of economic collapse and major civil unrest, which disrupted food distribution 
channels. The economic collapse led to growing unemployment, which undermined the 
purchasing power of large segments of the population, and their ability to buy, or to have 
access to food.656 In addition, a weak and ineffective government further threatened 
Indonesia’s food security. President Suharto’s downfall was ultimately precipitated by 
society’s lack of confidence in the government’s ability to solve the nation’s economic 
problems.657 This downfall arguably made other ASEAN leaders more acutely aware of the 
need to accelerate the region’s economic recovery, including provisions for food security.  
Within Southeast Asia, scholars evaluated the region’s economic recovery, and called 
on ASEAN to promote regional cooperation on human security. For example, in November 
1999, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, in Singapore, organized an ASEAN 
Roundtable on “ASEAN Beyond the Regional Crisis: Challenges and Initiatives,” to 
encourage discussions between ASEAN policy-makers, academia, businessmen, and the 
media. Scholars proposed development policies, which included a political and social 
dimension, namely, democratization, social development, an agricultural and rural 
development policy, measures for poverty alleviation, as well as environmental control.658 
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These proposals, in addition to the Asian Financial Crisis and the change of regime in 
Indonesia, provided further motivating factors for ASEAN member states to, at the very least, 
recognize the importance of democratization and human security in their statements, and to 
pave the way for their implementation. 
The Asian Financial Crisis and Regime Security: Catalysts for more People-Centred 
Regionalism 
 
 In the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis, ASEAN member states sought to 
protect their political regime by raising awareness on efforts to boost economic recovery, 
through social outreach and involvement of society in government programmes. ASEAN 
member states decentralized efforts for economic recovery and provided an opening for 
people-centred regionalism in three ways: first, by recognizing that the participation of rural 
communities plays a critical role in development; second, by supporting human resource 
development; and, third, by encouraging regional networking among civil society 
organizations (CSOs).659 These three elements are significant, since they demonstrate the 
application of a human security concept in ASEAN discourse, in terms of introducing a social 
dimension to the region’s economic development, strengthening society’s employment 
opportunities, and promoting social support networks. ASEAN member states came to 
identify rural communities as facilitators in the implementation of ASEAN policies. For 
example, they recognize that the rural population “plays a critical role in rural development 
within the framework of national development strategy, structure and system of ASEAN 
countries,” and that they provide a “strong foundation for pursuing economic and social 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Economic Links,” in Mya Than, ed., ASEAN Beyond the Regional Crisis: Challenges and Initiatives (Singapore: 
ISEAS, 2001). 
659
 ASEAN Secretariat, “Ministerial Understanding on ASEAN Cooperation in Rural Development and Poverty 
Eradication.” 
261 
 
recovery.”660 With regard to CSOs, ASEAN member states delegated them the task of 
“facilitating and intensifying local community and/or local government roles in social safety 
and protection.”661 Moreover, they have encouraged functional cooperation between states 
and CSOs in rural development and poverty eradication.662 Thus, ASEAN member states have 
provided a foundation for more people-centred regionalism by including other regional actors 
in the implementation of ASEAN policies. However, they have not provided a political-
institutional space within the ASEAN framework in which states and other regional actors 
can discuss policies. This means that CSOs, whether individually or collectively as a 
transnational civil society network, are limited to the role of facilitator, in terms of 
implementing policies that have been agreed on by states. As such, CSOs seek to convince 
ASEAN member states that they have wide regional membership, regional outreach, and 
regional knowledge: qualities which ASEAN member states should take into consideration, 
in order to give CSOs a bigger role in regionalism, especially as a fellow policy-maker.663 
II. Transnational Civil Society Networks (TCSN) and Community Building 
 
 In theory, transnational civil society networks (TCSN) are expected to advance 
community building in three ways.664 First, they are expected to advance community building 
through social mobilization and networking. This involves the provision of an organizational 
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site through which civil society organizations may discuss human security issues, coordinate 
an agenda for regional advocacy, and together exert social pressure on states for new policies. 
TCSN organize regional workshops on human security, and, in doing so, consolidate their 
institutional and material presence, as well as a vital political space to promote people-
centred regionalism.665 Second, TCSN can advance community building through innovation, 
that is, the provision of new knowledge or the introduction of new norms, which leads to 
widened and deepened regional cooperation in human security. In addition, TCSN are also 
expected to develop their expertise on human security issues, so that they may establish 
themselves as epistemic communities, and so that regional governments may deem them 
worthy of consultation in the policy-making process. An epistemic community is defined as 
“a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain 
and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.”666 
According to IR theorist, Peter Haas, the provision of knowledge and information by these 
networks can lead to new patterns of inter-state behaviour, which facilitates international 
policy coordination.667 Moreover, it is argued that the role of networks is to promote 
discussions and negotiations between states, and between states and civil society 
organizations, on new policies to address regional issues. These policies would then 
contribute to community building by indicating an additional area in which there is a 
common regional position, and thus a regional identity. Third, TCSN can advance 
community building through the creation of multi-level linkages, and through their 
“communicative power.”668 TCSN protect local interests by proposing new policies at the 
national and regional level, linking policies at these two levels, and raising awareness on the 
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benefits of multi-level policy linkage for a strengthened, integrated, regional approach to 
human security. TCSN’s “communicative power” is also intended to promote human 
security, and has been defined by IR theorists Meredith Weiss and John Drysek, as 
constituting a discourse that gives voice to oppressed and/or marginalized people.669 TCSN 
provide the opportunity for these people to have a strengthened political voice at multiple 
levels – national, regional and international – due to the increased number of supporters from 
other civil society organizations in the region. Finally, by bringing together similar-minded 
civil society organizations and providing an organizational site for their joint regional 
advocacy, TCSN are expected to increase their visibility vis-à-vis states, to facilitate their 
recognition by state actors and interactions between them, and, thus, to increase their chances 
of becoming a new actor within ASEAN regionalism.  
Innovation 
 
 TCSN not only seek inclusion in regional community building, but also seek to 
redefine community building, more specifically, states’ minimalist interpretation of 
participatory regionalism and human security, by introducing new knowledge and norms. In 
this regard, one could describe their role as a struggle for “interpretative power.”670 TCSN 
seek “interpretative power” to emphasize the aspect of multi-level linkage in regional 
community building. They do so by strengthening themselves as an epistemic community, or 
a network of professionals with policy-relevant knowledge. However, their proposals may 
become circumscribed by states’ co-option and state-centred interpretation. Scholars who 
adopt the epistemic communities approach, such as Haas, argue that members of a 
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transnational epistemic community can influence state interests either by identifying them for 
decision makers, or highlighting the main points of an issue so that decision makers can 
deliberate whether or not the issue is in their interest. Decision makers in one state may then 
influence the interests and behaviour of other states, thereby increasing the likelihood of 
convergent state behaviour and international policy coordination, based on the causal beliefs 
and policy preferences of an epistemic community. In this regard, an epistemic community 
may influence cooperation on a particular issue even when there are no systemic threats of 
power to force states into coordinating their behaviour. By focusing on different means 
through which ideas and information are diffused and considered by decision makers, Haas 
observes that the epistemic communities approach provides a non-systemic origin for state 
interests and identifies a process for long-term cooperation independent of the distribution of 
power in the international system. The approach is said to supplement structural theories of 
international behaviour by arguing that states respond to new knowledge provided by 
epistemic communities and, as a result, may decide to pursue completely new objectives. If 
new state policies can be influenced by the provision of new knowledge, rather than power, 
TCSN have a higher chance of linking local, national, and regional policies, and of 
influencing states to provide for more participatory regionalism. Thus, TCSN can advance 
community building if ASEAN member states give importance to their knowledge, and 
include it in the ASEAN discourse for consideration, prior to policy-making.  
Multi-Level Linkages and Communicative Power 
 
 TCSN provide a space for socialization between their member civil society 
organizations, by promoting social interactions, and enabling their members to build, and to 
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reinforce a common identity, based on shared norms, values, and objectives.671 By organizing 
regular activities, TCSN “embed” their members within the network, in terms of 
strengthening their network identity, and developing a regional consciousness on a specific 
human security issue.672 As civil society organizations within a TCSN become more 
socialized into a regional mind-set, and identify closely with a regional agenda, they will 
more likely try to engage with regional states to promote this agenda, and, thus, contribute to 
the shift towards people-centred regionalism. Moreover, these socialized civil society 
organizations are also more likely to promote a sense of regional solidarity and regional 
community, in addition to their domestic activities. In this regard, they have the potential to 
act as “social brokers” by reaching out to civil society organizations in other TCSN, and 
recruiting their support for the proposed regional agenda.673 TCSN’s policy proposals are 
legitimized by their member civil society organizations’ relationship with, and representation 
of local communities. Finally, TCSN’s regional networking, multi-level linkage, and regional 
advocacy contribute to community building, since they constitute horizontal and integrative 
processes, as opposed to the vertical and sectoral nature of states’ policy-making.  
Limitations to the Role of TCSN 
 
 Civil society organizations in different ASEAN member states will have different 
levels of political influence, depending on the extent of democratization at the domestic level, 
the extent of their membership and supporters, as well as the social status of their individual 
members, for example, whether they include members of the elite.674 Moreover, their role 
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within a TCSN is limited by both factors at the national level (e.g. repressive political 
systems) and factors at the regional level (e.g. highly centralized regional institutions), which 
make it difficult to coordinate and to promote an agenda for regional advocacy. Within a 
TCSN, there are internal challenges over how to distribute resources between activities at the 
local, national, and regional levels, without compromising the effectiveness of any of them; 
in addition, members of a TCSN will also need to reach a consensus on whether they should 
focus on mobilization-driven advocacy, or more long-term campaigns, such as capacity-
building.675 More importantly, civil society organizations do not have as much resources at 
their disposal as states, and are thus more restricted in the scale and outreach of their 
activities. At times, this means that they will lack funding to organize events, or to travel and 
meet state actors at international conferences. As observed by Weiss: 
CSOs [civil society organizations] enjoy a wider ambit than state actors compelled to respect 
diplomatic imperatives, yet may have limited concrete resources or options beyond 
communications networks, discursive and information-based strategies, and other tools of soft 
power. States retain coercive power as well as diplomatic levers and hence, the upper hand.676 
 
Thus, civil society organizations may participate in a TCSN, not so much to push for new 
state policies, but rather to create mutual support and self-sufficient networks; and to put 
forward their own alternative process of regional community building. In this way, they 
contribute towards people-centred regionalism, by challenging the singular state-based 
interpretation of regional community building, and offering plural perspectives from society. 
 Regional states may introduce cooperation with TCSN on policy-implementation in 
order to downplay their divergent interests, and to mitigate the cost of any adversarial 
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relations.677 In this regard, cooperation on policy-implementation can be interpreted as the 
minimum concession, and the minimum form of multi-level linkage, in terms of transferring 
accountability, expectations, and practices across the local, national and regional levels. More 
specifically, states seek to strengthen their accountability by including local communities in 
policy-implementation, thereby implying, and socially constructing, their support for the 
policy. At the same time, states communicate and share the expected outcomes of regional 
policies with local communities, and engage them in dialogue to discuss best practices. The 
outcome of these discussions may then be shared, and improved, with regional counterparts. 
Based on social movement theory, state-TCSN cooperation is expected to lead to states’ “co-
optation” and “de-radicalization” of TCSN’s discourse and advocacy.678 As such, states can 
continue to implement regional policies to their own liking at the national level, and not 
commit themselves to a regional standard. Rather, they can continue their traditional practice 
of making provisions for sharing knowledge, and the possibility of a regional standard being 
negotiated. In this way, they can provide for multi-level linkage, without actually seeing it 
through till the end.  
III. TCSN on Rural Development and Food Security: Creating Multi-Level Linkages in both 
Discourse and Policy? 
 
 This section provides the background to transnational civil society networks (TCSN), 
which work on rural development and food security, and which lobby ASEAN governments 
for new policies. The section demonstrates the current and potential role of TCSN in ASEAN 
community building, in terms of facilitating the convergence of aims among regional civil 
society organizations (CSOs), strengthening themselves as epistemic communities to be 
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consulted in ASEAN policy-making, and creating multi-level linkages in both discourse and 
policy.  
The ASEAN “Framework Action Plan on Rural Development and Poverty 
Eradication (2004-2010)” referred to a TCSN, the Asian Partnership for the Development of 
Human Resources in Rural Asia (AsiaDHRRA), which has been affiliated to ASEAN since 
May 2004. More specifically, the Framework Action Plan seeks to promote closer 
coordination between the ASEAN Senior Officials on Rural Development and Poverty 
Eradication, and “regional organisations that share ASEAN’s priorities for rural development 
and poverty reduction.”679 This implies that policies are solely determined by ASEAN 
governments, and that other regional actors are invited to play a facilitating role in the 
realization of these policies. Nevertheless, despite this limited opening into ASEAN 
regionalism, the AsiaDHRRA was motivated to become affiliated to ASEAN for two main 
reasons: first, to promote people-centred, rural development, with a focus on the poor and 
marginalized; second, to receive institutional backing from ASEAN to showcase their 
activities in rural development.680 For ASEAN, the affiliation of such TCSN is a means to 
raise awareness and to consolidate the ASEAN identity among society. The AsiaDHRRA 
initiated meetings with officials from the ASEAN Secretariat as means to promote confidence 
building. Moreover, it encouraged other TCSN, such as the Asian Farmers Association for 
Sustainable Development (AFA), to similarly engage with ASEAN, in order to gain ASEAN 
states’ recognition, invitation to events organized by the ASEAN Secretariat, and, thus, 
opportunities to interact with, and to influence ASEAN officials. For example, in April 2007, 
ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong invited both the AsiaDHRRA and AFA to a 
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conference on “ASEAN Talks Business.” Although the conference was primarily attended by 
the business sector, Ong Keng Yong stated that civil society was invited to raise awareness 
on their potential as partners in development.681 In this regard, the ASEAN Secretariat can 
facilitate TCSN’s role within the region by including them in meetings with state and 
business leaders. However, it is ultimately up to TCSN to further engage these leaders, and to 
persuade them of the need to reform existent policies, or to introduce new ones, for a more 
integrated, regional approach to human security.  
In addition to the AsiaDHRRA and AFA, there are two other TCSN on rural 
development and food security, which have been active in lobbying ASEAN governments for 
multi-level policy linkage: Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance (TERRA), 
and the Southeast Asian Council for Food Security (SEACON).682 TERRA was part of the 
Joint Thai-Regional Working Group on the first ASEAN People’s Forum, in 2009, which 
provides a platform for discussions between civil society organizations in the region, before 
they present their recommendations to ASEAN leaders at the ASEAN Civil Society 
Conference.683 With regard to SEACON, this TCSN is significant, since it initiated a process 
of “participatory research” to assess the impact of free trade agreements on small scale food 
producers, and to advocate new agricultural trade policies in ASEAN.684 This process of 
“participatory research” strengthens the network through provision of training in education, 
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and, by extension, strengthens its advocacy for multi-level policy linkage, so that 
governments may commit to a regional standard on human security. Moreover, “participatory 
research” also has the added benefit of creating a “feeling of ownership” among the 
participating small scale farmers on the process of ASEAN community building. In this 
regard, “participatory research” brings regional and national processes down to the local 
level, in an attempt to harmonize all these levels, as part of regional community building.  
Background to TCSN 
 
 The AsiaDHRRA grew out of local communities and organizations’ efforts to 
promote rural development at a time when economic growth was mainly focused on 
industrial modernization. More specifically, it grew out of the 1974 Development of Human 
Resources in Rural Asia Workshop (DHRRAW): a regional partnership of 11 social 
development networks and organizations in ten Asian countries, which aims to promote self-
sufficient rural communities, as well as cooperation and solidarity between them. The 
AsiaDHRRA includes social development networks in six ASEAN member states, more than 
half of ASEAN’s membership, and thus has the potential to influence new ASEAN policies if 
these networks successfully lobby their individual governments, and ASEAN as a whole. 
These social development networks are located in Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, the 
Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. They mainly focus on capacity-building at the national 
level and include civil society organizations, which work on rural development: the provision 
of agricultural training and knowledge for farmers, as well as the provision of healthcare and 
counselling services. However, they also participate in a TCSN in order to coordinate 
regional policy advocacy on rural development.685 The AsiaDHRRA raises awareness on the 
negative impact of regional and bilateral free trade agreements on small-scale farmers, and 
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seeks to mobilize these farmers, in order to push for social justice in the ASEAN 
Community.686 In this regard, the AsiaDHRRA highlights multi-level linkages, that is, how 
regional and bilateral agreements affect local communities; moreover, the AsiaDHRRA 
identifies these communities as regional stakeholders and provides them with a political 
space to express their support for people-centred regionalism, in order to protect their 
interests. The AsiaDHRRA raises awareness on ASEAN community building in rural areas, 
in contrast to ASEAN officials, who are based in urban capitals, and who tend to limit their 
outreach to academia and civil society organizations, which are similarly based there. In this 
way, TCSN contribute to regional community building by extending the process to non-state 
actors who are marginalized at the national level, and enabling them to overcome this 
marginalization by becoming part of a larger network, which gives them more visibility vis-à-
vis governments, and, thus, more opportunities to push for the protection of human security 
across all levels.  
The AsiaDHRRA has introduced fellow TCSN, such as AFA, to ASEAN officials; 
and, in doing so, acted as a bridge between them, and contributed to strengthened relations 
between TCSN in the region and ASEAN.687 The AsiaDHRRA views ASEAN’s increased 
recognition of TCSN as strengthening the role of TCSN as “a balancing force,” to ensure that 
a people-centred ASEAN Community is realized.688  ASEAN’s increased recognition is 
indicated by its meetings with TCSN at the ASEAN Civil Society Conference, and funding 
for TCSN’s projects on rural development, which is provided by the ASEAN Foundation. 
This Foundation was established by ASEAN leaders in 1997, to commemorate ASEAN’s 30th 
anniversary, to promote greater awareness of ASEAN, and to increase people-to-people 
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relations within the region, for example, through educational exchanges and conferences.689 In 
this endeavour, the ASEAN Foundation funded the AsiaDHRRA’s project on capacity-
building for small-scale farmers, so that they can maximize their access, and gains from the 
liberalized market.690 The AsiaDHRRA’s project (2007-2010) consisted of training 
workshops for small-scale farmers, which included discussions on the market situation, the 
challenges confronted by small-scale farmers and strategies to overcome them, as well as 
field trips to farming communities.691 By funding these workshops, the ASEAN Foundation 
was raising ASEAN awareness among local farmers, since its logo was included in the 
posters for the workshops, which provided a space for farmers from ASEAN countries to 
discuss the need for their governments’ support to promote social justice, environmental 
protection, and sustainable agriculture.692 In this regard, the working relationship between the 
ASEAN Foundation and the AsiaDHRRA facilitates regional community building, since 
marginalized social groups are made aware of ASEAN, and start to discuss their future plans 
within the framework of an ASEAN Community. 
 Moreover, the AsiaDHRRA also facilitated regional community building by creating 
a similar transnational civil society network (TCSN), called the Asian Farmers’ Alliance for 
Sustainable Rural Development (AFA) in 2002. AFA consists solely of farmers’ 
organizations and specifically focuses on their interests. In this regard, members of AFA are 
more similar to each other, compared to those of the AsiaDHRRA, and should find it easier to 
reach consensus on an agenda for regional advocacy on rural development.693 AFA includes 
farmers’ organizations in seven ASEAN member states, more than half of ASEAN’s 
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membership, from Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, and 
Vietnam. AFA seeks to increase the political space and recognition of farmers’ organizations 
within ASEAN regionalism, in order to protect their interests and to promote their role as 
states’ “active development partners” at both the national and regional level.694 AFA has 
carried out national and regional consultations on the impact of free trade agreements on 
small-scale farmers, as well as the impact of ASEAN’s policies on agriculture.695 It has 
sought to reach consensus on an agenda for regional advocacy on rural development and food 
security, especially at a time when international and regional conferences give importance to 
these issues. Given that rural development and food security are highlighted in international 
discourse, and on the international agenda, AFA argues that it is an opportune time to 
maximize the interest and attention of the international community (read, governments) by 
giving concrete proposals, and presentations on their activities, so that governments may 
identify which policies and activities they would like to support.696 Thus, AFA makes use of 
international trends to promote the role of farmers’ organizations in development, at both the 
national and regional level. 
Innovation 
 
 The AsiaDHRRA seeks recognition by ASEAN through innovation, that is, it seeks to 
showcase its knowledge and expertise to ASEAN states, so that it may be recognized as an 
epistemic community and consulted in policy-making. As stated by the AsiaDHRRA’s 
Communications Officer: the AsiaDHRRA 
can cooperate with ASEAN in the formulation of…policies and action plans. We can be 
active in task forces and committees that can be created. We can share our own experiences 
and technical expertise. Furthermore, we can help study how much governments allocate for 
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agricultural programs and services benefiting small scale men and women farmers, fishers 
and indigenous peoples.697 
 
In March 2011, the AsiaDHRRA proposed the establishment of a regional knowledge base, 
as part of its strategy to become an epistemic community. According to the AsiaDHRRA’s 
proposal, this knowledge base would be in the form of an ASEAN Peoples’ Field School on 
Sustainable Agriculture and Climate Change, to manage regional knowledge on small-scale 
producers.698 AFA supports this initiative, and already stores knowledge on members’ 
experience and expertise.699 In this regard, both networks are strengthening themselves for 
future meetings with ASEAN officials, and future opportunities to influence ASEAN policies 
on rural development and food security.  
 Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance (TERRA) is a further example 
of how a TCSN seeks to become an epistemic community, and, in doing so, strengthen its 
regional policy advocacy. TERRA is a project under the Foundation for Ecological Recovery 
(FER), which is a non-profit organisation based in Thailand. FER was established in 1986 by 
environmental activists and scholars, to conduct, and to produce research on ecological 
issues, with the aim to promote sustainable development and greater participation of local 
communities within the Mekong region. TERRA was subsequently established in 1991 in 
response to rapid industrialization and the depletion of natural resources in the region, 
especially in Thailand. It includes civil society organizations (CSOs) from five ASEAN 
member states: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. TERRA acts as an 
epistemic community by supporting joint research and joint field studies among CSOs, and 
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thus generating specialized knowledge that can be used against current ASEAN policies and 
the proposal for new ones.  
The Southeast Asian Council for Food Security and Fair Trade (SEACON) has 
members in seven ASEAN countries, and is similarly a TCSN that acts as an epistemic 
community by conducting research and presenting their findings to state actors; and by 
bringing international discourse down to the regional level, thereby promoting a regional 
response and regional position on the issue at hand. SEACON grew out of the Southeast 
Asian Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Conference on Food Security and Fair Trade 
in 1996, and has members from Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Thailand, and Vietnam. SEACON links national and regional policies by seeking to develop 
self-sufficiency in rice and other staple food at both levels. It also seeks to promote 
participatory regionalism by aiming for “the establishment of food security councils at the 
local, national and regional levels that ensure the strong representation of producer interests, 
with the participation of consumers, business and civil society actors.”700 SEACON seeks to 
strengthen its bargaining power with states by conducting research on rural development in 
Southeast Asia in the form of surveys and statistics, which form the basis of proposals for 
new regional policies.701 It seeks to influence state policies on rural development and food 
security by becoming a valuable knowledge base. However, ASEAN leaders do not recognize 
SEACON as a knowledge base, but rather as a TCSN which is to be invited to ASEAN 
conferences, so that it may voice its concerns, and have its questions answered, thereby 
making ASEAN look more accessible to society, more transparent and more people-
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centred.702 In this regard, ASEAN leaders view TCSN as social groups which need more 
clarification and explanations of ASEAN policies, rather than epistemic communities. 
Multi-Level Linkages 
 
 TERRA promotes multi-level policy linkage by monitoring development projects 
which have a negative impact on the local people and the environment, and calling on 
ASEAN to address this impact. For example, in September 2010, TERRA was one of the 
many networks which submitted a joint statement to ASEAN on “The impacts of overseas 
investment in large-scale resource extraction projects in (Myanmar) and the role of 
ASEAN.”703 The statement expressed CSOs’ concern with overseas investments in Myanmar, 
such as hydropower and gas projects, which were having a negative social and environmental 
impact. CSOs pointed out that most of these investments were carried out by large 
multinational companies without consulting local communities, and threatening these 
communities’ human security, especially their livelihoods. Moreover, CSOs highlighted the 
social and environmental threats posed by these investments to the region due to the 
increased flow of refugees and migrants. They reiterated their call from a year earlier, in 
2009, for ASEAN to establish a fourth pillar on the environment (the three existing pillars 
focus on political-security, economic, and socio-cultural issues) as part of the ASEAN 
Community. CSOs argued that environmental issues are important in their own right, and that 
they are more than part of regional economic integration, or a society’s lifestyle and culture. 
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For example, Dorothy-Grace Guerrero, a member of the TCSN, Solidarity for Asian People’s 
Advocacy (SAPA), stated that “environmental concerns can no longer be just subsumed into 
the ASEAN mechanisms as economic and socio-cultural rights; it is an urgent issue that cuts 
across governance, resource management, and environment-related disasters.”704 TERRA 
highlights multi-level linkages by pointing out how environmental issues and threats to 
human security in one country affect the whole region, due to problems of environmental 
depletion and increased migration. Moreover, TERRA emphasizes multi-level linkages by 
proposing a regional, ASEAN solution to these problems in the form of an additional 
ASEAN Environmental Community. In this regard, TERRA facilitates regional community 
building by maintaining discourse on the need for an integrated approach to human security. 
 TERRA proposed that a fourth pillar on the environment should focus on three main 
themes: large-scale development projects that destroy local livelihoods and the environment, 
climate change, and biodiversity. The purpose in doing so was to promote sustainable 
development and human security by emphasizing the link between sustainable management 
of natural resources and local livelihoods. Proposals for the fourth pillar of ASEAN on the 
environment reflect the discourse that is taking place in international organizations such as 
the UN. In this regard, TERRA’s proposals have wider international implications by not only 
linking the local, national, and regional levels, but also the regional and international levels, 
in terms of discourse and policy-making. By bringing the international discourse on to the 
regional agenda, TERRA promotes a regional response to this discourse, and thus a regional 
position and strengthened regional identity. This is particularly important with regard to food 
security, as members of academia have already pointed out that ASEAN member states, as a 
whole, have not agreed on a collective strategy: for example, should food security be based 
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on self-sufficiency in rice, or should it instead focus on the establishment of an appropriate 
and efficient price and supply stabilization strategy?705 TERRA pushed ASEAN to develop 
and consolidate its position on food security and on international issues in general, which is 
one of the reasons why it is significant for community building. As argued by Amelia Bello, 
from the University of the Philippines: 
If regional integration and cooperation means moving towards a common goal using a 
common strategy, then it is essential that the ASEAN member countries agree on what food 
security collectively means to them, and what food items are important to each of them and 
the region in general, so that regional integration and cooperation under the auspices of 
ASEAN can be better promoted.706 
 
TERRA submits statements to the ASEAN Secretariat and calls on ASEAN leaders to 
develop an agreed definition and strategy for protecting food security. In this regard, TERRA 
engages ASEAN states, so that they may pay more attention to human security issues, and, in 
doing so, promote a more people-centred regionalism and, thus, progress in regional 
community building.  
 The AsiaDHRRA and AFA have promoted multi-level linkages by organizing 
workshops, which give voice to the interests and concerns of rural communities, and enable 
them to participate in ASEAN community building. For example, at the 6
th
 ASEAN People’s 
Assembly, the AsiaDHRRA, together with AFA, the Union Network International Asia-
Pacific Regional Organization (UNI-APRO), and a few smaller organizations, jointly 
organized a panel on “Fair Trade towards an Integrating ASEAN.” The purpose of the 
workshop was to enable farmers to articulate their views on regional trade. Marlene Ramirez, 
the executive director of the AsiaDHRRA, started by quoting an aim of the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) to realize “equitable economic development and reduced 
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poverty and socio-economic disparities.”707 Ramirez stated that the AsiaDHRRA would hold 
ASEAN accountable to this aim by monitoring ASEAN’s progress in realizing an AEC, and 
helping to ensure that economic development is balanced and sustainable. Ramirez traced the 
course of uneven economic development since the establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA) in 1992. She claimed that free trade among ASEAN member states mainly 
benefited the traders and transnational corporations (TNCs). The latter has apparently 
received the most benefits due to their possession of capital and global networks to take full 
advantage of the new investment opportunities created by AFTA. In contrast, the 
AsiaDHRRA found that the larger part of ASEAN society suffered, as evident from 
the collapse of micro, small, medium, and indigenous farmers, industrial producers and 
traders; the weakening of the trade union movement and the rising violations of labour rights 
because of the regional race to the bottom or lowering of labour standards just to be 
competitive; and the rising joblessness, underemployment, and poverty.708 
 
AFA also acknowledged the negative impact of free trade in general, for example, in their 
discussions on agricultural trade liberalization. AFA stated that rapid agricultural trade 
liberalization led to massive dumping of cheap agricultural imports from developing 
countries and their transnational corporations. This destroyed the livelihoods of thousands of 
farmers and agricultural workers, who became poorer and more marginalized. AFA is 
concerned that ASEAN integration would further displace small scale farmers, destroy their 
livelihoods, rural heritage and the culture of agricultural communities in Southeast Asia. For 
this reason, AFA started to meet with ASEAN officials, and to communicate their concerns in 
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2005, when AFA and the AsiaDHRRA co-organized a session on “ASEAN and 
Agriculture.”709 
Given the negative impact of regional free trade on rural communities, the 
AsiaDHRRA expressed its aim to promote “wider, deeper and meaningful national and 
regional economic growth.”710 By “wider,” Ramirez explained that she was referring to more 
equal distribution of economic benefits, where it is not only the elite and transnational 
corporations which benefit, but also the small entrepreneurs and producers. In this endeavour, 
the AsiaDHRRA and AFA are campaigning for participatory regionalism, in terms of 
enabling small-scale producers to formulate, implement, and evaluate trade policies which 
affect their livelihood and human security. As such, they have a narrower interpretation of 
participatory regionalism than other TCSN, such as the Solidarity for Asian People’s 
Advocacy (SAPA), which interprets participatory regionalism as the participation of civil 
society organizations in all regional policy-making. These different interpretations reflect the 
spectrum of minimum to maximum participatory regionalism, where the former is marked by 
civil society’s participation in selected policy areas, while the latter is marked by civil 
society’s participation in all policy areas. The minimalist definition makes it easier for 
ASEAN member states to provide for participatory regionalism, by limiting it to human 
security issues such as the environment. Moreover, the spectrum of definitions also makes it 
easier for scholars to trace ASEAN’s progress in participatory regionalism, based on the 
number of areas in which civil society is allowed to participate in policy-making, 
implementation, and evaluation. Thus, an analysis on the discourse of different TCSN 
demonstrates the higher prospects for participatory regionalism, for monitoring the progress 
of participatory regionalism, and for achieving and studying ASEAN community building. 
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 Both the AsiaDHRRA and AFA seek to strengthen their role in ASEAN community 
building by proposing that ASEAN institutionalize the role of small-scale rural producers and 
identify them as an Advisory Council on trade policies.711 Such a development would indicate 
significant progress in participatory regionalism, but has thus far not taken place. With regard 
to the AsiaDHRRA’s call for “deeper” economic growth, this refers to more functional, 
economic demands: investment in local economies, and in research and development, 
farmers’ access to national and international markets, and environmental sustainability. 
Finally, its call for “meaningful” economic development similarly refers to functional, 
economic demands, such as the generation of employment opportunities, increasing incomes 
and the reduction of poverty.712 ASEAN statements thus far indicate that the functional, 
economic dimensions of development are prioritized over the political-social dimension. For 
example, the Strategic Plan of Action on Food Security for the ASEAN Region (SPA-FS) 
includes the following objectives: to promote the food market and trade, and to encourage 
greater investment in food and agro-based industry.713 At the time, ASEAN member states 
were reacting against the sharp increase in international food prices 2007/2008. However, 
they had also started to meet with civil society organizations (CSOs) at the ASEAN Civil 
Society Conference, and were in the process of finalizing the ASEAN Charter, which seeks to 
realize a “people-oriented” ASEAN Community. For this reason, there was a need to 
continue, and to strengthen the social dimension of ASEAN community building by at least 
recognizing the important role of CSOs in development, in ASEAN statements, and 
providing for their role in policy implementation. Policy implementation is left to the 
discretion of each ASEAN member state, which means that multi-level linkages have not yet 
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been created in the area of rural development and food security. If it had, there would be a 
common, regional standard to be reached, and provisions for monitoring by other regional 
states, or by the ASEAN Secretariat, as well as civil society. 
IV. Explanations for TCSN’s Lack of Impact on ASEAN Policies 
 
 Two reasons for which TCSN have not been able to have an impact on ASEAN 
policies is their lack of understanding on regional issues, and their internal conflict, which 
undermines their collective voice in regional advocacy. For example, in its strategy paper for 
2011-2015, the Asian Farmers’ Alliance for Sustainable Rural Development (AFA) noted 
that, “most often, because of the lack of understanding of matters in question, conflict 
between and among our leaders, members, and secretariat staff arises.”714 Moreover, the 
AsiaDHRRA also acknowledges that different civil society organizations have their own 
agenda, and encourages each one to be mindful of the broader long-term advocacy for 
people-centred regionalism.715 
 On the part of states, there has been a lack of multi-level linkages in ASEAN policies 
on rural development and food security, mainly because “the ASEAN agenda remains highly 
voluntaristic,” and because the agenda is left to national interpretation and implementation.716 
This flexibility, or “policy gap” among ASEAN member states has been described by 
scholars as “a strategic ambiguity,” which enables member states to participate in the 
community building process at their own pace.717 As such, ASEAN member states provide for 
limited multi-level linkages, in terms of encouraging the exchange of knowledge and 
practices at the national level, so that they may strengthen regional development as a whole. 
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They have not provided for multi-level linkages in terms of creating a fourth pillar on the 
environment as part of the ASEAN Community, which would prioritize environmental 
sustainability and social justice; or in terms of institutionalizing an advisory role for TCSN in 
rural development and food security.718 ASEAN member states have yet to achieve a balance 
between trade and investment liberalization on the one hand, and environmental protection on 
the other, with the latter affecting rural development and food security.719 Environmental 
protection includes the sustainable use of natural resources, which constitute the livelihood 
and maintain the human security of the rural population. Despite its importance, however, 
Jörn Dosch finds that 
there is little evidence of any substantial initiatives to mainstream environmental issues into 
trade/investment policymaking based on initiatives of domestic national actors or at the 
subregional or regional levels that go beyond official government rhetoric and – often 
unenforceable – legislative frameworks.720 
 
ASEAN member states have recognized the importance of the environment in the “Roadmap 
for an ASEAN Community 2009-2015”; they have also recognized the importance of rural 
development and food security in the ASEAN Integrated Food Security (AIFS) Framework 
and Strategic Plan of Action on Food Security in the ASEAN Region (SPA-FS) 2009-
2013.”721 Thus, it is not the lack of regional policy initiatives that restrict multi-level linkages, 
but rather the extent of policy implementation at the national level.722 There are numerous 
factors which restrict the implementation of regional policies on the environment, rural 
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development, and food security; for example, corruption, and illegal and uncontrolled 
economic activities.723 On the other hand, there are also factors which motivate ASEAN 
member states to pay more attention to these issues, such as volatile food prices, which may 
threaten the political regime. This potential threat was particularly acute after volatile food 
prices in Tunisia played an indirect role in provoking protests and riots in 2011.724 
Nevertheless, ASEAN member states still prioritize the functional, economic dimensions of 
development, over the political-social dimensions. They continue to focus on information 
sharing, and cooperation between ASEAN civil servants, scholars and farmers, on how to 
improve agricultural productivity, and to manage access to natural resources at the national 
level.725 As such, they have not yet created multi-level linkages in the area of rural 
development and food security, due to the principle of national sovereignty and non-
interference in another country’s internal affairs. 
ASEAN diplomats are aware of the potential role of civil society in community 
building, especially in the area of human security; however, they continue to prioritize 
regional unity and to prevent any clashes between democratizing and authoritarian member 
states. For example, Ambassador Manasvi Srisodapol, Permanent Representative of Thailand 
to ASEAN, considered the possibility of treating civil society as an epistemic community: 
(civil society) may have specialized knowledge and skills that can be utilized or taken into 
account in ASEAN projects and undertakings, if applied appropriately and constructively in 
the larger context where the interests and concerns of the general public have to be 
balanced.726 
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In addition, Bilahari Kausikan, second Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Singapore, noted the possibility of state-CSO meetings becoming more than “a 
ritual,” given ASEAN member states’ growing awareness of human security issues and their 
transnational nature, and the fact that TCSN may be in a better position to tackle them.727 
Thus, there is awareness of the potential of TCSN to advance community building among 
ASEAN diplomats, but there is as yet no collective preparedness and willingness to facilitate 
their role, due to ASEAN’s political diversity. 
V. Conclusion 
 
 This chapter sought to evaluate ASEAN’s progress in regional community building, 
based on the development and impact of transnational civil society networks (TCSN) in 
creating multi-level linkages in ASEAN discourse and policy, that is, the linking of the 
domestic and the regional into an integrated framework. TCSN are motivated to strengthen 
themselves, so that they may be “a balancing force” against ASEAN member states, to ensure 
that a people-centred ASEAN Community is realized.728 TCSN, such as the AsiaDHRRA, 
highlight multi-level linkages, in terms of how regional and bilateral agreements affect local 
communities. They identify these communities as regional stakeholders and provide them 
with a political space to express their support for people-centred regionalism, in order to 
protect their interests. TCSN raise awareness on ASEAN community building in rural areas, 
in contrast to ASEAN officials, who are based in urban capitals, and who tend to limit their 
outreach to academia and civil society organizations, which are similarly based there. In this 
way, TCSN contribute to regional community building by extending the process to non-state 
actors who are marginalized at the national level, and enabling them to overcome this 
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marginalization by becoming part of a larger network, which gives them more visibility vis-à-
vis governments, and, thus, more opportunities to push for the protection of human security 
across all levels.  
 ASEAN leaders do not recognize TCSN as epistemic communities, or as advisors in 
regional policy-making; rather, they view TCSN as non-state actors, which are to be invited 
to ASEAN conferences, so that they may voice their concerns, and have their questions 
answered, thereby making ASEAN look more accessible to society, more transparent and 
more people-centred.
 
 In this regard, ASEAN leaders view TCSN more as non-state actors, 
which need more clarification and explanations of ASEAN policies. This is one of the 
reasons why they have not provided TCSN with a bigger role than that of a facilitator to 
implement ASEAN policies. For example, the ASEAN Foundation provides funding for 
TCSN’s projects on rural development, which focus on capacity-building, and which are in 
line with ASEAN governments’ objectives to promote rural economic growth and the 
development of human resources in rural areas.729 ASEAN leaders have provided TCSN with 
a role in facilitating policy implementation at the national level. They remain averse to 
creating multi-level policy linkage, where there is a common, regional standard, and 
provisions for regional monitoring. The reason for this is the prioritization of regional unity, 
which means enabling each country to proceed at its own pace, in accordance to its own level 
of political development. As such, ASEAN member states provide for limited multi-level 
linkages, in terms of encouraging the exchange of knowledge and practices at the national 
level, so that they may strengthen regional development as a whole. They have not provided 
for multi-level linkages in terms of creating a fourth pillar on the environment as part of the 
ASEAN Community, which would prioritize environmental sustainability and social justice; 
or in terms of institutionalizing an advisory role for TCSN in rural development and food 
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security.730 In this regard, TCSN have contributed to community building by raising ASEAN 
awareness and maintaining a discourse on the need for multi-level policy linkages; however, 
they have, so far, failed to influence ASEAN leaders into transforming this discourse into 
policy. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
 
 This thesis sought to evaluate ASEAN’s progress in regional community building, by 
determining the extent to which there has been a shift from policies and processes associated 
with “old regionalism” (state-security-economic centred regionalism) towards those 
associated with “new regionalism” and a regional community (the widening of regionalism to 
non-state actors, the expansion of regional cooperation into new areas, such as non-traditional 
security, and the emergence of a transnational civil society network to promote socio-
economic welfare in the region, as well as the harmonization of domestic and regional 
policies). The first half of the thesis evaluated ASEAN’s progress along this sliding scale by 
testing the persistence of “old regionalism,” based on three sets of Thailand’s bilateral 
relationships; while the second half of the thesis tested the significance of “new regionalism,” 
based on three case studies on civil society participation in regional community building. In 
comparison to previous studies on regionalism, this thesis does not focus on economic 
interdependence as an independent variable, since it is more interested in the quality, rather 
than quantity, of intra-regional interactions, and the social, people-centred aspect of regional 
community building, rather than a material, economic-centred one.  
Thailand’s bilateral relations demonstrate the persistence of “old regionalism,” in 
terms of a continuing tendency to differentiate the other as an external security threat. This 
tendency is due to the following factors. First, the presence of a deeply embedded historical 
legacy of differentiation, which is supported by states for domestic political interests. Second, 
the dynamics of on-going bilateral disputes, which involve the exchange of accusations, an 
appeal to third party mediation, and, thus, an internationalisation of the conflict, and 
widening of differentiation for domestic political interests to international relations. Third, 
states’ domestic policies in the border area, which can instigate violent forms of protest, and 
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thereby undermine border security and the aim to realize a peaceful regional community. 
Differentiation in Thailand’s bilateral relationships demonstrates the limitations to regional 
community building, based on the persistence of distrust and insecurity within the region. 
Moreover, these relationships also undermine the theoretical argument that regionalism can 
help to overcome such deep-seated antagonisms, as shown by the case of Western Europe. 
The reason for this is that Western European states were inclined towards regional integration 
and diminishing national sovereignty after the Second World War, in order to prevent future 
wars, to maintain regional security, and to pool resources to match the superpowers. In 
contrast, countries from developing regions, such as Southeast Asia, remain very much 
protective of their national sovereignty. For this reason, they are more inclined towards 
widened and deepened regional cooperation, rather than regional integration and the creation 
of central political institutions. Such widening and deepening of regional cooperation may 
strengthen relations between regional states. However, it does not necessarily reverse 
differentiation between regional states, especially if differentiation is maintained by states for 
domestic political interests. Thus, the persistence of differentiation restricts improvements in 
the quality of intra-regional relations, as well as assimilation into a regional community with 
a common identity. 
With regard to the second half of the thesis, the case studies on civil society 
demonstrate that “new regionalism” is significant in form, rather than in substance. 
Moreover, these chapters also demonstrate how regional community building is 
simultaneously restricted by political diversity between regional states, and promoted by 
regional civil society organizations’ (CSOs) activities to raise regional awareness, and their 
common regional advocacy. The case studies on civil society highlight the parallels between 
domestic and foreign policies, in that democratization and engagement with civil society at 
the domestic level, tend to lead to states’ promotion of engagement with civil society at the 
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regional level, as well as their promotion of an institutionalized role for civil society in 
regional community building. Following the same logic, less democratized or authoritarian 
states, which suppress the role of civil society at the domestic level, also tend to suppress 
their role at the regional level. As such, any progress in widening regionalism to CSOs is the 
result of a negotiated compromise between democratic and authoritarian states. With regard 
to the expansion of regional cooperation to new areas, and the involvement of CSOs in these 
areas, progress is similarly dependent on democratizing ASEAN member states, which have 
consolidated their regime security, to the extent that they can engage more with non-
traditional security issues, at both the domestic and international level. Finally, the case study 
on transnational civil society networks (TCSN) demonstrates the limitations to community 
building, based on states’ symbolic ritual of meeting with civil society to consolidate their 
legitimacy, while being under no obligation to provide feedback to civil society’s proposals, 
or to transform these proposals into policies. The case studies on civil society and Thailand’s 
bilateral relations demonstrate the limited progress in ASEAN community building, based on 
the following factors. Domestic political interests in maintaining differentiation continue to 
override the regional interest in reversing it. The region’s political diversity continues to 
restrict the institutionalisation of a regional role for civil society, as well as the translation of 
regional aims into domestic policies. This is especially the case for human rights and non-
traditional security. Thus, ASEAN community building is largely rhetorical and empty in 
substance. 
The remainder of this concluding chapter is divided into three sections. Section I 
provides an elaboration on what the case studies on bilateral relations tell us about ASEAN’s 
progress in regional community, and the main limitations on this front. Section II does the 
same for the case studies on civil society. Finally, section III relates these findings to the 
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bigger picture of regionalism, and regional community building, and suggests areas for 
further research.  
I. Implications of Thailand’s Bilateral Relations on Regional Community Building 
 Thailand’s bilateral relations demonstrate how the reversal of differentiation is driven 
by shared political and security interests, as well as the unilateral pursuit of economic 
interests, especially under Chatichai Choonhavan’s government (1988-1991). The end of the 
conflicts in Indochina enabled Chatichai to be opportunistic and to initiate the policy of 
turning Indochina’s “battlefields into marketplaces.”731 Chatichai was driven by economic 
interests to reverse differentiation of neighbouring Indochinese countries, as well as 
Myanmar, and to promote bilateral economic cooperation. At the time, Thailand’s natural 
resources were rapidly decreasing and insufficient for domestic consumption and industry.732 
As such, the search for supplementary raw materials from other countries became necessary, 
and Myanmar appeared to satisfy this need. Moreover, bilateral economic cooperation with 
Myanmar and the former countries of Indochina was also intended to satisfy the domestic 
demands for trade. Following Chatichai’s premiership, the next Thai leader to pursue an 
economics-driven foreign policy and to reverse differentiation was Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra (2001-2006), who sought to demonstrate regional leadership in economic 
development and community building by initiating multilateral economic frameworks. These 
frameworks include the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) and the Ayeyawady Chai Phraya 
Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS): all of which promoted assimilation 
through a common regional identity. Moreover, Thaksin’s aim to consolidate regime security, 
and to demonstrate regional leadership in community building, also involved the initiation of 
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bilateral friendship associations. Thaksin was motivated to initiate such associations, and to 
promote closer bilateral relationships, due to the following security concerns: geographical 
proximity, border security, cross-border migration and cross-border trade.733 In the case of 
Thai-Cambodian relations, a Thai-Cambodia Joint Commission for the Promotion of Cultural 
Cooperation (later renamed the Thailand-Cambodia Cultural Association) was established in 
2004, with the specific purpose of reversing differentiation for national security, after the 
anti-Thai riots in Cambodia the previous year. In this regard, bilateral friendship associations 
and cultural associations serve the same purpose. In addition to these associations, recent 
Thai leaders, such as Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2011), also sought to consolidate national 
security and to demonstrate Thailand’s community spirit by proposing the re-write of history 
textbooks, and websites to promote regional awareness. However, all of these initiatives are 
vulnerable to a lack of political support, a lack of coordination between the actors involved, a 
lack of public outreach, as well as a lack of funding. In this regard, the Thai government’s 
efforts to reverse differentiation among society have generally been weak. These efforts have 
had a marginal impact, in terms of improving bilateral relations, and, as such, have not played 
a significant role in advancing regional community building.   
 Nevertheless, the failure of state policies to significantly reverse differentiation at the 
society level has motivated non-state actors to play a proactive role in regional community 
building. This role is motivated by their awareness of the negative impact of bilateral 
conflicts on national security, especially the security and socio-economic welfare of border 
communities.734 The increasing role of non-state actors is also motivated by their aim to 
improve the region’s socio-economic welfare through the maintenance of a peaceful, stable 
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regional environment, which the process of regional community building is expected to 
consolidate.735 Non-state actors who have taken an interesting in promoting the reversal of 
differentiation for national and regional interests include academia and civil society 
organizations (CSOs). Academia attempt to reverse differentiation by raising awareness on 
similarities between neighbouring countries, while CSOs mobilize the wider society to call 
for peaceful regional relations. Thus, progress in ASEAN community building is no longer 
only driven by shared political, security, and economic interests between regional states, but 
also by proactive non-state actors. 
With regard to limitations to regional community building, Thailand’s bilateral 
relations also demonstrate many restrictive factors. These include a deeply embedded 
historical legacy of differentiation, which is maintained through the school curriculum in 
Thailand, Myanmar and Cambodia. Differentiation is also maintained through bilateral 
problems (such as drug-trafficking), territorial disputes, and the presence of military troops in 
Thailand’s border area with Myanmar and Cambodia. In addition, Thai-Cambodian relations 
demonstrate how community building is restricted by the internationalisation of bilateral 
territorial disputes, which means that differentiation is not only pursued for domestic political 
interests, but also for international relations. Thailand’s bilateral relations demonstrate the 
pursuit of differentiation for domestic political interests, as follows. Thai governments which 
have been led by the Democrat Party sought to strengthen their legitimacy and their status 
within an international community of democratic and democratising countries, by 
differentiating the Burmese government as an authoritarian regime that abuses human rights, 
and promoting political reforms in Myanmar. Burmese and Cambodian governments sought 
to consolidate their political regime by maintaining differentiation of Thailand as an external 
security threat, based on Thailand’s apparent hegemonic aspirations. Moreover, the 
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Cambodian government’s differentiation of Thailand as a security threat is also based on 
Thailand’s increasing cultural and economic presence in Cambodia, which is perceived as a 
threat to Cambodia’s national identity, as well as the Thai-Cambodian territorial dispute over 
the area surrounding Preah Vihear temple. In the context of Thai-Malaysian relations, Thai 
governments have pursued differentiation in order to protect regime security, by implying 
that the conflict in southern Thailand is not so much a result of domestic policies, but rather a 
result of Malaysia’s interference. In contrast, Malaysian governments have been more 
inclined to promote the reversal of differentiation and bilateral cooperation, in the pursuit of 
their security and political interests. This is due to the security-based incentive to prevent 
spill-over of Thailand’s southern conflict into Malaysia, by emphasizing the fact that 
Malaysia does not provide a training ground and refuge for southern Muslim separatists. 
Moreover, Malaysian governments have also sought to consolidate their political regime and 
status in the international community, by promoting a good image of Malaysia as a friendly, 
cooperative neighbour. Thus, Thailand’s bilateral relations restrict ASEAN community 
building due to the pursuit of differentiation – be it mutual or one-sided – for domestic 
political interests, as well as the continuation of border insecurity. 
One acknowledges the shortcomings of these case studies in mainly relying on 
secondary literature, rather than elite interviews, or surveys among social groups, for 
example, university students, to assess the current degree of differentiation and assimilation 
among policy-makers and society, respectively. In such interviews and surveys, 
differentiation would be indicated by identification of the other as an external security threat, 
while progress towards assimilation would be indicated by, for example, positive 
identification of the other – be it as an economic partner, and/or fellow member of ASEAN, 
which shares the aim of realizing an ASEAN Community. Such surveys among different 
social groups within ASEAN constitute an area for further research.  
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II. Civil Society Participation and Regional Community Building 
The case studies on civil society demonstrate how “new regionalism” (the widening 
of regionalism to non-state actors, the expansion of regional cooperation into new areas, such 
as non-traditional security, and multi-level linkage between regional declarations and 
domestic policies) is mainly driven by democratizing ASEAN member states, for the 
following reasons. Democratizing ASEAN member states, namely – Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand – were already engaging with development-oriented CSOs at the 
national level, and sought to consolidate their status as a democratic country in the 
international community, by also promoting state-CSO meetings at the regional level. For this 
reason, the Malaysian government initiated an ASEAN Civil Society Conference in 2005, 
which involves a meeting between state leaders and CSO representatives, and demonstrates 
the aim of ASEAN member states to consolidate their legitimacy, and to strengthen the 
credibility of their declarations to realize a region of democratic states and people-oriented 
regional community building. With regard to the expansion of regional cooperation into new 
areas, such as human rights, this process has also been driven by the aforementioned 
democratizing ASEAN member states, since they had already supported the creation of 
national human rights commissions, and were thus prepared to support human rights at the 
regional level. Moreover, these national human rights commissions, together with academia 
and CSOs, have also been active in promoting the expansion of regional cooperation to 
human rights. They have constantly met with state actors to negotiate the form and nature of 
a regional human rights body. This regional human rights body gradually emerged as an 
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), which, despite its 
limitations (see below), at the very least institutionalized ASEAN member states’ recognition 
of human rights norms. Finally, the last case study on civil society demonstrated how 
progress in ASEAN community building is facilitated by transnational civil society networks 
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(TCSN), which raise awareness on an ASEAN Community, especially among the rural 
communities, and include these communities as part of a larger regional network, in order to 
give them more visibility vis-à-vis governments, and the opportunity to voice their 
preferences on regional policies. Thus, ASEAN community building has made visible 
progress, in terms of ASEAN-CSO interactions, the emergence of a regional human rights 
body, and a transnational civil society network (TCSN), which is increasing regional 
awareness and increasing society’s participation in ASEAN affairs; however, it has made 
limited substantive progress, due to the region’s political diversity and prioritization of 
regional unity, which has resulted in a lack of feedback and outcomes from ASEAN-CSO 
meetings, a regional human rights body that lacks power, and a lack of institutionalized and 
enforceable regional norms on non-traditional security issues.  
As such, the main limitations to ASEAN community building, which have been 
demonstrated by the case studies on civil society, are as follows. ASEAN community 
building is restricted by the less democratic ASEAN member states, namely, the countries of 
former Indochina and Myanmar, which prefer closed participatory regionalism, in contrast to 
CSOs’ preference for open participatory regionalism. Closed participatory regionalism is 
characterized by i) selected public participation that is limited to specific social groups, for 
example, students, and pro-government CSOs; ii) availability of information on fait accompli, 
or official documents which have already been agreed on by state actors; and iii) the 
presentation of the results of a public debate on regionalism to state actors, whereby these 
results are not given feedback or acted upon. In contrast, open participatory regionalism 
features i) open public participation, whereby anyone can participate; ii) availability of draft 
policies for feedback and voting; iii) the presentation of the results of a public debate on 
regionalism to state actors, whereby these results are given feedback and there is a negotiated 
outcome between state actors and CSOs. These different preferences between ASEAN 
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member states, as a whole, and CSOs, also demonstrate the restrictions on ASEAN 
community building, on the part of less democratized and authoritarian ASEAN member 
states, which seek to maintain purely state-centred regionalism for regime security. With 
regard to the expansion of regional cooperation to new areas, such as human rights, ASEAN 
community building is similarly restricted by the prioritization of regime security, to the 
expense of an effective, and functioning regional human rights body. This prioritization of 
regime security meant that the regional human rights body, the ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), had no power to penalize ASEAN member states 
for repressive political practices, or human rights abuses. Moreover, the AICHR also 
maintains ASEAN member states’ defensive mechanisms against external interference and 
their exclusive role in agenda-setting. As such, ASEAN community building lacks “teeth” in 
new areas of regional cooperation, especially in human rights, which similarly lacks an 
element of participatory regionalism. Finally, ASEAN community building is limited by the 
fact that ASEAN member states remain averse to creating multi-level policy linkage, where 
there is a common, regional standard, and provisions for regional monitoring. The reason for 
this is the prioritization of the ASEAN principle of non-interference, which means enabling 
each country to proceed at its own pace, in accordance to its own level of political 
development. Thus, the main limitations to community building, as demonstrated by the case 
studies on civil society, are the region’s political diversity, namely, the political struggle and 
constant negotiating of compromises between the more democratic, and less democratic 
ASEAN member states, as well as the prioritization of regional unity over a people-centred 
ASEAN Community.  
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III. An Evaluation of ASEAN’s Progress in Regional Community Building and 
Areas for Further Research 
 
ASEAN community building is limited by the persistence of “old regionalism,” as 
indicated by politically motivated differentiation and border insecurity, as well as non-
substantial “new regionalism,” as indicated by symbolic meetings between states and CSOs, a 
powerless regional human rights body, and the remaining gap between regional declarations 
and policy implementation. These conclusions are derived from a sample of intra-regional 
relations, based on Thailand’s bilateral relationships, and selected case studies on 
participatory regionalism, regionalism and human rights, and transnational civil society 
networks (TCSN). As such, the thesis only constitutes a small part of the potential field of 
research on regionalism in general, and ASEAN’s progress in regional community building 
in particular. Further areas for research include the linkages between the domestic and foreign 
policies of all ASEAN member states, the impact of new ASEAN institutions, other than the 
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), and the role of the 
media in promoting regional solidarity.  
Studies on ASEAN community building would benefit from further research on how 
ASEAN member states’ domestic politics, level of economic development, and international 
role, affect their ASEAN policy. Indonesia particularly constitutes an interesting case study 
for such research, due to the following reasons. Under Indonesia’s chairmanship of ASEAN 
in 2011, the Indonesian leadership highlighted the implications, and prospects, for an 
“ASEAN Community in a global community of nations.” The President of Indonesia, Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono, noted how ASEAN has to strengthen itself, in order to respond to both 
traditional and non-traditional security threats at all levels. As stated by Yudhoyono: 
The world is faced with great changes…(and) new threat of economic crisis. Continuous 
uncertainties are haunting the global economy, besides financial fluctuation, like food 
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security, water security, the issue of energy, climate change…Amidst such great changes, 
there are also great hopes placed on our region…ASEAN must be part of the solution to 
global challenges, to facilitate and engage in the resolution.736 
 
Indonesia is one of the ASEAN member states which plays a significant role on the 
international stage due to its large population, its traditional leadership role in ASEAN, and 
its membership of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), as well as the G20. This 
is partly why the Indonesian leadership has emphasized regional consolidation within the 
wider global context in addition to other reasons for projecting a broad world view, such as 
the urgency of preparing for a potential global economic recession. Indonesia’s chairmanship 
demonstrates the importance of state leaders in promoting an ASEAN Community, as well as 
the importance of stable domestic politics to underpin a strong and credible foreign policy. 
Analyses on the linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy for all ASEAN member 
states would provide a comprehensive and detailed picture of how democratic, and 
authoritarian, states promote, or restrict, progress in regional community building.  
 Research on ASEAN community building would also benefit from analyses of the 
impact of new ASEAN institutions, such as the ASEAN Institute for Peace and 
Reconciliation (AIPR). ASEAN member states agreed to set up this institute in November 
2011, with the intention that this institute would review ASEAN cooperation, and contribute 
to peace and reconciliation in the region.737 At the time of writing, the modalities of this 
institute have not yet been determined. However, the institute will likely provide another 
platform for dialogue between ASEAN member states, and possibly offer ASEAN mediation 
for intra-regional conflicts, as well as promote policy relevant research in the areas of peace 
and conflict studies. In this regard, the emergence of new ASEAN institutions indicates an 
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expanded space for the process of socialization, especially for the reversal of differentiation, 
the promotion of assimilation, as well as the promotion of dialogue and cooperation between 
countries that treat bilateral conflicts as a zero-sum game. While it is possible that the 
ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation may not be able to promote interactions 
between countries that are locked in a bilateral conflict, the institute should at least play a 
significant role in bringing other actors in the region – namely academia and civil society - 
together to brainstorm activities among the region’s societies, in order to promote bottom-up 
peace and reconciliation. Thus, there are many possible angles in which to study the impact 
of new ASEAN institutions on community building, ranging from socialization between 
states, to networking and coordination among non-state actors for collective action. 
 In addition to academia and civil society, journalists are also non-state actors which 
have the potential to play a significant role in regional community building, and can be part 
of a broader study on the media and regionalism. Journalists in Southeast Asia who write 
about ASEAN affairs, such as Kavi Chongkittavorn, have argued that the media is a vital 
player in the process of ASEAN community building.738 Chongkittavorn notes the 
establishment of the ASEAN Committee on Culture and Information (COCI) in 1978, and the 
Confederation of ASEAN Journalists (CAJ) in 1979, which have done little to promote 
cooperation and solidarity among journalists in Southeast Asia. He draws on the experience 
of the European Union (EU), to demonstrate how the media has the potential to serve as an 
active conduit for promoting regional identity and integration, as well as a sense of sharing 
common values, norms and standards. However, studies on the EU demonstrate that shared 
knowledge via social networks and the media can also undermine regional community 
building, if the shared knowledge reinforces negative views of regional institutions as 
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irrelevant to people’s lives at the national level.739 Such studies could be carried out within 
ASEAN to identify the negative and positive impact of social networks and the media on 
society’s perceptions of the ASEAN Community. These studies would be beneficial in 
explaining society’s support, or the lack thereof, for the ASEAN Community, and contribute 
to the existing discourse on the pro and anti-ASEAN community building process.  
 ASEAN has its problems of intra-regional conflicts and the lack of a social dimension 
to regional community building; however, it has, at the very least, made incremental steps to 
manage these conflicts, and to provide for state-CSO meetings. ASEAN member states have 
a tendency to perceive a conflict of interests between regime security and the reversal of 
differentiation, due to historical legacy and nationalist sentiment. Moreover, they also have a 
tendency to perceive a conflict of interests between regime security and regional institutions 
on human rights and non-traditional security issues, due to concerns over national 
sovereignty and an aversion to any form of external interference. In this regard, ASEAN 
community building requires a change of mind-set on the part of both state actors and 
society: a change from nationalist differentiation to regional assimilation; as well as a change 
from a lack of trust and confidence in regional institutions, towards support for these 
institutions, and a perceived need to strengthen them for regime legitimacy and political 
support from society.  
  
                                                          
739
 Hajdeja Iglic, “The relational basis of attachment to Europe,” in William A. Maloney and Jan W. van Deth, 
eds., Contextualizing engagement and political orientations (London: Routledge, 2007), 193. 
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